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Intent of the paper . The main purpose of this paper has been to
instruct the author. The theme chosen was largely arbitrary, merely
as a focus around which I could concentrate while delving into the
primary materials dealing with the foreign policy and foreign re-
lations of the People's Republic of China (PRC), in order to acquaint
myself with the kinds of material available and their content, organ-
ization, and peculiarities. Secondly, by comparing these materials
with non-Communist and therefore more objective (or at least less
ideological) sources covering the same events, I sought to gain ex-
perience in the analysis and interpretation of Communist sources,
as well as insights into the way the Chinese view the world beyond
their borders.
Though arbitrarily chosen, the subject is nonetheless of
considerable intrinsic interest, both intellectually and operationally .
Northeast Asia is an area in which the United States has interested
itself (whether justifiably or not is immaterial to the purposes of
this paper) for over a century. This was at first an almost purely
commercial interest, but by the second third of the twentieth century
it had come to be what was conceived of as a primarily security
interest. As a Pacific power we have engaged in two major wars
in the area. Today we maintain large contingents of ground and air
forces on the Asian continent as well as on the peripheral islands,
and in the waters of the western Pacific we maintain the greatest

fleet in the history of naval operations, the United States Seventh
Fleet.
Military involvement has been both cause and result of
political involvement in one of the most complex international
situations to be found in the world today. Northeast Asia is the
center of a four -way power involvement among the three greatest
industrial powers of the modern world and the most populous state
in the world. It is the scene of direct confrontation between the
major socialist and capitalist states, and between the two main
rivals for influence among socialist states. What happens in this
corner of the world can have the most serious effects imaginable
upon the entire course of world history during the next half century,
not excluding the possibility of bringing that history to an abrupt
close.
With four powers involved there are six bilateral relation-
ships, each of which affects and is affected by the others. The un-
ravelling of all these relationships is a most difficult task. One
cannot understand the situation completely without first understanding
each of the six relationships independently. Yet one cannot under-
stand any one relationship without some reference to the other five.
I recognize this dilemma, but for the purposes of this study I have
had to ignore it. I have chosen to elucidate just one of these six
relationships, that between Japan and the PRC. The impingement
of the other powers on this relationship will be discussed only where
it can be shown to have had a direct effect, where Sino- Japanese
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relations cannot be understood without bringing in the acts of a
third or fourth power. I will keep such expansion of my subject to
a minimum.
I have restricted still further the scope of this paper to con-
centrate primarily on the Chinese side of the relationship. Consid-
eration of the Japanese side will be limited to those matters which
are direcly relevant to explaining Chinese behavior. Of course I
can be much less rigorous about excluding this half of my theme
than about excluding Soviet or American matters. Much of Chinese
behavior consists of reactions to Japanese actions; still more of
Chinese policy is determined by the PRC's view of what is happening
in Japan and what they want to happen there. Purely Japanese
matters are unavoidable in a study of this type, but time and space
limitations require that the Japanese side be treated only in the
most summary fashion.
I intended originally that this paper be primarily analytical,
but I found that a historical description of the events did not exist.
As a result I have had to write the history myself and the first half
of the paper, therefore, will be a detailed narrative. Only in the
second half will there be an attempt to analyze these events and
seek answers to the more important questions about Sino- Japanese
relations.
I have chosen the decade of the nineteen sixties as the time
frame for three reasons: First, the fifties have been covered well
by secondary sources and I can add little to what has been done

already. Second, this paper is in the nature of a sequel to a paper
written by John F. Knowles at the Fletcher School covering the
period from 1949 to 1962. Third, the decade as a whole has an
integral character: it opened with the revision of the US- Japan
Security Treaty and is closing with what seems to be another basic
decision on that treaty, its indefinite continuation. The decade has
seen the birth (if not the conception) and development of the apo-
calyptic split between Soviet and Chinese Communism. As we shall
see later, the sixties have also seen what is probably one complete
major cycle in Sino- Japanese relations. Finally the decade has been
a kind of entr'acte between the events of the post-war world and what
will probably be a whole new act in the drama of world politics.
A word is necessary as to why I have chosen I960 as a
starting point, in view of Knowles cut-off date of 1962. Unknown to
him at the time he wrote his paper, the end of 1962 was to witness
an event which would represent the culmination of the events of the
preceding two years in Sino- Japanese relations. I960 and 1961
cannot be properly understood without the hindsight possible from
the signing in November 1962 of the Liao-Takasaki Memorandum
Trade Agreement. Consequently the history of those two years must
be retold here.
One final word on the organization and content of the paper.
In order to make it stand on its own, I am including a brief resume
John F. Knowles, Communist China's Policy Toward Japan: 1949-
1962
,
unpublished MALD thesis, The Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy, Tufts University, June 1962.
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of the background to the period. I hope by this not only to make the
body of the paper more intelligible to readers who may not be ac-
quainted with that background, but also to highlight what I think are
the continuities in Chinese policy which a restriction of the paper to
the sixties alone would conceal. Where there have been significant
changes, they too will stand out all the more clearly by being con-
trasted with what has gone before. An example of the changes is
the divergence between Chinese and Soviet policies toward Japan.
An example of the continuities is the consistent view of the Chinese
concerning the US-Japan Security Treaty.
Comment on sources. In sheer volume the Survey of the China
Mainland Press (SCMP) has been by far the most important primary
source which I have consulted. It has also been predominant in the
matter of relevant substance. Other Chinese documents have been
less useful. Peking Review and the several translations series on
Communist China by the Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS),
including Translations from Hung Chi and the Communist China Digest
,
have contained little on Sino- Japanese relations, and that little has
been duplicated almost entirely in the SCMP . The Summary of China
Mainland Magazines and Current Background also contained very
little useful material. Radio broadcast materials compiled by the
Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) were also largely
duplicative, as far as PRC sources are concerned, of the SCMP .
FBIS Reports
,
however, have been extremely useful for their trans-
lations from the Japanese press, and have in fact been a major source

of factual information on the events of the decade. It will be noted
that these are all English language sources. The author does not
have any competence in the languages of the area.
Other primary sources have been the chronology sections
of several periodicals, particularly the China Quarterly , Japan
Quarterly, and the Japan Annual of International Affairs . The
Asian Recorder and The New York Times have been thoroughly
searched, although with surprisingly little result as far as factual
detail is concerned. Journalists today seem to have a penchant for
speculation rather than for reportage. Finally, some material
from the Christian Science Monitor and the Neue Zurcher Zeitung
has been found to be useful. This material was found in the form
of clippings in the files of the Center for International Studies at
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), and not by a personal
search through the newspapers themselves.
As far as secondary sources are concerned, the selection
available is of very mixed quality. No book covers the subject as
a whole and only a few deal with it at all except in the most summary
fashion or else with regard to extremely narrow and specialized
concerns. There is also a dearth of factual reportage in the scholarly
journals, as well as a conspicuous lack of analyses of current events
and an emphasis on speculation and prediction. Finally, most
analytical or descriptive articles I did find were strong on Japanese
policy toward China but weak on Chinese policy toward Japan.

The annotated bibliography at the end of the paper contains
detailed comments on specific articles. It is not, of course, any-
thing like exhaustive, but what I have left out of the bibliography is
either only marginally relevant to the specific subject of the paper,
or else so general and speculative as to be of little use to someone




Chinese foreign policy goals . Every discussion of Chinese
foreign policy and foreign relations seems to begin with a statement
of China's foreign policy goals. There are two main reasons for
this. First, Americans have been ambivalent in their attitude
toward China for over a century, and particularly since the last war.
Having found ourselves at odds with the PRC in 1949, we have sought
to understand and perhaps explain the hostility between us by assert-
ing their aggressive intentions. Yet we have by no means convinced
ourselves that they are in fact intent upon foreign adventures, and
as a result every American who writes about China is constantly
looking for evidence one way or the other. Preoccupation with goals
is thus a function of our own uncertainty. It is also, of course, a
function of what appears to be the great discrepancy between the
bellicosity of China's statements and the prudence of its actions.
We don't know quite what to believe.
The second reason for this preoccupation is that a general
discussion of goals always sets the framework within which the
student will discuss Chinese foreign policy. By setting down what
he believes those goals to be, he is making a tacit statement of his
own biases and theoretical framework, either intentionally or un-
consciously giving the reader notice to help him evaluate what he
finds in the work. The goals he chooses and the way he organizes
and discusses them will reveal much about the author: whether he

is a political scientist or a historian; a Pekingologist or an Old
China Hand; a believer in realpolitik or a subtle practitioner of
explication de texte . With this warning, I will leave my own biases
implicit in what comes next, rather than attempt to make them
explicit.
I believe China's fundamental goals are largely self-evident.
Defensively it aims at preserving its own security, in the sense of
defending the state, its territory, and its governing regime from
potential or actual foreign or domestic enemies. Offensively it
aims at achieving a great power status commensurate with its
national pride in its history and its great size and population. The
place of Japan in this scheme is varied and multifaceted. First, as
a great power in its own right, Japan is both a past invader and
conqueror and a potential future one. Whether on its own, as a base
for US power, or in cooperation with US power, Japan is a very real
danger to Chinese security. Japan is also a potential rival for the
kind of hegemony which China seeks in Asia. Whatever influence
Japan is able to wield in the nations on China's periphery, China
itself cannot wield. To the extent that these other Asian nations are
friends, allies, or clients of Japan, thus acting as sources of Japan's
power and prestige, they automatically are not available as sources
of Chinese power and prestige.
Conversely, Japan is itself a source of great potential for
the accomplishment China's offensive goals. Japan has much of the
modern technology which China lacks and wants very badly. It would
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be of immense benefit to China if Japan were to assist it, rather
than compete with it. As far as status and prestige are concerned,
having a great power as a client would immeasurably enhance
China's own standing. It would be a great jump from a precarious
equality to clear predominance.
Putting these considerations into concrete terms, it is
reasonable to view China's maximum goals as something like the
establishment in Japan of a government which would subordinate
its own foreign and domestic policies to China's, which would look
to China for guidance on its attitude toward the rest of the world
and the policies it should follow within its own borders, which would
most definitely not compete with China in any way but on the contrary
cooperate with and assist China in every way and on China's terms.
This does not necessarily mean that China wishes to conquer Japan,
incorporate it within its own boundaries, or directly govern it. It
does mean that China would like to have the advantages that such
courses would offer, but is not anxious to face the problems that
such courses would entail.
With the above as its maximum goals, what would its
minimum goals be? If one puts cooperativeness and subservience
on a scale with plus and minus signs, China's minimum goal must
be seen to be a neutral or zero position for Japan, for as long as
it cannot obtain a positive position. Thus China wants as a minimum
a Japanese government which would not compete with China, which
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would not ally itself with any other states against China, which
would permit Chinese relations and dealings at least on a par with
all other nations, and which if not cooperating with China vis-a-vis
the rest of the world would at least not oppose it. First and fore-
most, it would wish an end of the US-Japanese alliance and an end
to Japanese recognition of the government of the Republic of China
(ROC).
As good Leninists, the Chinese operate with both a maximum
and a minimum program constantly in mind. It is this which lends
such great continuity to its basic policies. Its tactics and individual
actions are designed to achieve the minimum program at any one
time, without prejudicing the maximum program, and if possible
making progress toward it. It is most important when discussing
Chinese foreign policy to keep both maximum and minimum programs
in mind; it makes what might otherwise seem irrational quite under-
standable,
The reader will note little reference to Communism or
Maoism in the above discussion of goals. I believe China is guided
primarily by raison d'etat in its foreign policy. Marxist-Leninist-
Maoist ideology enters in mainly as a complicating and qualifying
factor. Ideology prescribes what kind of a Japanese government
would be considered friendly. Ideology sets the framework and
provides the competing models for the guidance of the rest of Asia.
It gives a special fillip to China's dealings with various groups in
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Japanese society. It has a complicating effect in terms of economic
and trade relations. Finally, ideology provides the language in
which Chinese policy is expressed. Ideology gives color to the
ends, and often prescribes the means; it does not substitute for
national interest as a goal of Chinese foreign policy.
The nineteen fifties
.
T. Ishikawa, a Japanese political scientist
writing in 1962, was impressed by the continuity of Chinese foreign
policy during the nineteen fifties. He saw mostly evidence of con-
sistency in both goals and tactics throughout the period, although
he also saw briefer sub-periods of what he spoke of as more or less
flexibility or militancy in pursuing these goals. The militant periods
he described as 1949 to 1952 and 1958 to 1961; the flexible periods
he described as 1952 to 1957 and I960 to the (then) present.
William Hinton divides the period into two sub-periods at the year
1957, although he does not characterize either sub-period by any
2general theme or topic. M. Y. Cho, a Chinese scholar working
in Germany, has used a third scheme of subdivision in an inform-
3
ative article in AuBenpolitik . Knowles breaks up the decade into
4
three main phases and six sub-phases. All of these scholars are
E. F. Szczepanik, ed.
,
Symposium on Economic and Social
Problems of the Far East
,
Hong Kong, Hong Kong University
Press, 1962.
2
Harold C. Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, Boston,
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966, Ch. 14.
3M. Y. Cho, "Sechs Phasen in den Beziehungen Tokio-Peking",
AuBenpolitik, Vol. 16 no. 7, July 1965.
4
Knowles, p. 10 ff.
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well versed in the facts of the period, yet all chose a different
scheme of subdivision to describe the period. Obviously the divid-
ing up of time in a subject as subtle as the relations between two
powers is not a simple or self-executing task. All of the schemes
referred to have elements of truth in them, but there can be no
denying that the whole process is in some measure arbitrary.
Which scheme one chooses depends upon which aspects of foreign
relations one wishes to emphasize. It also depends upon the per-
sonal tastes of an author in defining the turning points in foreign
relations. Should one, for example, begin an era when a new policy
is first introduced, or when it has matured and is at its peak of
influence on overall policy?
Arbitrary or not, some form of subdivision is necessary,
in order that the author and reader may have manageable blocs of
data to work with. It is an essential middle ground between the
popular journalist who sees a revolution between the lines of every
routine government press release, and the Olympian historians of
Spenglerian or Toynbean stature who see consistencies and con-
tinuities over the course of centuries. I have chosen to follow
Knowles 1 scheme in this chapter only because it is convenient, it is
complete in its coverage of the subject, and it does not mislead the
reader. It is also a scheme which shows most clearly the tie between
domestic and foreign policy formation in China. Finally I intend to




As mentioned above, Knowles sees three main phases in
5
Sino- Japanese relations during the fifties: hard from 1949 to 1954,
soft from 1954 to 1957, and hard again from 1957 to the time of his
study (1962). The first phase is further divided into the period of
the Occupation and the period of adjusting to a newly independent
Japan in alliance with the United States. The third phase is sub-
divided into three sub-periods: a transition from mid- 1957 to mid-
1958, a deep freeze from mid- 1958 to mid- I960, and a transition
back to more flexibility from I960 on.
During the Occupation, China's policy closely followed
that of the Soviet Union. It was aimed at minimizing US influence
in Japan, defending against a recrudescence of Japanese military
power, and participating in the peace settlement. It sought to pre-
vent an alliance with the United States from superceding the Occupation
relationship between the two major non-communist powers of Asia
and the Pacific. China approved, as far as we can tell, of the
COMINFORM resolution of January 1950 directing the Japanese
Communist Party (JCP) to reverse its moderate course and to go
on the offensive. The anti- Japanese clause of the Sino-Soviet Treaty
of 25 February 1950 was an indication of a security and defense con-
centration. Another sign of the hardness of the Chinese line during




this phase were the repeated mentions of the possibility of extensive
war claims. These showed a marked increase during the Korean
War when China, along with the Soviet Union, sought to minimize
the utility of Japan as a base for United States prosecution of that
war. With respect to the question of diplomatic relations between
the two countries, a question constantly in the minds of politicians
on both sides throughout the period, the Chinese position is clearly
stated in the Common Program of the People's Consultative Con-
ference: the PRC "was prepared to negotiate and establish diplo-
matic relations.
. . .with any foreign government that will sever
relations with the Nationalist reactionaries and assume a friendly
attitude toward the People's Republic of China. " We will find echoes
of this policy in the three political principles enunciated later in the
decade.
This first half of the first phase ended with the signing of
the peace treaty and the United States-Japan Mutual Security Treaty,
both of which went into effect on 28 April 1952. These two treaties
signalled the end of the Occupation and also a total failure of Sino-
Soviet policy towards Japan during the first sub-phase. They had failed
to drive a wedge between Japan and the United States. They had failed
to foment a communist controlled revolution. They had failed to play
any role at all, let alone a favorable one, in the process of defining
the peace settlement. (Not that this failure is evidence of any errors
Quoted in Szczepanik, p. 311.
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or mistakes on the part of the Chinese or Soviets; the U.S. simply
held all the cards). They now had to redefine their relationship to
the newly independent state. They began this process by denying
the validity of both treaties, and by characterizing the U.S.
-Japan
alliance as merely a concealed continuation of the Occupation.
The second half of the first phase was still one in which
China by and large followed the Soviet lead. The Korean War was
still on during this period and efforts to hamper the U.S. war effort
continued. But the means used toward this end changed. China be-
gan to experiment with "people's diplomacy", that is trying to
establish contact with discrete groups within Japanese society
which would, for various reasons, put pressure on the Japanese
government to lean more towards the PRC and away from the U.S.
Unofficial contacts were tried with receptive groups in Japan, al-
though the Yoshida government's restrictions on travel visas to
China made this relatively unproductive. Japanese prisoners-of-
war were released in batches. The releases were timed to show
Chinese appreciation for "friendly" acts; cessation of the releases
was timed to show anger at "unfriendly" acts, especially acts which
could be attributed personally to Yoshida. In an effort to forestall
Japanese accession to the CHTNCOM agreement on trade restrictions
with China proposed by the United States, the Chinese signed their
first informal, unofficial, short term trade agreement with private
Japanese traders on 1 June 1952. Japan welcomed the trade, but the
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government acceded to the CHINCOM agreement anyway that August.
A second trade agreement, slightly expanded, was signed in late
1953. While these economic and propaganda offensives were being
tested, China maintained an officially hard position: she would not
deal with Japan at all unless Japan first renounced both the US and
ROC treaties. Another evidence of the softness growing underneath
the official hard line was China's statement in the fall of 1953 that
she would have no objection to Japan maintaining a limited self-
defense force.
Knowles sees this phase as a hard one on China's part. I
think it clear, though, that it was really in the nature of a transition
to the softer phase to follow, a transition in which the Chinese were
experimenting with various tactics and techniques, seeking a formula
which would enable them to exert the maximum pressure on the
Japanese government. Until such a formula was found, their formal
stance remained cold and correct and gave away nothing of conse-
7quence. Murthy actually sees 1952, while the Korean War was still
going on, as the beginning of a soft "people's diplomacy" phase in
Sino- Japanese relations.
Knowles' second phase runs from October 1954 to July 1957.
It is characterized by a continued adherence on China's part to the
line established by the Soviets, but with increasing reluctance, in-
7 P. A. Narasimha Murthy, "Japan's Changing Relations with
People's China and the Soviet Union", International Studies
(New Delhi), Vol. 7 No. 1, July 1965.
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creasingly only in pro forma public statements, and with increasing
divergence from the Soviet line in matters of substance. On 12
October 1954 a joint Sino-Soviet statement was issued in Peking
announcing the partners' readiness to discuss normalization of
relations with Japan. It was not specific as to any concessions
that would be demanded in return for such normalization, but the
tone indicated that the Soviets were more prepared to compromise
than were the Chinese. The PRC was most unhappy over the Soviets'
pursuance of this policy without insisting on progress in Sino-Japan-
ese relations as a prerequisite for improvements in Russo-Japanese
relations. In 1956 the Soviet Union and Japan established diplomatic
relations and the Soviet Union withdrew its veto on Japanese ad-
mission to the United Nations. In 1956 and 1957 the two countries
signed official governmental trade agreements.
The Chinese moves toward a normalization of relations
were slower. They were not willing to make concessions them-
selves or to reduce very much the concessions they were demand-
ing of the Japanese. Chou En-lai did tease a Japanese mission in
October 1954 with the possibility of a non-aggression pact between
the two countries, but was careful to make no substantive promises.
There were actually four tenders of negotiations during this period.
On 17 August 1956, in a letter from the Chinese Consul General in
Geneva to his Japanese counterpart, the PRC announced its willing-
ness to receive an official delegation in Peking to discuss trade
matters. On 4 November, via the same channel, China offered to
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discuss the establishment of diplomatic relations. Chou himself on
30 January 1956 published a statement that the PRC was ready to
discuss diplomatic relations, and on 1 1 February a communique
from the PRC Foreign Ministry was issued to the same effect. In
none of these, however, was any softening of China's conditions for
such relations proposed or offered. They were merely offers to talk.
This half-hearted, noncommittal diplomatic maneuvering was
paralleled by a rapid acceleration of people's diplomacy after the
Yoshida cabinet was replaced by the Hatoyama cabinet in December
1954, and the new cabinet relaxed the travel restrictions to the PRC.
China used this opportunity to expand its ties to more and more groups
of Japanese, in the hope of putting more pressure on the Japanese
government to make concessions. The first Chinese mission to Japan
since the Communists had come to power visited Japan in October
1954. People-to-people contacts were supplemented by the first
fisheries agreement between the two countries on 15 April 1955, by
a third trade agreement on 4 May 1955, which was twice extended on
18 May and 15 October 1956. In June 1956 the bulk of the remaining
POW's were released and several war criminals still held in China
were repatriated.
The last major development of this period worth noting was
the switch from private contacts with pro-Chinese elements of the
Japan Socialist Party (JSP), presumably members of the radical
Heiwa Doshikai faction, to public support in the press and on the
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radio for JSP positions in both foreign and domestic matters. This
process culminated on 22 April 1957 when Secretary General Asanuma
Inejiro of the JSP made the first official party visit to Peking. At
this meeting the PRC made some noncommittal remarks about the
possibility of a collective security pact for the Pacific area, and
also made its first real diplomatic concession; it offered in effect
to cancel the anti- Japanese clause of the Sino-Soviet Treaty if Japan
would first abrogate the US Mutual Security Treaty. The Chinese
attitude towards Japan at the time of this visit was a high point for
this moderate phase. It is significant that such a concession should
have been offered through the JSP. China was initiating a tactic,
later frequently used, of trying to ensure that any favorable steps
or agreements would be reached with groups who could then capitalize
on their relations with China in Japanese election campaigns. (The
analogy between this tactic and that of North Vietnam in releasing
US prisoners-of-war through US "peace groups" is striking. )
The beginning of the third phase of Sino- Japanese relations
in the fifties is put by Knowles in July 1957, coincident with the first
major propaganda attack on the new Japanese Prime Minister Kishi.
A transitional sub-phase to a harder line actually overlaps the pre-
ceding moderate phase, beginning with Kishi's assumption of office
in February 1957. He was a man not known for pro-Chinese senti-
ments, and was expected to be closer to Yoshida than to Hatoyama
in his policies. Nevertheless China withheld its fire until July. In
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that month Kishi made one pro- Chinese move, ending the "China
differential" by which the anti-Communist embargo was tougher
on China than on the Soviet Union. However he accompanied this
by reaffirming his support for the U. S. alliance, by visiting Taiwan
and reaffirming his recognition of the Chiang Kai-shek government,
and by making a tour of Southeast Asia, during which he proposed
a Southeast Asia Development Bank with major Japanese financial
support. This last step represented to China a public avowal of
Japan's intention to compete with China for influence in the rest of
Asia.
China's response to Kishi was to refuse to extend or renew
the unofficial trade agreement which expired on 4 May 1957, and to
launch a full scale propaganda attack in Jen Min Jih Pao on 29 July.
That this was still a transitional phase, however, was shown by
China's permitting trade to continue without an agreement. The
next step was cancellation of scheduled trade fairs, ostensibly over
the issue of Kishi's insistence on fingerprinting all visitors to Japan.
On 10 September negotiations for a new trade agreement
were opened, but Chinese demands in return for an agreement were
increased. It was particularly insistent upon the need for establish-
ing at least semi-official trade missions in Japan which would have
the right to fly the national flag of the PRC. It should be noted that
these conditions had been posed in previous negotiations, but China
had not insisted on Japan meeting them. Rather it had accepted their
word toward meeting these conditions at some time in the future.
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In 1957 China became adamant about meeting these conditions before
an agreement was signed. The negotiations continued for seven
months, with the Japanese side seeking a formula which would
satisfy the Chinese without actually meeting the substance of their
demands. On 5 March 1958 they finally signed an agreement even
though Kishi was still maintaining reservations to the Chinese con-
ditions and the Chinese were still refusing to accept Kishi's proposed
compromise. Apparently it was hoped that some kind of compromise
could be worked out in practice which would satisfy both sides.
This proved impossible however. Taipei objected strongly
to the new agreement and Kishi appeased Chiang with promises that
no official status would be given to any trade mission from the PRC
and that no special status, including the right to fly the national flag,
would be accorded to any PRC personnel. At the same time he tried
to mollify the PRC by assuring it that its mission would be permitted
to reside in Japan. On 13 April China reacted: it refused to be re-
assured and insisted on its right to fly the flag and on the official
status of its mission. At the same time it repeated its earlier
comments about the possibility of raising the war claims and repara-
tions issues. It paralleled this hard tactic with a soft one: it released
eight more war criminals and returned the remains of some Japanese
war dead. Thus it applied pressure to Kishi and the Japanese public
in the hope of defeating Kishi at the polls. The capstone of this policy
was put in place on 2 May when China took advantage of an incident
at Nagasaki (where some rightist Japanese toughs had torn down the
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PRC flag from over the trade mission offices) to announce the can-
cellation of all trade agreements, including negotiations then under-
way for a long term agreement on the barter of coking coal for
Japanese steel. At the same time it mounted a frenzied propaganda
attack on Kishi as being personally responsible for these setbacks
in relations. The general elections were held in Japan on 22 May
1958 and Kishi's party was retained in power. China had thus failed
in its hope of getting a more cooperative government in Tokyo, yet
it was by now committed to a hard line. The Nagasaki incident and
the Chinese reaction to it signalled the end of the transition and the
beginning of the deep freeze of phase three.
The transitional phase paralleled the growth of the radical
movement in Chinese domestic policy, and the setting in of a very
hard line paralleled the announcement of the Great Leap Forward
and the Commune program. It can be viewed both domestically and
internationally as characterized mostly by impatience. As far as
Japan was concerned, the substance of China's demands were un-
changed. The difference was that in 1958 China was unwilling to
accept any further delay in meeting those demands. There were
other elements in their policy toward Japan which reflect the radical
shift: their expressed confidence in the ability of Japan's "masses"
to overthrow Kishi, and their avowed expectation that the assumed
shift in the post-Sputnik strategic situation would engender more
Japanese cooperation. It is also possible that because of the bad
harvests of 1958 China would have been hard pressed to meet export
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commitments, thus using a trade cutoff to conceal its internal dif-
ficulties. If true, this would not have been the first time that Peking
sought to make a virtue out of necessity.
The hard phase firmly established in 1958 was confirmed
by the end of all Chinese visits to Japan and reductions in the number
of Japanese visitors to China. Propaganda attacks were also in-
creased, especially when in September 1958 Kishi announced his
intention to renegotiate the U.S. treaty. Propaganda themes began
to include allusions to the danger of war, capitalizing on the extreme
pacifism then current in the Japanese public.
On 11 June 1958, China refused to renew the fisheries agree-
ment which existed between the two countries' fishery associations.
The refusal message also contained the first mention of the "three
political principles" or conditions for normalization of relations.
These principles were that Japan must cease its hostile policies,
cease advocating a two-Chinas policy, and cease obstructing the
normalization of relations. On 7 July Jen Min Jih Pao extended
these three principles to all matters at issue between China and
Japan.
Knowles, along with most other commentators, has exag-
gerated the depth of this freeze. In late summer 1958 an agreement
was reached with friendly Japanese on maintaining cultural relations.8
8Ryozu Kurai, "Present Status of Japan
-Communist China




Japanese visits did not drop off more than a small amount. An
agreement on special trade was signed with SOHYO, the Japanese
leftist trade confederation, in February 1959 designed to gain favor
from the small artisans in Japan who depended upon Chinese raw
materials for their work. During 1959 a fisheries agreement on
9emergency boat shelter was signed. On 8 June 1959 another
cultural relations agreement and a joint statement were signed
which spoke of the friendship which existed between the two
10
peoples.
At the same time, China continued its efforts at building
ties with the JSP. Asanuma made a second official visit to Peking
in March 1959. During this visit, the Chinese emphasized that the
three political principles and their acceptance by Japan were a pre-
requisite to resumption of trade relations. They insisted upon
abrogation of Japan's treaties with the U.S. and the ROC, and on
the inseparability of politics and economics (the separability of them
being the Japanese official policy at the time). They also extracted
from Asanuma his famous statement that U.S. imperialism was "the
common enemy" of China and Japan. Simultaneously with all this
the Chinese talked about a collective security pact among the four
major Pacific powers; they adopted as their own an earlier Soviet
qNew China News Agency (NCNA), English, Peking, 9 Nov. 1963.
Survey of the China Mainland Press
,
No. 3100, p. 47. (Hereafter
all Chinese and Japanese press sources cited will be assumed to
be from English language editions unless otherwise noted. )
10NCNA Peking 27 Dec. 1963, SCMP3130, p. 35.
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proposal for a nuclear free zone in the Pacific. They even repeated
a moderate phase statement that they would understand if Japan felt
it necessary to maintain a small defensive army. Their formula for
Japan, "peace, independence, and democracy" was now supplemented
with a fourth slogan, "neutrality".
Thus the hardness of this phase consisted primarily in the
severity of their propaganda attacks on the Kishi regime and the U. S.
security treaty negotiations, and withholding trade in the hope of
getting Japanese traders to oppose both Kishi and the treaty. They
also sought to appeal to the Japanese masses, especially through the
JSP, to foster opposition to the treaty. But they did not break off all
contacts or even all trade.
This phase culminated and ended with the massive propaganda
attacks during the final phase of the treaty revision discussions, and
Chinese support for the mass demonstrations which accompanied the
ratification of the new treaty by the Diet. Although the treaty was
signed and ratified, thus representing a failure of China's foreign
policy similar to the 1951 failure, China took comfort from the fact
of the radicalization of some elements of Japanese society, especially
youth and the JSP. They also gained satisfaction from the subsequent
cancellation of Eisenhower's visit and Kishi's resignation in the
summer of I960. From this point on, the end of the radical phase in
domestic policies was paralleled by a new search for better relations
with Japan, a search which will be the subject of our next chapter.
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Preliminary conclusions . From this brief review of the events
of the fifties, what preliminary conclusions can we draw? We can
list some of the major Chinese policy objectives with respect to
Japan: abrogation of the treaties between Japan and the US and the
ROC, and an end to both the US alliance and recognition of the Taipei
government. China is anxious to prevent Japan from competing in
the economic penetration of Southeast Asia and from exercising
political influence there. They want to prevent any close ties between
the Soviet Union and Japan in which China does not participate; they
want the Soviet Union to consider Chinese interests in its dealings
with Japan and to refrain from concessions to Japan while Japan is
withholding concessions from China.
As far as Japan itself is concerned, China desires that Japan
not remilitarize, although it is apparently willing to accept small,
purely defensive forces. It would prefer a Communist government in
power, failing that a Socialist government, and failing that a con-
servative government headed by friendly members of the conservative
parties. They want freedom to deal with their supporters in Japan
and for their supporters to have complete freedom of action to actively
push Chinese interests.
With regard to tactics, the most important is their version
of people's diplomacy, that is the selective cultivation of specific
elements within Japanese society. They tailor many of their policies,
or at least the expression of those policies, to suit the desires and
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prejudices of these groups in order to build a reservoir of sentiment
and obligation. These groups are then used wittingly or unwittingly
to exert domestic pressure on the Japanese government to follow
policies favorable to China. Among them are the JCP, the JSP,
labor unions, traders, manufacturers of potential Chinese imports,
small businessmen and artisans dependent upon Chinese raw mater-
ials, relatives of prisoners-of-war, fishermen, people living near
American military bases, etc.
The second major tactic is straight propaganda: press and
radio stories and articles attacking the Japanese government for
unfriendly acts, threats of the dire consequences likely to be incurred
for hostile acts, and support for Japanese dissidents, demonstrators,
and rioters (without much regard for the substance of dissent as long
as it is anti-government). Propaganda themes include playing on
widespread Japanese pacifism and fear of war and nuclear weapons,
discontent with the behavior of U.S. military forces, guilt feelings
over Japanese aggression against China, feelings of racial and
cultural sympathy, prospects for vastly profitable trade, etc.
Trade itself is a tactic, although the evidence is insufficient
to determine if it is only that or is also an end in itself. Offers of
trade and threats of withholding trade are frequently addressed to
the Japanese nation as a whole, as well as in specific public and
private statements to individual trading groups.

29.
Another general conclusion concerns the correlation be-
tween domestic and foreign policies during the fifties. There was
a great deal of coincidence between the timing of policies in these
two spheres in terms of tone and emphasis, flexibility and militancy,
patience and impatience.
The decade also saw the definite end of the period in which
China followed the Soviet line in its policies toward Japan, even
though the Sino-Soviet dispute had not become public by the end of
the decade.
I am now going to turn to the main subject of my paper,
the events of the nineteen sixties. In the course of this narrative,
decisions as to what to include and what to exclude will be deter-
mined in part by the need to answer the following questions: What
evidence can be adduced to confirm, deny, or modify the prelim-
inary conclusions? To what extent is trade only a means for the
Chinese, and to what extent is it an end in itself? What are the
relationships between the CCP and the JCP? What is the likelihood
that China will take major risks to accomplish its maximum program,
or continue to be satisfied with progress on the minimum program?
Finally, what new factors might be injected into the situation which
would mean drastic changes in the course of Sino- Japanese relations?

in
SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS I960- 69
General
.
Dividing the first of the decade into periods is rela-
tively simple. From the culmination of the hard phase with the
passing of the revised U.S. security treaty in June I960 until
the signing of the Liao- Takasaki long term trade agreement in
November 1962 there was a distinct period in which China gradually
sought to establish a new, more moderate, and more profitable
line with respect to Japan. During the second phase of the decade
which then began, events proceeded at a relatively stable pace and
policies remained consistent until the Cultural Revolution inter-
vened in the latter half of the decade. As we shall see, the dividing
line between the second and third phases is not as easy to draw. By
the height of the Cultural Revolution in 1967 and 1968 China's policy
toward Japan had obviously turned around, but the process was by
almost imperceptible stages, and was not by any means consistent
across the entire range of relations between the two countries.
Because of this gradualness I have chosen to end the second phase
at the point where we had the first clear indication that change was
imminent, namely the refusal by Mao to sign a communique with
the visiting delegation of the JCP in March 1966. The third phase,
which I shall call the Cultural Revolution phase for convenience, I
regard as unstable and transitional in nature. It may or may not




of the domestic upheaval in 1969. The evidence is conflicting, but
I am inclined to believe the third phase is still in progress at the
time of writing. In summary, then, our scheme for the nineteen
sixties is as follows: June I960 to November 1962, transition to
a new line; November 1962 to February 1966, the Liao-Takasaki
Trade Memo period; March 1966 to the present, the Cultural
Revolution.
Transition to a new line: June I960 to November 1962. The
ordinary observer might consider the ratification of the new U.S.-
Japan Mutual Security Treaty a defeat for Chinese foreign policy,
but the PRC, like all communist states, is unable to admit failure
or defeat if it is to maintain its legitimacy as a government ruled
by scientific socialism. On 1 June I960 a group of Japanese writers
meeting in Canton were still repeating the basic Chinese line de-
nouncing the treaty, Kishi's tactics in "ramming it through the Diet",
and the U.S. 's semi-military occupation of Japan which the treaty
represented. On the 12th Jen Min Jih Pao 's Commentator (a pseudo-
nym for a highly authoritative source) in editorializing on the writers'
conference repeated this theme, adding comments appropriately
tailored to the conferees: on U.S. cultural aggression and the need
2for intellectuals to join the mass struggle against it. By the end of
the month, with the treaty an accomplished fact, the PRC was claim-
*NCNA Canton 1 Jun I960, SCMP 2273, p. 28.
2NCNA Peking 12 Jun I960, SCMP 2279 p. 35.
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ing victory. On the 21st Mao Tse-tung issued a statement on the
resignation of Prime Minister Kishi and the cancellation of the
Eisenhower visit as evidence of the usefulness and effectiveness
3
of mass action. On the 14th the writers' conference had called
for a united front of all anti-U.S. forces to include intellectuals,
workers, and peasants to overthrow imperialism and its lackey,
4
Kishi. On the 21st Mao and Chou En-lai met with the writers
and praised the people's struggle as representing a significant
5heightening in the people's political consciousness.
Having claimed success, the Chinese could justify to it-
self a move toward a more positive policy with regard to Japan
without embarrassment. Kishi's resignation also helped them to
explore the possibilities of renewed dealings with Japan without
loss of face. On 17 July an agreement for the exchange of tele-
vision newsreels was signed signalling their readiness to deal.
On the 20th, the new Prime Minister Ikeda responded and announced
that cultural and economic relations with China were "desirable"
and other relations "advisable", at the same time reaffirming Japan's
7friendship with the U.S. and its primary orientation to the West.
3Quoted in Knowles p. 45.
4NCNA Peking 14 Jun I960, SCMP 2280 p. 26.
5NCNA Shanghai 24 Jun I960, SCMP 2288 pp. 32, 33
6NCNA Peking 17 Jul I960, SCMP 2302, p. 33.
7 The New York Times, 20 Jul I960.
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Ignoring this qualification in greeting several groups of friendly
Japanese on the 26th, Chinese Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi emphasized
that China was in favor of peaceful coexistence between states. He
also denied the rumors then current in Japan that China had pro-
vided financial aid to the anti-treaty rioters. He balanced this
friendly gesture with a reminder that the U.S. was against peaceful
coexistence, and linked the patriotic struggles of the Japanese people
g
with those of the people of Cuba, Turkey, and South Korea. The
month was climaxed by the arrival of the first Chinese delegation
in Japan since the May 1958 incident. Liu Ning-yi, Chairman of
the All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) and a high party
official frequently active in Sino- Japanese affairs, visited Japan to
attend the convention of SOHYO, and the 6th World Conference
Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (6th WC). At his meeting
with SOHYO, Liu congratulated the Japanese people on the victory
of their struggle efforts, and boasted of the friendly reception given
him by both the JCP and the JSP. Since the main political tie of
SOHYO is to the JSP, Liu's visit indicated a firm intention to use
the JSP, as well as the JCP to further its aims in Japan, and to
make its appeals on the widest possible basis.
8NCNA Peking 26 Jul I960, SCMP 2308, p. 33.
9NCNA Peking 29 Jul I960, SCMP 2311, p. 36.
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This intention was reaffirmed in his important address to
the opening session of the 6th WC on 2 August. In this speech Liu
sounded many of the themes which were to become common for the
next several years. Liu's words were given high level support and
emphasis in a message from Chou En-lai to the 6th WC on the 3rd.
First Liu reminded his audience of the ancient and close ties
which existed between the Chinese and the Japanese people. Then he
linked the two nations as jointly suffering under US occupation, the
Japanese by virtue of the Security Treaty, and US bases, and the
Chinese by virtue of the US alliance with Taipei. Common victims,
the Japanese people were also common strugglers, linked in the world-
wide mass struggle of the Socialist Camp, a struggle which the Japan-
ese had shown could achieve great victories. A nationwide mass move-
ment was the key tactic to bring about an end to the sufferings of the
people, as it had been the source of the crushing defeats inflicted on
the US imperialists and Japanese reactionaries by the overthrow of
the Kishi regime and the exclusion of the American president. China
was prepared to help in working toward an end to the people's suffer-
ings and oppressions. It was guided by the ideal of peaceful coexist-
ence and the five Bandung principles. It was willing to establish
normal relations with the government of Japan as soon as, following
the people's real will, it renounced the path of militarism and abolished
10NCNA Peking 2 Aug I960, SCMP 2314 p. 32.
HNCNA Peking 3 Aug I960, SCMP 2314 p. 34.
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the Security Treaty. Once this were done, Liu said, it would be
possible to annul the anti- Japanese provisions of the Sino-Soviet
Treaty of 1950, establish an atom-free zone in the Pacific, and
conclude a mutual non-aggression pact of all the major Pacific
powers. The ball was clearly being passed to the Japanese people
to bring all this about through struggle, while China stood on the
side lines and cheered them on.
The rest of August was as busy as the beginning. On the
12
5th Peking staged a rally to promote Liu's themes. On the 6th
13
Liu visited the headquarters of the JCP in Tokyo. On the 8th
Liu broadened his approach at a friendly dinner given by Matsumura
Kenzo, a member of the Liberal Democratic Party and the Japanese
version of an "old China hand". Here Liu repeated the three political
principles of 1957, but this time with the implication that they were
a means to friendly relations, rather than an obstacle. He repeated
that China and Japan could coexist peacefully, and that a non-aggression
14
pact was possible once the U.S. treaty were abrogated.
(Having introduced Matsumura Kenzo, a digression here
to explain his position is appropriate. In an article he wrote for
15Japan Quarterly in 1964, he expressed the conviction that China
was not after all completely Communist. It had not abolished all
NCNA Peking 5 Aug I960, SCMP 2315, pp. 33-36.
13NCNA Peking 6 Aug I960, SCMP 2315, pp. 33-36.
14NCNA Peking 8 Aug I960, SCMP 2316, p. 41.
"Bridging the Gap to China", Japan Quarterly , Vol. 11, no. 1,
Jan - Mar 1964 p. 27.
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religion, fully nationalized the economy, or fully collectivized the
land. Its foreign policy goals reflected not Communism but Han
pride and patriotism. The trouble between the U.S. and China was
largely a result of the fact that the U.S. as a non-Asian nation
simply didn't understand China. Japan did and could therefore act
as bridge between the two unfortunately and unnecessarily hostile
powers. )
On the 11th, Jen Min Jih Pao hailed the success of Liu's
visit, and noted that it had been made possible by Kishi's ouster.
Presumably Kishi's downfall would make other things possible.
This was affirmed on the 12th when a new agreement to double
import of Chinese lacquer for the use of Japanese artisans was
17
announced by SOHYO, and on the 16th by the signing of a new
cultural relations agreement and joint statement in Peking by
Nakajima Kenzo, Chairman of the Japan China Cultural Exchange
18Committee (JCCEC). On the 19th Suzuki Kazuo, member of the
JSP, the Japanese Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, and the Japan
19China Trade Promotion Association (JCTPA) arrived in Peking.
On the 27th, Suzuki was received by Chou En-lai and the capstone
20
to the new line was set in place.
NCNA Peking 11 Aug I960, SCMP 2319 p. 5.
17Japan Quarterly
,
Vol. 7, No. 4, Oct-Dec I960, p. 528.
18NCNA Peking 16 Aug I960, SCMP 2322 pp. 32-26.
19NCNA Peking 19 Aug I960, SCMP 2325 pp. 37, 38.
20NCNA Peking 27 Aug I960, SCMP 2330 p. 40
NCNA Peking 12 Sep I960, SCMP 2340, p. 23ff.
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In his meeting with Suzuki, Chou announced for the first
time what have come to be called the "three commercial principles"
as a supplement to the "three political principles". Chou blamed
Kishi for the trade breakdown in 1958, and since Kishi was gone,
trade could resume. The formula for trade could be three fold:
(1) government-to-government agreements would be necessary for
any long term trade, and would have to be preceded by progress in
the normalization of relations (the three political principles still
applied); (2) pending this state of affairs, however, private con-
tracts between private Japanese firms and Chinese state trading
corporations would be possible, provided the firms were friendly
to China; (3) special trade, like the import of lacquer for SOHYO
craftsmen, could also continue.
China was clearly signalling that it was ready to resume the
trade relations which had been broken in 1958, but exactly how this
trade was to be conducted was not clear at all at the time. The con-
tents of the Chou statement to Suzuki were not published by the
Chinese until 12 September, and in the interim were reported back
to Japan only through JSP channels. The questions were what did
China mean by progress towards normalization? Was this merely
a way of ignoring the three political principles while still giving them
lip service? What was the reason for using the JSP as a channel for
this communication? What would make a private firm "friendly" in
Chinese eyes and hence able to trade? The working out of the answers
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to these questions was the main theme of Chinese policy toward
Japan for the remainder of this phase. For the next two years
Chinese policy sought a way to permit trade on a major scale with-
out a public retreat from the three political principles, a search
climaxed by the Liao- Takasaki agreement of November 1962. At
the same time the "friendly trade" under the second commercial
principle became routinized and grew in volume, with friendly firms
being defined as those which do not trade with the U. S. or Taiwan,
which provide financial assistance to pro-Chinese fronts in Japan,
which publicly support pro-Chinese positions, and which use their
2 1
influence on the government to adopt pro-Chinese policies. During
this phase also, China cultivated the JSP as its main advocate in
Japan, until it discovered that the socialists were far too divided to
be relied upon or to achieve the necessary influence with the govern-
ment, thus making a rapprochement with the pro-Chinese factions of
the LDP potentially more productive.
While working out these new trade relations, however,
China did not hesitate to excoriate the Japanese government for
"hostile" actions. Building a united front for China included maxi-
mizing the groups supporting the front, but also excluding the "non-
people" who actually govern Japan. As was explicitly avowed in a
21
A. Kashin, "On the Fringe of the Bamboo Curtain", Institute
for the Study of the USSR Bulletin, Vol. 9, no. 12, Dec 1962.
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joint statement signed by a several Chinese and Japanese organi-
22
zations in Peking on 3 October, * the people must work for the
expansion of trade simultaneously with the unfolding of the mass
struggle. Tatsunosuke Takasaki of the LDP was given a friendly
23
reception on the same day that Commentator of the Jen Min Jih
Pao published the first major attack on Prime Minister Ikeda since
his assumption of office. Ikeda was attacked for sending delegates
to Taiwan and South Korea (pushing for a "northeast Asia Treaty
Organization"), for breaking off negotiations with North Korea on
repatriation of Korean nationals, for supporting Tibet in a UN vote,
for opposing a PRC seat in the UN, for his continued support of the
U.S. Security Treaty, for his increase of the defense budget, etc.
For the first time in this editorial, he was equated with Kishi insofar
as hostility to China was concerned. Yet the three political and three
commercial principles were repeated, and while large scale trade
was implicitly not yet possible, small scale trade was encouraged
between the two peoples, in the same editorial.
China's hopes for the JSP were made clear by other events:
in October, the massive Chinese reaction to the assassination of JSP
24leader Asanuma by a right-wing Japanese extremist. In January
1961 a visiting JSP delegate, Kuroda Hisao, was received personally
2NCNA Peking 4 Oct I960, SCMP 2355 p. 33.
23NCNA Peking 11 Oct I960, SCMP 2360 p. 24.




by Mao. A delegation of the ACFTU visiting Tokyo signed a joint
statement with SOHYO on 14 February 1961 affirming China's strong
support for SOHYO's current program. On 26 February the JSP
chairman Eda announced a new anti-treaty drive, along with a
campaign to force a government-to-government trade agreement
27between the two countries. In March a Japanese journalist noted
that "friendly" firms increased from 11 to 47 in number during the
month (it was later to grow to over 200) most of which were essentially
dummy firms formed specifically for the purpose of the China trade
28by already existing Japanese commercial and industrial firms.
The designations were made by the Chinese People's International
Trade Promotion Association (CPITPA) on the recommendation of
the JSP/JCP controlled JCTPA. 29
The double-pronged propaganda offensive was made clear
again in April 1961. On the 3rd in Djakarta, Ch'en Yi repeated that
abrogation of the treaty with Taiwan was a pre-requisite for the
30
establishment of relations, but on the 20th at a banquet for visiting
Japanese Chou En-lai emphasized peaceful coexistence and China's
3 1
and Japan's joint objective to drive the U.S. out of Asia. Similar
25NCNA Peking 24 Jan 1961, SCMP 2428 p. 18.
26NCNA Tokyo 14 Feb 1961, SCMP 2442 p. 39.
27 The New York Times 26 Feb 1961.
28
Ryozu Kurai, 1961 article already cited.
29Japan Quarterly
,
Vol. 8, no. 3, Jul-Sep 1961, p. 377,
30Quoted in Knowles, p. 71.
31NCNA Peking 20 Apr 1961, SCMP 2481, p. 54.
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themes were sounded throughout this period as two way traffic in
people between the countries grew rapidly, including delegations
from front groups and organizations representing all sectors of
society: women, youth, fishermen, unionists, writers, artists,
"untouchables", lawyers, patients, calligrapher s, and so on. Every
conceivable channel was being exploited, although the emphasis on
the JSP remained strong in this early part of the period.
The summer of 1961 brought increasing propaganda comment
on purely domestic Japanese affairs, exploiting domestic grievances
against the government as well as pro-Chinese sentiment. Ta Kung
32Pao in an editorial on 7 June '" attacked the "anti-political violence"
bill introduced by Ikeda in an attempt to prevent further disruptions
like that which surrounded the treaty ratification in mid- I960. On
33
the 9th, Jen Min Jih Pao congratulated the Japanese people for the
defeat of the bill. In August the Chinese press and Peking rallies
made much of the Matsukawa case in Japan, a constitutional case
on the Japanese government's right to try offenders for anti-U.S.
34terrorism during the Korean War.
In June another pro-Chinese LDP member Tokuma Utsonomiya
visited China, talked with Chou, and came home calling for diplomatic
35
relations with China. On 3 July a protocol was signed by the
32NCNA Peking 7 Jun 1961, SCMP 2515 p. 34.
33NCNA Peking 9 Jun 1961, SCMP 2517 p. 38.
34SCMP 2554 et seq.
35NCNA Peking 25 Jun 1961, SCMP 2529 p. 29
The New York Times, 2 9 Jun 1961.
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JSP/JCP controlled Japan China Friendship Association (JCFA)
agreeing on cultural exchanges and attacking U.S. imperialism in
Cuba, the Congo, Laos, Korea, China (Taiwan), and South Vietnam,
as well as Kennedy and Ikeda personally. At the end of the month
a violent attack on Ikeda was occasioned by the Justice Ministry's
refusal to grant an entry permit to P'eng Chen to attend a JCP
37Congress. In August the Chinese press attacked Ikeda for sup-
porting Kennedy's "successor state" doctrine regarding Taiwan and
38
for sending ex-Prime Minister Kishi on a mission to Taipei.
Ikeda was accused of being no better than Kishi and Yoshida, and
of joining with the U.S. to seek reconquest of Taiwan for the Japanese
militarists and reactionaries. Yet a rally in Shanghai on 14 Septem-
ber for visiting Japanese emphasized that only "a handful" in Japan
39
were hostile to China, a handful increasingly seen as unable to
prevent the people from having their way.
40
In October another cultural relations agreement was signed
affirming the people's friendship and attacking U.S. imperialism and
Japanese reaction. In December Jen Min Jih Pa o reacted strongly to
36NCNA Peking 3 Jul 1961, SCMP 2533 p. 44.
37NCNA Peking 25 Jul 1961, SCMP 2548 p. 26.
-jo
NCNA Peking 17 Aug 1961, SCMP 2564 p. 40;
NCNA Peking 27 Aug 1961, SCMP 2571 p. 38.
' 9NCNA Shanghai 14 Sep 1961, SCMP 2582 p. 35,




Ikeda's offer of talks to the Republic of Korea (ROK), while Hung
Ch'i printed an analysis of the way US imperialism was controlling
Japanese monopoly capitalism to help it control Asia. Japanese
monopoly capitalists were held to be willing tools of US imperialism
in this article, but the emphasis was on their subservience, not on
42Japanese initiation of hostile acts and policies
.
January 1962 saw the culmination of China's efforts to
cultivate the JSP during this phase of Sino- Japanese relations and
to exploit this cultivation in terms of influence within Japan. A
party delegation was led to China by Mosaburo Suzuki on one of the
by-then regular bienniai JSP formal visits to China. Suzuki arrived
43
on the first and was royally feted for two weeks: a banquet on 2
44 45January received by Mao on the 3rd; a rally for Gensuikyo on
46 47
the 4th, received by Chou and Ch'en Yi on the 11th, again re-
ceived by Mao, Chou, and Ch'en on the 12th, and another banquet
48
on the same day. Finally, on the 13th he signed a joint statement
49
which showed the signs of long and arduous negotiation.
41NCNA Peking 30 Dec 1961, SCMP 2652.
42Hung Ch'i, no. 24, 16 Dec 1961 translated in Summary of
China Mainland Magazines (SCMM) no. 295 p. 9-
43NCNA Peking 1 Jan 1962, SCMP 2653.
44NCNA Peking 2 Jan 1962, SCMP 2654.
45NCNA Peking 4 Jan 1962, SCMP 2655.
Ibid.
7NCNA Peking 11 Jan 1962, SCMP 266o p. 27.
48NCNA Peking 12 Jan 1962, SCMP 2661 p. 29.
9NCNA Peking 13 Jan 1962, SCMP 2661 pp. 24-28.
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Suzuki made every effort to avoid committing himself to
the starkness and simplicity of the original Asanuma statement of
1959 about US imperialism being the common enemy. The JSP was
already suffering some domestic consequences from its apparent
servility and obsequiousness to the PRC, both within the party itself
and in the Japanese press in general. He was anxious to obtain
Chinese support for the leftist candidate Sasaki in the forthcoming
party elections, but not to involve himself too closely and give the less
pro- Chinese Eda faction any ammunition. It was a difficult line to
have to draw, and the Chinese did not make it any easier. They were
anxious, of course, to obtain the most propagandistically useful
statement possible. Suzuki wormed his way out of a blanket affirmation
of the Asanuma statement by admitting only that US imperialism was
an enemy of both the Japanese and Chinese people, and that this made
it "objectively" a common enemy, although the struggles against it
were independent . To the discriminating reader he had avoided
tying himself to a joint Chinese Japanese struggle. Unfortunately
the sophistries were wasted on both Japanese public opinion and the
opposing factions and Suzuki was roundly criticized. Even a secret
letter he sent to the Party secretariat immediately after signing the
statement explaining his actions did not remove the intra-party odium
he had incurred.
50
Shinkichi Eto, "Japan and the Two Chinas", The New Japan:
Prospects and Promises
,
Princeton University Conference Series,
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The New York Times 20 Jan 1962
Japan Quarterly
,
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If I may get ahead of the story here, this event was the
beginning of a decline in China's concentration on the JSP for a while.
Eda defeated Sasaki at the party election, thus bringing to power the
Structural Reform faction of the party. This faction advocated a
policy derived from the Communist Party of Italy and hence, at this
51
stage of the Sino-Soviet dispute, anathema to the Chinese. At
about the same time the Japan Teachers Union adopted a policy of
reformism and economism, in place of revolution and politicism,
and SOHYO began making tentative offers of cloer cooperation with
the more moderate ZENRO trade union federation. Finally, the
Chinese were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the results




This estrangement from the JSP reached its breaking point
in August with a breach at the anti-bomb congress, in which the JSP
and SOHYO walked out in protest over the Soviet bomb test while
China and the JCP supported the Soviet test. TheJSP break with
Gensuikyo which was to follow clinched its unreliability from China's
53
standpoint. After the conference propaganda attacks against the
54JSP began to appear in the Peking press. The consequence of all
51 Japan Quarterly
,
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this was for China to transfer the main focus of its attentions to the
JCP and the pro-Chinese wing of the LDP. This process culminated
in Takasaki's signing of the trade agreement in November, an agree-
ment which had been foreshadowed by the announcement of the three
commercial principles to Suzuki of the JSP in August I960.
All of this was yet to come in January 1962, however. At
that time the Suzuki joint statement represented a definitive state-
55
ment of Chinese policy. Van BrieBen insists the statement should
be taken literally as a pronunciation of Chinese policies. I would
prefer to characterize it as a statement of China's minimum program
during this period. Essentially it called for Japan to abrogate the
US and ROC treaties, expel all US forces and bases, establish
diplomatic relations with the PRC, and sign a formal treaty of friend-
ship and nonaggression. The anti- Japanese clause of the Sino-Soviet
treaty would then become automatically a dead letter. Japan's desire
not to join the socialist bloc, but to maintain "positive neutrality"
was noted by the Chinese, although not agreed with. Japan's desire
for a treaty with the Soviet Union as well was "appreciated" by the
Chinese. Finally the Chinese promised not to "interfere" in Japan's
domestic affairs.
China renewed its attacks on Ikeda in February, re-
emphasing its sensitivity to Japan's intra-Asian relations. A whole
55
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series of editorial attacks were published in response to Ikeda's trip
to Southeast Asia the preceding November, the Foreign Minister's
trip to Taiwan, some published articles by ex-Prime Minister
Yoshida, the ongoing talks with the ROK and Ikeda's attack on the
56
Suzuki statement. These attacks all equated Japan's economic
offensive in Southeast Asia and its diplomatic efforts toward rap-
prochement with the ROK with pre-war Japanese military expansion-
ism. Hinton sees this as partly evidence of special Chinese sensi-
57
tivity resulting from its security crisis with India then brewing,
but there is really nothing in these editorials and speeches which is
significantly different from earlier and later statements on the same
theme. In May one new item did surface, however. Jen Min Jih Pao's
observer, taking note of Kennedyls increase in the number of ad-
visors in South Vietnam, claimed that Ikeda and Kennedy were
planning to use Japanese troops in Vietnam, an obvious attempt to
CO
exploit Japanese fears of involvement in actual hostilities. From
this point on the danger of war in Southeast Asia and the danger of
Japanese involvement became gradually more frequent and more
extreme in Chinese propaganda aimed at Japan. One sign that
56Peking Review
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China may have been especially sensitive, although her response
was not particularly unusual, was an attack made on Ikeda in June
for approving a loan to the Taipei government, at a time when
Chiang Kai-shek was (according to Peking) preparing an attack
59
on the mainland. Yet a fortnight later the press items commem-
orating the anti- Japanese war anniversay (the 1937 incidents) were
milder than usual.
As the JSP break grew, in September Matsumura Kenzo
was invited to China by Chou En-lai and Ch'en Yi for conversations.
He arrived at Canton on 13 September. On the 14th he arrived in
Peking and a heavy schedule of talks was opened. During these
high level talks, the Chinese restated their fundamental adherence
to the three political and three commercial principles, and the in-
separability of politics and economics. However they also agreed
with Matsumura on a desire to promote trade and, significantly, the
possibility of improving relations by "gradual and cumulative steps".
This was obviously a concession by the Chinese, reducing their
minimum program in return for some kind of trade agreement.
59NCNA Peking 27 Jun 1962, SCMP 2771 p. 23.
60NCNA Peking 5 Jul 1962, SCMP 2775 p. 1.
NCNA Peking 7 Jul 1962, SCMP 2776 p. 1
61NCNA Canton 13 Sep 1962, SCMP 2821 p. 34.
NCNA Peking 14 Sep 1962, SCMP 2821 p. 35.
NCNA Peking 15 Sep 1962, SCMP 2822 p. 33.
63NCNA Peking 14 Sep 1962, SCMP 2824 p. 28 ff.

49.
Agreement in principle was reached on an expansion of trade, an
exchange of newsmen, and the establishment of direct air service
64between the two countries. China agreed, in essence, to permit
progress in economics a step at a time, in return for political pro-
gress a step at a time, rather than insisting on a dramatic political
65
advance as a prerequisite for any large scale trade. This was
interpreted in the Japanese press as tacit Chinese acknowledgment
that it was impossible for Japan to simply break with Taiwan and the
U.S., and that China would settle for less, at least temporarily.
We have already considered the reasons for China's choosing
to deal with LDP members with reference to expanding trade at this
time, but this does not answer the question of why China was in fact
willing to make concessions politically in return for trade. We will
discuss this subject more thoroughly in the next chapter, but briefly
here let it suffice that many observers in Japan, the U.S., and Europe
attribute the move to economic necessity resulting from the failure of the
Great Leap Forward combined with sufficient recovery from the
67
Great Leap Forward to permit major exports. Japan represented
64The New York Times
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50.
one of the few good markets for Chinese raw materials. At the same
time, they feared Soviet competition, both with the Japanese govern-
68
ment and with the JCP. Ch'en Yi gave a hint of this in a press con-
ference of 9 November when he noted that the good harvest of 1962
permitted trade expansion. He also noted that he viewed the agree-
ment as in a way both private and governmental. After all, Takasaki
69
was a leading Japanese political figure.
The Japanese responded quickly, and Tatsunosuke Takasaki,
ex-Minister of International Trade was dispatched to China at the end
70
of October to work out the details of an agreement. He was
71
accompanied by an economic mission representing 41 Japanese firms.
On 9 November he signed an agreement with Liao Cheng-chih called
72
the L<iao- Takasaki Memorandum Trade Agreement (L-T agreement).
The news release announcing the agreement emphasized that Liao
and Takasaki acted as individuals and that this was a non-govern-
mental agreement, that it represented a further development of
private trade (thus by implication tying it to the second of the three
commercial principles, although neither they nor the political prin-
ciples were referred to explicitly), and that the basis of the agree-
ment would be "equality and mutual benefit" and the "improvement
Kashin "Bamboo Curtain" and Cho "Sechs Phasen"
69
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of trade by gradual and cumulative methods". This last phrase
was to become the standard line for the next few years, largely
supplanting the three political and three commercial principles in
Chinese pronouncements.
Specifically, the agreement provided that:
(1) long term comprehensive trade would be initiated
for a five year period ending in December 1967 at
an average annual level of 36 million pounds sterling;
(2) commodities involved would be coal, iron ore, soya,
maize, beans, salt, tin from China and rolled steel,
chemical fertilizers, insecticides, agricultural
machinery, farm implements, and whole-set
machinery (i. e. , complete factories) from Japan;
(3) transactions would be in the form of contracts be-
tween private Japanese firms (no mention was made
that they must be "friendly") and the China National
Foreign Trade Corporation;
(4) sales would be paid for by letters of credit guaranteed
in sterling or other agreed currencies;
(5) deferred or installment payments were to be the
subject of further discussions;
(6) the exchange of technical information would be
promoted;
(7) questions of arbitration and commodity inspections
were to be resolved by further discussion;
(8) the agreement could not be unilaterally annulled;
(9) revision would be possible after further talks; and
(10) the agreement would be valid immediately, running







The provision for immediate effectiveness was not an
idle one; implementation began immediately. On 16 November
a Council was formed in Tokyo under Takasaki's chairmanship
75
to act as liaison for implementing the China trade, and in Peking
Nan Han-chen gave a banquet on the 23rd for all visiting Japanese
traders, both non-affiliated firm representatives and members of
the Japan-China Trade Promotion Association and Japan International
Trade Promotion Association, both of which were already involved
deeply in "friendly" trade. On 14 December a number of Japanese
traders who had been waiting in Hong Kong were permitted to enter
77
to begin trade contract talks. On the 17th Nan gave a reception
78
at which he spoke brightly of the fabulous prospects for trade,
and on the 2 7th Nan and a group of Japanese signed a protocol to
expand "friendly trade" and agreeing to exchange industrial fairs
79
in Peking and Shanghai in 1963 and in Tokyo and Osaka in 1964.
By the new year contracts under the LT agreement were already
being signed and a new phase in Sino- Japanese relations had opened.
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. While the main line of Chinese
policy was being worked out during this phase with first the JSP
and then the pro-Peking wing of the LDP as the main targets of
negotiation, Chinese relations with the JCP were more clearly
related to the developing Sino-Soviet split and less directly to Sino-
Japanese relations. Accordingly I have withheld discussion of
CCP/JCP relations during this phase for separate treatment.
The JCP began this period ambiguously in the Chinese camp.
Although it eschewed any attacks on the Soviet Union or the CPSU
and was very mild in its support of the CCP, it did support it. At
the June meeting in I960 of the World Federation of Trade Unions,
at which the Chinese began their anti-CPSU factional activities
80
which 'were to so enrage Khrushchev, Japan voted with China.
During his Japan visit in July and August I960, Liu Ning-yi paid a
formal visit to JCP headquarters in Tokyo, and the JCP was promin-
8 1
ent at most other functions Liu attended. In September I960 at the
Hanoi conference of the Lao Dong Party, the JCP maintained a gen-
82
erally neutral position. In November at the preparatory conference
of the 81 Communist Parties in Moscow, the JCP took a moderately
pro-Chinese position, that is, it supported China in its position on
83
what the Declaration should say. At the full conference in December
80William E. Griffith, Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift
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they took a noticeably weak position, refusing to support the Soviet
Union's positions, and refusing to join with the Soviets in attacking
84
Hoxha and the Albanian party. On the 13th of December, the JCP
delegation made a point of stopping off in Peking on the way home
o c
from Moscow. Although only briefly in the capitol, the delegation
was greeted at the airport by P'eng Chen.
In early 1961 there was little mention of the JCP in the
Chinese press, and the JCP itself maintained a discreet silence.
It did, however, cooperate with the JSP in helping build up "friendly"
trade through membership in the trade promotion associations. And
JCP fronts continued to send delegations to China which were re-
ceived in a friendly fashion, and helped welcome Chinese delegations
visiting Japan. It is noteworthy, though, that most of this front and
visiting activity vis-a-vis China did not emphasize JCP participation,
but rather general "progressive" collaboration between the JCP and
JSP.
In June 1961 there was a burst of friendliness between the
JCP and CCP. A JCP delegation visited China between 13 and 25
June. They were greeted by a highly laudatory editorial in Jen Min
87
Jih Pao on the 16th which praised the JCP's "correct line" on the
84
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world liberation struggle. On the same day they were given a major
88banquet by Chu Teh. On the 19th they were the honored guests at
a major Peking rally which was given unusually large coverage in
89
the Chinese press. On the 20th they were received by Liu Shao Ch'i,
90Chu Teh, and Chou En-lai. On the 21st they were received by Mao
and met with the Chinese National People's Congress, and at a re-
ception given by Peng Chen received much verbal support for their
91
united front activities in Japan. On the 22nd a joint JCP-NPC
statement pointed out the correctness of the JCP line and its ad-
herence to Marxism-Leninism. It also noted the unique Japanese
combination of proletarianism and patriotism. Both parties in com-
menting on the major issues of the Sino-Soviet disagreement con-
centrated on support of the Chinese position without a direct attack
on the Soviets, although Japan did express support for China's Great
92Leap Forward, and did oppose revisionism. On the 23rd, a Jen
Min Jih Pao editorial came out with high praise for the joint state-
93
ment. In spite of the discretion with which the Japanese supported
the Chinese side in the growing controversy, on the 7th of July the
JCP startled Japan with a purge of thre-e Executive Committee mem-
bers, and the resignation of seven other party members, on a charge
88 n.^Ibid
.




91NCNA Peking 21 Jun 1961, SCMP 2525 p. 33.
92NCNA Peking 22 Jun 1961, SCMP 2527 p. 35.




of being pro-Soviet and anti-Chinese. The ostensible charge was
anti-party activities; apparently his Soviet patrons were pressing
him too hard for a pro-Soviet line which, as we shall see later, the
JCP structure wanted to avoid. On 25 July a message from the
Central Committee of the CCP to the JCP was released (it could
not be delivered in person because the Japanese government, to the
indignation of the Chinese, had refused an entry permit for Peng
95 96Ch'en to visit the JCP convention. The message again praised
the JCP's correct line, loyalty to Marxism-Leninism, and pro-
letarian internationalism. It noted the JCP contribution to the
purity of ideology and the solidarity of the movement.
On October 11th, the expelled JCP pro-Soviet members
97formed a new group called the "Voice of Japan", an organization
which was never to achieve much strength, but which was to remain
as a faction of the Japanese left always ready to act as a mouthpiece
for the CPSU. The main stream itself sent one of the few fraternal
delegations to the Albanian conference of its women's association
98
in the same month. During October a JCP delegation to the 22nd
CPSU Congress in Moscow maintained a neutralist position at the
947 The New York Times
, 9 Jul 1961.











conference, and visited Peking on the way to Japan. On the
28th they were given a banquet by Liu Shao-chi, held cordial talks
with Teng Hsiao-ping, and were seen off at the airport by a
group which included Teng and the Soviet charge. Thus while
definitely leaning toward the Chinese and away from the Soviet Union,
the JCP was attempting to maintain as neutral a stance as possible
and was being actively wooed by both.
In November another step towards the CCP was taken when
Akahata announced the publication in Japanese of the works of Mao
102
Tse-tung, described as the successor to Marx and Lenin. During
the same month an Akahata and a JCP delegation were in Peking for
103
meetings with CCP high officials, including Mao himself on the 23rd
104
and Liu Teng on the 25th. In December the JCP balanced this
pro-Peking move by supporting the Soviet line on the dangers of
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On 29 December, Akahata in an editorial emphasized its
neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute. It noted that the JCP 8th
Congress had resolved against both right and left opportunism,
wanted Communist Parties to be able to assume independent positions,
and wanted to avoid a split of the international communist movement.
In January 1962 Akahata noted JCP attendance at the 22nd
Congress of the CPSU, but mounted an attack on the revisionists in
general and the Voice of Japan people for their ideas on structural
107
reform. In February it published three days of strong anti-
1 08
revisionist editorials. This neutralist, anti-Soviet interference
line continued fairly stable through the remainder of the first half
of 1962. In July Akahata revealed that at the 8th Congress the previous
summer had approved the expulsion of the Voice of Japan group for
109
anti-party activity. The following month the JCP lined up with
both the Soviet Union and the CPR in attacking the JSP for its dis-
approval of the Soviet H bomb test.
In December 1962 at the conferences of the East European
communist parties, the JCP stuck to its moderately pro-Chinese
position and refused to join in the mounting public attacks on Albania.
106
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It also had a five man delegation in Peking the same month.
Finally two Chinese ideological journals during the month included
articles on the quality of the JCP struggle being waged in Japan
113
against U.S. imperialism and Japanese monopoly capitalism.
This process of gradual moving over to the Chinese side was thus
growing in strength as this phase of Sino- Japanese relations ended.
It was not to reach its climax, however, until the following summer,
with the split over the Test Ban treaty and the final public explosion
of the Sino -Soviet Rift.
The period of LT trade: November 1962-February 1966 : Picking
out the trends during this period is difficult. After the LT agree-
ment relations on the surface remained stable between Japan and
China until well into the depths (or heights depending upon your view-
point) of the Cultural Revolution. Trade between the two countries
grew steadily in volume. Even though the signing of contracts was
occasionally made more difficult by Chinese intransigence or sensi-
tivity, the totals at the end of the year always added up to respectable
gains over the previous year until 1968. Conversely propaganda
attacks of some virulence by the Chinese on the Japanese government
were sprinkled liberally throughout the period. The Chinese in effect
112NCNA Peking 12 Dec 1962, SCMP 2881 p. 25.
113
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ignored undesirable Japanese policies and events when dealing with
the substance of their trade relations; and the Japanese in turn were
prone to shrug off the fulminations of Commentator and Observor as
if they were almost parts of an accepted and not too important ritual.
Yet below this stormy and disturbed surface currents were flowing.
In 1963 and till December 1964 there were genuine signs
of a detente between the two countries, with much of it a function of
114
competitive Chinese and Soviet wooing of Japan in a decreasingly
bi-polar world where Japan gave the impression to both communist
states that it was to a degree loosening its ties with the United States
and pushing for a more independent line. There are definite im-
provements in Sino- Japanese relations during this phase, plus many
signs of a potential for far more improvement.
In December 1954, however, with the election of Eisaku
Sato to the prime ministership (an echo of the fifties, Sato being
Kishi's half brother) a sudden and distinct chill fell over the relations
between the two countries, a chill which deepened throughout 1965
even though the surface relations remained ostensibly warm (that is
a mixture of growth in trade and periodic propaganda attacks). By
the beginning of 1966 this cold current became dominant and it is
fair to say a new phase had begun, even though this current did not
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In this chapter the main actors are the government and the
LDP on the Japanese side, so developments in PRC relations with
both the JSP and JCP will be considered separately. I will relate
the events of the two sub-phases first: the plateau of 1963 and 1964
followed by the increasing decline of 1965. I will then go back and
pick up individually the developments with the two leftist parties
during these two periods.
January 1963 set the stage for the development of economic
relations during this phase. On the 10th a Chinese delegation arrived
115
in Japan to begin a study of the vinylon industry; on the 12th the
first large contract under the LT memo was signed (silk for fertil-
izer); on the 19th agreement was reached on financing trade by
direct letters of credit between Chinese and Japanese banks instead
117
of through London as was the case previously; on the 22nd a fish-
118
eries agreement was reached on starting formal talks. Also
during the month, however, Japan and the US held their third annual
security conference, Japan and the USSR initialed a liberalized trade
agreement, and Xkeda decided in principle to admit US nuclear
119powered submarines to Japanese ports. Also the Justice Ministry
announced it would not permit the Chinese (or any communist countries)
115NCNA Peking 10 Jan 1963, SCMP 2898 p. 24.
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to send delegates to a Japanese leftist youth conference. China's
relatively mild response to these steps was indirect. On the 7th of
February, New China News Agency (NCNA) announced a signature
campaign in China for a petition to be sent to Ikeda demanding a
Japanese apology for the deaths caused by Japan in China during
12 1World War II; a Japanese "war criminal" was also released
after having been forced to read a statement denouncing Japanese
122
war crimes; and a moderately strong message was sent by some
Chinese organizations to Japan expressing support for a "united action"
123(read demonstration) against the Japan-ROK talks; and against US
124
nuclear submarine visits. This mildness was repeated in a joint
statement signed by a visiting delegation of Japanese jurists in March,
which made no reference at all to the Japanese government, restrict-
125ing its attacks entirely to US imperialism.
This dual pattern continued over the next months, amounting
in effect to what the Japanese have always insisted on as "the separation
of economics and politics". A large contract was signed exchanging
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127HAWK missiles from the United States the same month; China
128
released two more war criminals and in its Okinawa Day editor-
129
ial attacked the US only, not mentioning "Japanese reactionaries".
In May agreement was reached on shipping between the two countries
130
and ports of entry, the Dai Nippon company reached preliminary
131
agreement with China on the sale of a vinylon manufacturing plant,
and Nan Han-chen gave a banquet to more than 100 Japanese traders
132
in Peking. Politics during the month consisted of editorials and
messages of support for united actions against nuclear submarines
and F105D aircraft newly deployed to Japan, this time attacking not
only the US but also Ikeda, Japanese reactionaries, "right wing social
democrats" (read Eda faction of the JSP), and revisionists (read pro-
133
Soviet splinter of JCP). This latter article by Jen Min Jih Pao
Commentator is interesting in that it separated Japanese monopoly
capitalists into a different category from US imperialists. Both were
134
still enemies but the jointness of their hostility is not emphasized.
In May and June 1963, as the final rupture in the Sino-Soviet
split was about to burst out, Japan and the Soviet Union reached a new,
Ibid
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more liberal trade agreement and an agreement on Japanese fishing
and seaweed collecting in northern waters, and talk of Japanese
collaboration in the economic development of Siberia began. The
135
Soviets also released some previously captured Japanese fishermen.
On the 14 June a highly optimistic joint statement was signed by the
Chinese and a large group of "friendly" traders containing not a word
1 3 f,
of political attacks on Ikeda or even the US. On the political side
there was a whole series of editorials and messages of support for
"united actions" (now being serially numbered by the Chinese as was
137
their practice during the treaty crisis of I960). Jen Min Jih Pao
Commentator, in noting the united actions and the anniversary of the
US security treaty, cast Kennedy and the Japanese military in the
villain roles, but made no tie between them and Japanese businessmen
.. .. . 138
or capitalists.
On 1 July, Ch'en Yi had a friendly talk with representatives
139
of the Kurashiki Rayon Company ' and on the 13th a contract was
140
signed for the sale of a complete vinylon plant. On 20 August the
141
Japanese government approved deferred payment for the plant.
135
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During the same two months the Chinese objected strongly to Japan-
142
ese limits on the activities of a youth delegation in Japan ~ and the
visit of the Chinese ACFTU delegation to the 9th Anti-bomb Confer-
143
ence.
An interesting article was published in Hung Ch'i during
144
August, noting the deepening economic misery in Japan, and
implicitly foreseeing an imminent crisis in which Japanese monopoly
capitalists would seek to win their independence from US domination.
Thus the Chinese found an ideological justification for their increased
dealings with Japanese capitalists, in spite of Japan's still existing
ties to the United States and the Capitalists continued support for the
Ikeda government.
The Kurashiki deal produced a protest from the ROC, which
requested that deferred payment not be granted to the PRC for such
contracts. The Japanese government refused to cancel the approval
of the deferred payment, but in a private letter ex-Prime Minister
Yoshida soothed Chiang Kai-shek, assuring him that Japan had no
intention of providing economic aid to the PRC by extending inexpen-
sive credit, and would in no way give discriminatory advantages to
the PRC. He emphasized that the Kurashiki deal was a straight com-
mercial transaction, and that the deferred payment was a standard
142NCNA Peking 11 Jul 1963, SCMP 3019 p. 22.
143NCNA Peking 2 Aug 1963, SCMP 3035 p. 34.
144Chuang T'ao, "The Development of Post War Japanese
Economy and its Deepening Contradictions", Hung Ch'i





six percent loan arrangement. Chiang was apparently satisfied
and said no more, but the Yoshida letter was to become a major bone
146
of contention between China and Japan in ensuing years.
In September 1963, closeness and cooperation in economic
affairs continued to grow, while the staccato drumfire of propaganda
blasts also continued without noticeable effect on the former. The
second year agreement under the LT memorandum was signed on 23
147September accompanied by mutual congratulations on the progress
being made in trade expansion and, this time, agreement on inspection
of commodities and commercial arbitration. Nan Han-chen and Liao
Cheng-chih held a series of large banquets and receptions for visiting
Japanese traders, including representatives of "small and medium
business" interests, "friendly companies", big LDP-connected in-
148
dustries, and exhibitors at the forthcoming Peking Fair. A
common theme at these meetings was the glowing prospect for expand-
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article is close to what both the Chinese and Japanese imply
whenever they mention the letter. I am therefore satisfied
that this is its operational meaning, whatever its exact
wording.
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ment putting up "obstacles" (that is, Japan's refusal to permit a few
items to be exhibited because of the CHJJMCOM agreements). Some
149
more war criminals were also released. The propaganda activity
was largely related to the growing Japanese demonstrations against
the Vietnam War, US submarines and aircraft deployments, and
150
some high publicized anti-radical court cases in Japan.
151
In October the Peking Fair opened ' accompanied by friendly
meetings between the Japanese figurehead President of the exhibit,
Tanzan Ishibashi of the LDP, and the highest Chinese officials includ-
152
ing Mao himself. On the day before the opening, the China Japan
Friendship Association, the only such association formed by the
Chinese with a country not ruled by a communist Party, was founded
153
officially. China's reasonableness during this month was truly
phenomenal. In an article in Jen Min Jih Pao on the 5th, Nan Han-
154
chen blamed only the US and Chiang for being obstructionists.
In an editorial the next day there was no mention of conditions or
principles, only "mutual friendship, refraining from hostility, equality
149NCNA Fushan 3 Sep 1963, SCMP 3055 p. 30.
150NCNA Peking 3 Sep 1963, SCMP 3055 p. 31.
NCNA Peking 11 Sep 1963, SCMP 3060 p. 25.
NCNA Peking 13 Sep 1963, SCMP 3062, p. 27
NCNA Peking 17 Sep 1963, SCMP 3064 p. 31.
151NCNA Peking 5 Oct 1963, SCMP 3076 p. 37.
152NCNA Peking 1 Oct 1963, SCMP 3074 p. 39.
153NCNA Peking 4 Oct 1963, SCMP 3076 p. 29.




and mutual benefit". At a conversation with Ishibashi, Chou
En-lai was reported to have "understood" Japan's difficulties with
Taipe and to have expressed the feeling that China was in no hurry
but would be patient about the ending of this particular obstacle to
156
normal relations. At a big reception, Nan Han-chen looked on
approvingly while a Japanese speaker urged Japanese "national
capitalists" to work for Japan's independence (i. e. end the US-ROC
157
ties). The peak of this fulsomeness came in a Peking Review
article on the 11th, which blamed the US for the 1958 break in trading
relations, completely ignoring the arch-villain Kishi earlier held
1 58
responsible. On the 28th, Ch'en Yi told a group of visitng Japanese
correspondents covering the fair that trade would continue to grow
as China's solvency grew (a clear admission that internal Chinese
economic conditions do limit trade), that ambassadorial relations
between the countries were desirable but would have to wait till the
ambassador from Taipei left Tokyo, and (calmly slipping it in) that
159China was of course developing nuclear weapons. On 9 November,
the anniversary of the LT agreement and the midpoint of the plateau
of good relations, a major fisheries agreement was signed delineating
155NCNA Peking 6 Oct 1963, SCMP 3077 p. 32.
15 Asahi (Japanese) 10 Oct 1963.
157NCNA Peking 6 Oct 1963, SCMP 3077 p. 33.
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fishing areas and emergency harbor procedures. In December
the Japanese fair in Shanghai opened and another cultural relations
1 62
agreement was signed, ' in which the only "principles" mentioned
were those of Bandung.
As befitted his stature as China's chief ideologue (and show-
ing his emergence from his post-Great Leap low posture) Mao in
January tied up all this sweetness into a neat package: the policy of
Intermediate Zones between the Socialist camp and the leading imper-
ialist enemy. Japan was placed in the second intermediate zone along
with the small capitalist powers of Western Europe as objects of
Chinese overtures, countries to be wooed away from the United States
even if they could not immediately be expected to become allies of
Communist China. This policy was aimed most directly at the French,
1 6"^
who recognized the PRC in the same month but was also explicitly
applied by Mao to Japan when he received a delegation from Japan's
164Afro-Asian organization on the 27th. That this was not, however,
a call for complete coexistence between China and the governments of
such countries was also made clear by Mao's insistence that the need
was for struggle, for a world wide people's united front against US
imperialism, a front to include all people including even big entre-
Current Background
,
No. 724, 6 Dec 1963.
Japan Annual of International Affairs
,
Vol. 3/4, 1963/64, Chronology.
162NCNA Peking 25 Dec 1963, SCMP 3129 p. 30.
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Hinton, p. 383.
164NCNA Peking 27 Jan 1964, SCMP 3150 p. 17.
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preneurs. Mao's statement was to be quoted for years thereafter,
memorialized on anniversaries of its pronouncement, and became
the standard definition of the broadest united front China ever en-
visioned. There was a parallel hint that even capitalist governments
might be included in this anti-US united front. An article reporting
an Ikeda speech on Japan's independent policy was completely without
hostile remarks on that policy.
January 1964 also saw the resolution, to China's satisfaction,
of the Chou Hung-chi case. A member of a Chinese delegation to
Japan in October, Chou had sought asylum in the Soviet Embassy in
Tokyo. He had then been taken into custody by the Japanese who held
him while Peking, Taipei (and presumably Moscow and Washington)
expressed their views on what should be done with him. In the end,
Chou decided he wanted to go back to China and the Japanese sent him
back. Taipei reacted by withdrawing some embassy personnel
from Tokyo and canceling all Taiwan's government (not private) pro-
curement in Japan. Yoshida eventually was sent to Taipei to appease
Chiang, but it is hard to deny that the PRC saw this decision on
Japan's part as a very favorable sign of the positive results of per-
1 h~7
mitting trade between the two countries.
l65NCNA Peking 22 Jan 1964, SCMP 3147 p. 28.
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In February 1964 Nan Han-chen carried Chinese optimism
to new official heights when in a speech he expressed an expectation
of victory in the struggle for diplomatic relations, the end of Japan's
dependence on the US and its recognition of the ROC. On the 18th,
talks between Liao Cheng-chih and visiting LDP Diet representatives
resulted in preliminary agreement (to be formalized by later negoti-
ations) on the exchange of newsmen, stationing of permanent trade
representatives, expansion of trade, initiation of direct air service,
and visiting rights for Japanese relatives at war dead cemeteries in
169China. Similar views were being conveyed at the same time in
Tokyo by Chao An-po, a visiting Chinese delegate. After duly pro-
testing the government's limiting of the size of his delegation, Chao
was very conciliatory and optimistic, although slightly more militant
170
than either Nan or Liao in that month. At the end of the month
several Chinese officials, led by Chou En-lai were very cordial in
171
expressing their condolences on the death of Tatsunoke Takasaki.
On 6 March, China released the last of her store of Japanese war
172
criminals. On 4 March, in an editorial praising Japanese memorial
meetings to protest the Bikini bomb tests, Jen Min Jih Pao noted the
possibility of admitting the LDP and big businessmen to the anti-US
173
united front.
8NCNA Peking 5 Feb 1964, SCMP 3156 p. 27.
169Kyodo News Service 18 Feb 1964.
170Kyodo News Service 2 Feb 1964.
NCNA Peking 8 Feb 1964, SCMP 3159 p. 29.
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Except for the matter of airline services (which Japan saw
174
as impossible until diplomatic relations were established, Japan
was quick to take up the Liao-LDP talks of 18 February and to exploit
the agreement in principle then reached. Matsumura Kenzo arrived
175
in Peking on 12 April to begin negotiations (still, of course, unofficial).
At the same time Nan Han-chen was invited to Tokyo by Ishibashi
1 7 A
Tanzan to represent China at the opening of the Chinese trade fair
in Tokyo. Nan spent the rest of the month being received by industri-
alists all over Japan, spreading a sanguine view of the potential of the
China trade, while in Peking Matsumura quickly got down to cases and,
on the 19th, signed an agreement to establish trade liaison offices in
Tokyo and Peking for expediting LT trade, and to exchange news
177
correspondents. In reporting back to LDP headquarters, the
mission to China noted that China was very cooperative, but extremely
178
sensitive to the public posture of the Japanese government. The
implication was that China would be satisfied if the government be-
came friendly (or even neutral) in public, whatever its policy was in
substance. It was also reported that the Chinese were anxious to
negotiate a long term fertilizer contract completely outside the LT
or friendly trade formulae. Matsumura did some preliminary deal-
ing on this, but the Japanese government was reluctant to commit
174Kyodo News Service 13 Mar 1964.
175NCNA Peking 12 Apr 1964, SCMP 3200 p. 26.
NCNA Peking 6 Apr 1964, SCMP 3195 p. 28.
177NCNA Peking 19 Apr 1964, SCMP 3205 p. 27.




itself to such an agreement without some solid guarantees. During
this peak of cooperativeness on China's part, it was almost as though
they were advocating the separation of politics and economics, in the
hope that the former would follow the latter inevitably. The few
hostile remarks in the Chinese press during these spring months
were addressed almost exclusively at the right wing socialists and
the revisionists in the JCP.
In May Nan continued his rounds of the Japanese geisha
houses making friends and winning influence among industrial and
180
financial circles until his departure on the 21st. An additional
impetus was given to the Chinese drive for increased relations by
the visit in this month of Soviet leader Mikoyan to Tokyo. Probably
in response to this visit, Chou En-lai gave an interview on the 15th
in which he offered still more trade expansion. At the same time in
his talks with LDP representatives he spoke of increasing talks on
cooperative resource development within China (as Mikoyan had
mentioned re Siberia), technical cooperation, etc. He suggested a
top-level mission from the Japanese government go to Peking to talk
about these things, or the Japanese Consul-General in Hong Kong
179Kyodo News Service 18 Apr 1964.
180NCNA Osaka 6 May 1964, SCMP 3217 p. 21.
NCNA Osaka 8 May 1964, SCMP 3218 p. 24.
NCNA Fukuoka 9 May 1964, SCMP 3219 p. 28.
NCNA Kitakyushu 10 May 1964, SCMP 3219 p. 29.
NCNA Tokyo 20 May 1964, SCMP 3226 p. 32.
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could approach the NCNA representative there on the same subject.
Ambassadorial talks in third countries were also suggested. Chou's
price for such talks was a public affirmation ("clear cut policy") of
Japan's intention to proceed toward diplomatic recognition of China,
and attendance at the 2nd Afro-Asian solidarity conference then being
181
sought by China to bolster its position against the CPSU. He
agreed not to insist on a break in US-Japanese relations as a pre-
182
requisite to Sino- Japanese relations. While these overtures were
being made, the three responsible Japanese ministries were man-
euvering over the April Matsumura agreement on LT trade offices.
MITI was pro from the beginning, the Foreign Ministry and Justice
were reluctant and insisted on conditions, particularly guarantees





These offers of governmental talks were not taken up by
Japan. And the Justice Ministry continued to follow a very restrict-
ive policy on entry permits for Chinese, especially from youth organi-
zations, a policy which was met with loud complaints from China, but
184
not from very high levels. Foreign Minister Ohira on the 4 June
said that ambassadorial level talks were not yet needed. Yet the
181NCNA Peking 16 May 1964, SCMP 3223 p. 30.
Sankei 17 May 1964.
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182
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Chinese Fair in Osaka opened amid much fanfare and much talk of
10/
trade potential and people's friendship.
This unresponsiveness on the part of the Japanese govern-
ment, which China perhaps was surprised at in view of their hopes
from the trade arrangements they had permitted, continued into July
and generated the first real signs that the plateau of friendly relations
was not permanent. In a sense relations reach their peak this month,
when Mao announced his support for the Japanese claim to the south-
187
ern Kuriles to a visiting JSP delegation, but the seeds of decline
were nonetheless sown. The Japanese government agreed to the
establishment of a Chinese trade office but only on the basis of a verbal
promise of no political activity and only with the understanding that
the representative be purely a private, unofficial, non-governmental
188
representative. On the 18th Taiwan lifted its ban on governmental
189purchases from Japan. (What Taiwan likes, Peking can be sure
to hate). Peking saved its displeasure for the next provocation, when
Japan insisted on limiting the size of the Liu Ning-yi delegation to the
10th WC on atomic weapons, at which the Chinese were determined
190
to make points against the Soviets. Ta Kung Pao's Commentator
protested this exclusion as a hostile act endangering the friendship of
the two countries at the behest of foreign powers. The editorial
18 NCNA Osaka 13 Jun 1964, SCMP 3240 p. 32.
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further reminded Japan that the two countries were still officially at
war, since Peking had never signed a peace treaty. It contrasted
Chinese hospitality to visiting Japanese with Japanese rudeness.
The bite of the editorial was reduced, however, when they singled
out the Justice Ministry for attack, rather than making a general
attack on the Japanese government as a whole.
This hint of declining relations remained just that. Liu
attended the conference, reduced delegation notwithstanding, and his
speeches, as well as the Chinese press stories and messages of
support from Chinese mass organizations, concentrated their fire
exclusively on the US, the Soviet Union, and various shades of re-
visionists (including a rather violent speech against the JSP right
191
wing given to SOHYO).
In August the Japanese continued to refuse any concessions
in their policies, but the Chinese were so busy with the party battles
that they did not react. During this month the Japanese Foreign
Ministry issued a statement defending the US bombing of North Viet-
nam, and the government gave its final approval to visits by US
192
nuclear submarines to Japanese ports. At the same time the
Chinese trade representatives arrived to take up their Tokyo posts,
a tourist agreement was signed with a Japanese travel agency, and
9 NCNA Peking 29 Jul 1964, SCMP 3270 p. 21.
NCNA Peking 1 Aug 1964, SCMP 3273 p. 40.
NCNA Peking 31 Jul 1964, SCMP 3273 p. 45.
NCNA Peking 6 Aug 1964, SCMP 3276 p. 28.
192Japan Quarterly
,
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the Japanese government gave its preliminary approval to the ex-
193
change of correspondents by newspapers. On the 26th the Chinese
also announced a three year contract for the import of chemical ferti-
194
lizer. Politics might be lagging, but economics still advanced.
In September the Chinese were still being restrained. A
few messages of support for anti-nuclear submarine and anti VN
war demonstrations were printed, but they were not especially
195
violent or high level. Tourist travel agreements were signed,
and the first Japanese tourists arrived and were given red carpet
196
treatment. The correspondent exchange was finally agreed to
197
and publicly announced ' and the trade representatives were mutually
198feted and banqueted in both capitals.
In October the Chinese appeared to be hopeful still, but
signs of the coming decline began to grow. On the 4th Ta Kung Pao's
Commentator wrote of the successes achieved in Sino- Japanese
relations since the founding of the CJFA a year previously, but
raised anew a demand which had been ignored for a year and a half,
199
that the Taiwan treaty be abrogated. On the 5th a joint statement
193 TK AIbid
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by groups in the friendly trade category mentioned the three political
and three commercial principles for the first time in many months.
On the 8th a cultural agreement promised expansion of relations, but
201
raised the demand for Japanese eschewal of a two-China policy.
A similar joint statement appeared on the 9th signed by the JCFA and
202
the CJFA. On the 16th China exploded her first nuclear device
and all but the JCP and left wing of the JSP in Japan condemned the
test with varying degrees of firmness. China's initial reaction to
the criticism was to emphasize the peaceful nature of her weapons,
and to support her peaceful intent by a proposal for a summit meeting
to agree on a total abolition of nuclear weapons. This initial reaction
was probably intended to cool Japanese fears, rather than as a real
203desire for negotiations. China quickly changed to the offensive on
the nuclear issue, supporting the massive Japanese demonstrations
against US nuclear submarine visits (which were, conveniently, just
about to begin) mounted by Japanese leftists prior to the scheduled
204general elections. These attacks did not mention the Japanese
government critically, but concentrated on US imperialism and the
Johnson government.
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The break came in late November. On the 20th, Sato's
government refused an entry permit for P'eng Chen to visit the JCP
205
in Tokyo. On the 21st a massive outpouring of protest signaled
the end of the plateau of good relations and the beginning of a gradual
decline into increased invective and propaganda and inter-govern-
mental hostility, although there was almost no real effect on trade
until well into the Cultural Revolution.
Growing invective and the transition to the Cultural Revolution
,
November 1964 to February 1966. On 20 November, the Japanese
government refused an entry permit for P'eng Chen to visit Japan in
connection with a JCP Congress. The Chinese reaction was quick and
violent. On the 21st the Foreign Ministry issued a protest accusing
Sato of being unreasonable and viewing the situation as very grave,
? A
reflecting a possible hostile attitude toward China on Sato's part.
The same day a rally in Peking was staged to protest an unresponsive
reply by the Japanese government to a demand from China for inform-
207
ation on Chinese laborers abducted during the war. On the 23rd
Jen Min Jih Pao's Commentator made a blistering attack on Sato,
raising a number of themes which were to be worked out and embroidered
2 08
upon in the coming months. Sato's action was laid to hostility and
a desire to undermine Sino- Japanese friendship. Such acts, it was
205Japan Annual of International Affairs , Vol. 3/4, 1963-64, Chronology.
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207NCNA Peking 21 Nov 1964, SCMP 3344 p. 24.
? ORNCNA Peking 23 Nov 1964, SCMP 3345 p. 29.

80.
warned, would endanger relations, but the statement was carefully-
couched in terms of warnings not threats. Sato was also attacked
for inviting US nuclear submarines, even though it was the US which
endangered Japan, not China. On the 24th, Jen Min Jih Pao's
209Observer extended the propaganda attack. Sato was accused of
blindness to political realities. He was taken to task for Japanese
attacks on China's nuclear weapons tests, and reminded that Japan
would be the main sufferer in a nuclear war, and that it would have
only itself to blame if it continued to be subservient to US imperi-
alism. On the 25th, Observer further deepened the intensity of its
attack, and attributed more of the initiative to Sato, with less em-
210
phasis on his subservience to the US. There was mention of a
new "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere", of Sato being worse
than Kishi, and of Sato as the willing tool of US imperialism.
The Chinese emphasized their displeasure by stalling on
211
the negotiations for the third year of the LT trade agreement,
and asking some scheduled LDP visitors and a Diet traders group
to postpone their visit. The ambiguity of this economic sanction
was underlined, however, by the fact that individual contracts were
still being signed during this month, even though the overall agree-
ment was being held up. Sato refused to be pressured in this way,
209^ NCNA Peking 24 Nov 1964, SCMP 3346 p. 29.
210NCNA Peking 24 Nov 1964, SCMP 3346 p. 31.
211
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however. He was quick to make conciliatory statements about his
desire for friendship with China and the possibility of ambassadorial
talks in third countries, but he did not withdraw the ban on Peng's
. .. 212
visit.
Peking underlined its displeasure with Sato on 12 December,
Jen Min Jih Pao's Observer again wrote a blistering attack on him,
213
this time for his foreign policies. Sato was attacked for his
"despicable" UN policy (voting with the US on the China question),
his adherence to a two-China's policy, his "slanderous" attack on
China's nuclear program, loans to Taiwan, Kishi's visit there, even
his giving a medal to General Le May of the US Air Force. Ta Kung
Pao's Commentator echoed this attack on the same day, adding a
phrase which was also to become standard: the peoples of the two
countries would not allow such hostility to stand in the way of improv-
214
ing relations. This was to become the formula under which con-
tinued trade and cultural relations were to be permitted regardless of
Japan's official actions and China's propaganda responses.
China's view of Sato was not enhanced by events in January
and February 1965. The communique released after his US visit
acknowledged Japan's independent stance vis-a-vis mainland China,
215
but also reaffirmed Japan's basic western facing attitude. M1TI
212 The New York Times 6 and 9 Dec 1964.
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approved deferred payment plans for the second whole vinylon plant
ordered by China, but denied a low interest Export -Import Bank
? 1 ft
credit. (Even this compromise, of course, brought a protest
2 17from Taipei. ) US Nuclear submarines made a more port calls,
Japan and the Soviet Union signed a new trade agreement, and MITI
refused EIB credits for a freighter ordered by China. Sato during
this time also refused to renounce the Yoshida letter as government
218
policy, though he did admit it was only binding indirectly. China's
reaction included the cancellation of a scheduled visit to Japan by
219 220
Liao Cheng-chih, more anti-Sato press items hard words by
22 1
Ch'en Yi to a pro-Peking LDP man visiting in Peking, and can-
222
cellation of a contract for a five million dollar urea plant.
China's reaction was not entirely negative, however, It
continued to apply the carrot along with the stick. Ch'en Yi was
bitter in his talk with Utsonomiya (the LDP visitor) but he repeated
Mao's support for Japanese claims in the Kurile Islands, and approved
of the pro-Peking conservatives' idea of Japan as an intermediary
between the US and China. Nan Han-chen, in talks with Okazaki
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(successor of Takasaki as LT head) was very favorable about the
223
prospects for trade and friendship. And Jen Min Jih Pap's
Commentator in a 12 February article implied that the only real
224
obstacle liable to affect trade was the Yoshida letter.
On 17 February, the Chinese press became highly incensed
over the disclosure of a Japanese Self Defense Force contingency
war plan known as "Three Arrows", It was used as a focus for
strong attacks on Japan's militarism and aggressiveness. But the
attacks went out of their way to attribute these qualities only to "a
225handful", and not to the Japanese government as a whole. The
same restraint was not part of the Chinese response to the initialing
of the treaty with the Republic of Korea on 20 February, after years
of on and off negotiations. All the old charges about Japanese im-
perialism, lackeyism, a Northeast Asia Treaty Organization, and
collusion with the US in Vietnam were revived in articles by Commen-
tator and Observer, in editorials, in a formal statement by the Chin-
? ? A
ese Foreign Ministry, and a massive Peking rally.
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Having apparently vented its bile by this massive outpouring
of invective, China was almost totally silent in March 1965. The
only event of the month was conciliatory; agreement was reached on
227
the resumption of parcel post service between the two countries.
Perhaps China was giving Sato time to react to its warnings. In
April the freighter was canceled in a letter which made the Yoshida
228
letter and denial of EIB credits the causes of the action. China
then gave Sato still another month before cancelling the vinylon plant
229
contract in May, because of Sato's "hostile acts". Sato's response
to these charges and cancellations was studied silence; he continued
negotiations of specific agreements with the Republic of Korea on
fisheries, property claims, and treatment of Korean aliens in Japan.
These agreements brought a new round of invective from China in a
230
whole series of articles and editorials.
On 19 April Kawashima Shojiro, Vice President of the LDP
and Sato representative, held brief talks with Chou En-lai during a
visit to Djakarta, in what amounted to an attempt to appease China's
anger and resentment without making any significant changes in policy.
Official results published for the talks were non-committal. But
various Japanese journalists apparently had better sources. Kawashima
227 -Japan Quarterly
,
Vol 12, no. 3, Jul-Sep 1965, Chronology.
770
°NCNA Peking 6 Apr 1965, SCMP 3435 p. 32.
229NCNA Peking 10 May 1965, SCMP 3457 p. 35.
230NCNA Peking 7 Apr 1965, SCMP 3436 p. 32.
NCNA Peking 8 Apr 1965, SCMP 3437 p. 27 ff.

85.
was reported to have told Chou that the Japanese did not consider
the Yoshida letter binding, but Chou was incredulous in view of the
denial of EIB credits. Kawashima also raised the possibility of
ambassadorial level talks in Switzerland, which Chou refused.
The tone of the conversations was reportedly quite sharp on Chou's
side. He categorized the denial of EIB credits as interference in
China's internal affairs (i.e. , support for the reactionary Chiang
Kai-shek), and discrimination against China. He also was angry
over Japanese denial of a visa to P'eng Chen and Japanese support
for the US policy in Vietnam. Clearly, the PRC was not going to be
231
mollified by gestures.
On the other hand it was not going to allow its indignation to
interfere with normal friendly and LT trade. A major rice contract,
232
the first since 1957, was signed on 15 April; Nan Han chen told
the Hitachi board chairmen that the freighter would be reordered if
233EIB credit were approved; most of the comments in the Chinese
press emphasized third party responsibility for the obstacles, that is
Taiwan and the US; and Japanese traders at the Canton Spring fair
234
reported business was better than ever.
23 1 Schechter Reporter article.
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In June the Korean Treaty and four supplementary agree-
ments were formally signed, and China reacted with violent charges
about NEATO, collusion with the US and ROK in Vietnam, Japanese
235
militarism making a comeback, etc.
In July and August, the Chinese took advantage of the 11th
WC on nuclear weapons to bring their propaganda attack onto Japan-
ese soil. Liu Ning-yi arrived in Tokyo on 23 July and immediately
attacked the government for its failure to progress toward normal
relations with China, as well as for denying visas to delegations
2 3 6from North Korea and North Vietnam. Much of Liu's speeches,
as well as messages from Chou En-lai and various Chinese organi-
zations, were taken up with matters related to the Sino-Soviet split,
and CCP relations with the JSP and JCP. Liu went out of his way,
however, to bring up all China's grievances against the Sato govern-
ment, and to call for peoples' struggle to correct these grievances.
He did not, however, identify Sato by name as the chief villain, only
237by implication. Liu repeated his charges in a third major speech,
and a similar line was taken by a delegate of the ACFTU before the
23 5Communist China Digest no. 153, 19 Jun 1965, p. 42
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NCNA Peking 25 Jun 1965, SCMP 3488 p. 22.
NCNA Peking 26 Jun 1965, SCMP 3489 p. 26.
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238SOHYO convention. In Hiroshima Nan Han-chen attacked the
Japanese government for putting up obstacles to trade, and said
that trade depended upon the government's taking up a friendly-
attitude and carrying out friendly policies. Nan refrained from
direct threats of economic retaliation, but the warning was clear
239
and, to the Justice Ministry, insulting. Yet at the same time
unidentified Chinese officials were reportedly offering talks on ex-
pandmg trade.
August of 1965 al-so saw a sudden spate of long articles
memorializing the anti- Japanese war, and the CCP's successful
use of people's war against the Japanese. Most of these articles
were part of the debate then going on in China over foreign and
defense policy vis-a-vis the Vietnam war and the Soviet dispute.
Only one was clearly aimed at Japan. On the 31st, Ta Kung Pao
241
used the occasion to warn Japan about a revival of militarism.
Finally during August the propaganda buildup for a massive Youth
Festival for Japanese young activists began, with Mao and Liu Shao-
chi leading the welcoming parties, and with much invective against
242
Japan for limiting the size of the delegation permitted to attend.
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For the next five months, from September through the be-
ginning of February 1966, there was a fairly steady trend in Sino-
Japanese relations. In matters of trade and other economic relations
China was pragmatic rather than dogmatic. At the same time she
mounted a continuous and ever-increasing propaganda campaign
against the ROK-Japan Treaty in her propaganda organs, and Ch'en
Yi in a series of announcements gradually hardened the political
stance of China. These three sequences do not seem to have been
precisely coordinated in each detail, proceeding simultaneously at
the same pace; but by the end of the period a new balance was achieved.
In the economic sphere the major development was the sign-
ing of the 4th year LT agreement (for 1966 trade) at the relatively
early date of 18 September, and without any indications that the
Chinese bargained very much harder than usual or attempted to in-
243
sert more than the usual amount of propaganda into the documents.
In October a Japanese industrial exhibition was held in Peking, at
which the speeches made pro-forma reference to US and Japanese
reactionary "obstacles" to trade, but were otherwise quite business-
244
like. Talks on the improvement of shipping between the two
245
countries were opened in October. In November and December
talks were held on fisheries and a joint statement resulted which was
more restrictive than the previous agreement, but still relatively
243NCNA Peking 18 Sep 1965, SCMP 3543 p. 36.
244NCNA Peking 4 Oct 1965, SCMP 3554 p. 31, 33,
NCNA Peking 16 Oct 1965, SCMP 3562 p. 36.
245




amicable. The Shanghai Japanese exhibition in December re-
247peated the general non-political atmosphere of the Tokyo fair.
At a reception for Japanese businessmen in December, Nan Han-
chen took a rather ambiguous stand, speaking of the glowing pros-
pects for trade, while at the same time referring to the political
and commercial principles and the potential difficulties raised by
Q , , , ..... 248Sato's hostility.
Attacks on the ROK treaty emphasized the dangers of the
revival of Japanese militarism and collusion between the US, Japan
i
and the ROK, as well as the good results in the anti-treaty struggle
movement which mounted massive demonstrations to oppose ratifi-
249
cation. The high point of this campaign was a Jen Min Jih Pao
editorial (unsigned) on November 15th after the treaty was ratified
by the lower house of the Diet. The essence of this attack was that
the treaty was an actualization of a combined US, Japanese, and
Korean military threat to China, as well as an oppressive denial of
250
the real will of the Japanese people. This was all repeated again
251
when the treaty was ratified by the upper house in December.
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248NCNA Peking 6 Dec 1965, SCMP 3594 p. 24.
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The Ch'en Yi pronouncements began on 29 September when
he stated that normalization of Japanese-Chinese relations could only
follow an end to Japanese subservience to the United States, that Sato's
desire for trade with China but political relations with the US would
not work, and that while the existing level of trade could be maintained,
252
expansion was out of the question. On 30 December, in an inter-
view with an Akahata correspondent, Ch'en echoed the general line on
the ROK treaty, characterized Sato as a running dog of US imperialism,
and stated flatly that there could be no improvement in Sino- Japanese
i
253
relations until Sato changed his policies. The stage was now set
for the 4 February 1966 article in Jen Min Jih Pao which was to in-
augurate the next phase in Japanese policy.
CCP-JSP Relations, 1963-1965
.
We have already discussed how
relations between the CCP and JSP during the early sixties were
cooling as China turned to the LDP as a potentially more profitable
contact point in Japan. During the plateau of the mid-sixties this
relative emphasis on the LDP continued, but additional causes for
tension between the JSP and China were added. The central issue
during these years was that of nuclear weapons, and the failure of
the JSP to continue with a foreign policy both hostile to the West and
subservient, or at least not contradictory to, that of the socialist
camp.
252NCNA Peking 6 Oct 1965, SCMP 3555 p. 26.
The New York Times 2 Oct 1965.
253NCNA Peking 4 Jan 1966, SCMP 3612 p. 29.
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The first manifestation of this trend came in March of 1963
when Gensuikyo split over the issue of condemning Soviet as well as
Western nuclear tests. The JSP elements in Gensuikyo, while no
doubt deploring American bombs more than Russian ones, still felt
it necessary to condemn both. As the JCP elements adhered to a
254
more usual line, the two parted company. This jump off the
bandwagon was reaffirmed at the 9th WC in August 1963 when the
question of the test ban treaty, over which the Chinese and Soviets
were so hopelessly divided, effectively destroyed the little remaining
cooperation between the JSP and JCP in the anti-bomb movement.
The JSP and SOHYO representatives walked out of the conference,
held one of their own, and issued their own statement supporting the
Soviet position on the test ban. The party was not totally united on
the details (or for that matter on the major point: the hard line pro-
Peking leftists of the Heiwa Doshikai faction did not approve of any
of this). Narita eventually forged a compromise position acceptable
to the pro-Soviet Wada faction which embodied total opposition to
nuclear weapons, but acceptance of the test ban treaty as a step in
the right direction. He also articulated the policy of "positive
neutralism" which reaffirmed that Japan should not become attached
255
to any military bloc of states. The Chinese reply was a renewed
and vicious attack on the JSP, which asserted collusion between Soviet
254Japan Quaterly Vol. 10, no. 3, Jul-Sep 1963, Chronology.
255
"The Socialists and Communist China", Japan Quarterly
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revisionism, US imperialism, and "right wing social democracy",
the Chinese phrase for the center right of the JSP. The attack also
256
named SOHYO as being corrupted by right wing social democracy.
This attack did not, of course, apply to the whole party.
The pro-Peking factions continued their active membership in the
various trade, cultural, and friendship associations, and a large
delegation made a friendly and widely publicized visit to China in
257
the fall of 1963, although it was not an official party visit. At
\
the next party elections in February 1964 the centrist factions of
Kawakami and Narita won, and the pro-Peking left factions boy-
258
cotted the elections. The centrist factions were being careful
however, in spite of the Chinese attacks, to avoid giving Peking more
reasons for the attacks. The party supported the Chinese request for
three rather than the two industrial fairs in Japan allowed by the
259government. In spite of this, Radio Peking made a particularly
violent attack on the JSP and Narita on 2 March 1964, accusing them
of supporting a two-China's policy. The JSP quickly denied the
charge, but there was considerable shock in Japan over the virulence
of the Chinese attack on a party that was believed essentially friendly
256NCNA Peking 24 Aug 1963, SCMP 3049 p. 32 ff.
257NCNA Peking 21 Sep 1963, SCMP 3067 p. 32.
NCNA Peking 23 Sep 1963, SCMP 3069 p. 26.
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to Peking, and over the JSP's submissiveness in the way the^reacted
to the attack. The consequence was a JSP decision to delay a
formal visit to Peking previously scheduled for May, and to consider
2 6 1
a proposal to visit the Soviet Union before visiting China. By
June, however, public reaction in Japan had eased, and two simultan-
eous missions departed for the Communist capitals: Sasaki to Peking
? A?
and Narita to Moscow.
Sasaki's trip was extremely well publicized by the Chinese,
and he was extremely cooperative in making statements in support
of Chinese policies. It was during this trip that Mao chose Sasaki
as the recipient of China's ideas on the right of Japan to the southern
2 64
Kuriles. Sasaki reaffirmed all three of the earlier CCP-JSP
joint statements, including explicitly the Asanuma statement of 1959-
Some of the more extreme members of his party joined the Chinese
attack on modern revisionism. Sasaki himself, however, stuck to
265
the JSP line on the test ban.
2 An
Ryozu Kurai, "Current Developments in Sino- Japanese Relations
and Japanese Attitudes Toward Communist China", Japan Annual o f
International Affairs
,
Vol. 3/4, 1963/1964, p. 110.
Yomiuri 4 Mar 1964.
2 6 1
Kyodo News Service 4 Mar 1964
Kyodo News Service 8 Mar 1964.
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Sasaki's faction was still not in command, however, and the
10th WC in August 1964 was a three way affair, with three separate
conferences held under the auspices of three separate organizations:
Gensuikyo and the JCP supported by Peking; Gensuikin (dominated by
the JSP and SOHYO) supported by the Soviet Union; and Kaikin Kaigi
2 ft f>(DSP and Domei) blandly blessed by the US. At the Gensuikyo
rallies, the Peking representative repeated China's attacks on "right
wing social democrats", but did not attack the JSP by name and made
? A 7
a plea for an end to the disunity of the ban the bomb movement.
This concilatory gesture was repeated by the Chinese in
October, at a rally commemorating Asanuma's assassination. While
attacking "right wing social democrats", the main speakers noted
that there was much agreement between China and the JSP in spite of
the disagreements over nuclear policy. The gesture was presum-
ably a sop to Narita's prestige, as he was about to arrive on a fence-
269
mending mission, which was at least temporarily successful
.
In spite of China's exploding its first nuclear device during Narita's
visit, a compromise was worked out which accepted the JSP disagree-
7 h ft
"Three Ban the Bomb Rallies", Japan Quarterly , Vol 11, no. 4,
Oct-Dec 1964.
267NCNA Peking 1 Aug 1964, SCMP 3273 p. 40.
NCNA Peking 6 Aug 1964, SCMP 3276 p. 28.
268NCNA Peking 12 Oct 1964, SCMP 3319 p. 30.
269NCNA Canton 15 Oct 1964, SCMP 3321 p. 26.
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ment over nuclear policy, while pointing to the large number of
270common goals and objectives of the two parties.
This CCP-JSP rapprochement made it easier for the Sasaki
wing in December to improve its position in the central executive
271
committee of the Party and was at least not a hindrance in Sasaki's
election as Chairman in May of 1965. Peking's congratulations to
272
Sasaki on his election were fulsome. Sasaki reciprocated by. an
273
attack on US policy in the Dominican Republic. In July, Peking
I
joined in congratulating the JSP on its successes in the local elections
274held that month.
The rapprochement was to be short-lived, however. As
Chinese policy towards Japan as a whole became more stringent
during 1965, Peking became less willing to accept the JSP's opposition
to its nuclear program. At both the 11th WC and the SOHYO convention
275
in August, China radically raised its price for friendship. To
SOHYO, the ACFTU speaker was blunt and insulting. Anyone who
didn't support China's nuclear program had to be a tool of American
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imperialism. The speaker was jeered and walked out of the
conference, and the JSP disappeared from the Communist press
for the rest of the year. Essentially, the hard line came to the
JSP almost six months before it solidified with respect to Japan
as a whole in February 1966.
CCP-JCP relations 1963-1965 . During this period the JCP moved
from a moderately pro-Peking but largely autonomous line to a
position more pro- Peking, reaching a peak with its support of the
PRC nuclear explosion in October 1964.. In 1965, however, as
China became more demanding of subservience and public support
of its side in the Sino-Soviet dispute, and became generally more
radical in its view of the role of communist parties in capitalist
countries, the JCP moved away from its pro-Peking stance. The
JCP announcement of a policy of "United Action" in Vietnam on 4
February 1966 was the key to the JCP-CCP split, which then grew,
becoming more public later in 1966, but essentially complete as
early as March, when a JCP visit failed to produce a communique.
The period ended with the JCP again basically neutral but more
receptive to Soviet overtures.
These developments are not at all clear on the Chinese side.
Most of what can be said about Chinese policy has to be deduced
second hand from the affect of this policy on JCP actions and state-
London Times 5 Aug 1965,
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ments. Ostensibly throughout this period, and even after the split
for several months into the next phase, the Chinese were openly
supporting the JCP as a leader of the Japanese struggle movement,
against the interference in JCP affairs of the CPSU. It is not until
late 1966 that Chinese moves against the main stream of the JCP
become visible. We can only, therefore, review the events of these
three years briefly, drawing what inferences we can in terms of
Chinese policy inputs to them.
In January 1963, a delegation of the JCP was received in
277
Peking by Mao, Liu, and T'eng. Mainichi on 10 January noted
that Akahata was giving equal space to both Chinese and Soviet
polemics, but that debate within party circles was strong and that
the neutralists within the main stream were having difficulty resist-
2 78
ing demands from the pro-Peking factions for a more positive stand.
An Akahata editorial on 24 January was still denying any split, but by
279
the end of the month Asahi reported that pro-Soviet party members
were being purged, largely because they were guilty of factional
activities, trying to split the party, and not submitting to party dis-
cipline. The pro-Peking groups were simply being more circumspect
and less factional. Akahata in its 26 February issue reaffirmed its
neutral position, but was slightly more hostile to revisionism than to
dogmatism, again on the grounds of the revisionists anti-party
277NCNA Peking 4 Jan 1963, SCMP 2894 p. 42.
NCNA Peking 6 Jan 1963, SCMP 2895 p. 28.
278
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activities. China proved its friendship and anti-splittist role by
publishing in March, with much fanfare, a flattering history of the
280JCP and a collection of JCP speeches, and by a major radio
281
attack on the anti-party activities of the revisionists in April.
282
In May another JCP book was published in Peking. The JCP
reciprocated by supporting China and opposing the test ban treaty
during the 9th WC in August 1963.
In September a JCP delegation was again given flattering
284
treatment, seeing both Mao and T'eng during its visit. No
communique was issued on the group's departure, and on the 29th
Chairman Nosaka of the JCP was explicitly neutral in remarks on
28 5
the Sino-Soviet split. In reporting on the CCP 7th Plenum in
November, however, the JCP took a line which clearly raised re-
286
vionism as a greater danger than dogmatism .
In March 1964 a delegation from the JCP visited Moscow,
stopping in Peking enroute and on the way home. At both times China
280NCNA Peking 21 Mar 1963, SCMP 294o p. 21.
281Radio Peking NCNA 23 Apr 1963.
282NCNA Peking 17 May 1963, SCMP 2984 p. 33.
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mounted huge, banner waving receptions for the visitors. On 25
March, NCNA reprinted a major Japanese speech claiming leader-
ship for the JCP in the Japanese struggle movement, a speech which
288
was actually given a month previously. The delegation also made
a side trips to Pyongyang and Hanoi from Peking, as well as widely
publicized tours in South China with major Chinese Communists as
289
hosts all along the route. Again, however, no communique was
290issued on their final departure.
This wooing apparently paid off, however. In May the JCP
delegations voted against ratification of the test ban treaty by Japan,
and the JCP members of both houses who broke party discipline to
vote for ratification were expelled by the Party. (They were later to
join and promote a separate pro-Soviet organization called the Voice
291
of Japan, but it never amounted to much. ) In June 1964, the JCP
also publicly opposed the CPSU call for an international conference to
292
ex-communicate the Chinese from the movement.
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In July, Akahata finally came out in the open with a series
of letters the JCP had exchanged with the CPSU, each growing more
critical as the JCP rejected Soviet calls for cooperation against the
CCP. The letters were dated 6 March 1963, 22 October 1963, and
10 January 1964, and revealed that the Soviet pressure on the JCP
293
was deeply resented. In the same issue justification was given
for JCP opposition to the test ban and the international conference.
The paper did not, however, balance its anti-CPSU attacks with any
pro-CCP material. While leaning away from one party to the split,
it was still resisting leaning toward the other. At the 10th WC on
atom bombs in August, the JCP again stood with the CCP organiza-
294
tionally, although it did not participate in the anti-Soviet polemics.
In September the JCP Secretary-General Miyamoto paid
another visit to China, where the welcome was more fulsome than
ever. He spoke with every leader of importance including Mao, and
the toasts were reported in unusual detail and completeness and were
295
unusually warm. Yet in a TV interview on his return to Japan,
Miyamoto would only say that he regretted the Sino-Soviet split,
wanted to restore unity, and attacked only the Shiga Voice of Japan
296
group, noting that Moscow was quoting Shiga's speeches.
293Akahata, 22 Jul 1964.
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A Central Committee plenum in September confirmed the
297
expulsion of the pro-Soviet faction leaders on the grounds of their
acting as Soviet agents and permitting interference in internal party-
affairs. In October, the JCP officially supported the Chinese ex-
298
plosion of a nuclear device. Hakamada, a leader of the main
stream faction with pro-Peking tendencies, gave a secret speech on
17 October, in which he explicitly accused Krushchev of financing
the Voice of Japan group through a CPSU representative in the Soviet
299Tokyo Embassy. The results of this plenum included the most
anti-Soviet statements of the era. Revisionism was characterized
f
as becoming more and more dangerous, and struggle against it more
and more important; attacks on China and Albania were denounced;
Yugoslavia was attacked by name for revisionism; the interference
of "certain members" of the CPSU in internal JCP affairs was de-
nounced; the Soviet capitulation over the Cuban missile crisis was
denounced; the call for an international communist conference was
opposed; and Zhukov was denounced for splittist activities during
his stay in Tokyo in the Spring of 1963.
This plenum was preparatory to the JCP 9th Congress held
in November 1964, to which P'eng Chen was invited, and whose being
denied an entry permit signalled a violent CCP attack on the new Sato
government. Failing a delegation, the CCP sent a series of messages
297Akahata, 20 Oct 1964.
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of support, including one from Mao himself. The messages were
301
highly flattering. The Congress approved the plenum's proposed
line and confirmed the expulsion of the anti-Party groups, but re-
elected an essentially neutralist slate of officers, with only the
slightest pro-Peking caste.
Miyamoto was again in China in February and March 1965,
303
and again left without a communique being issued. In April an
editorial in Ta Kung Pao praised the JCP stand opposing the US actions
304
in Vietnam and Sato's concurrence in the US actions. In Djakarta
in May the JCP and CCP delegations exchanged calls, the substance
of which was not reported. In June a meeting was held in Peking.
None of these meetings produced any reports, and in fact the silence
from both Peking and Tokyo was almost unprecedented. The first
indication of a policy development for the entire year was a speech
by Miyamoto published in Akahata for 2 July 1965, in which he noted
JCP agreement with the CCP on the subject of US imperialism, but
in which he emphatically denied that the JCP was a tool of the CCP.
Thus in this critical year, when the hostility between Japan and China
was growing on the official level, the Vietnam war was rapidly in-
creasing in intensity, the Indonesian coup was to take place, and the
301NCNA Peking 25 Nov 1964, SCMP 3346 pp. 24, 25.
302
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two parties were undergoing a considerable cooling of their relations.
At the 11th WC in August, at which Liu and Nan made their antagon-
istic remarks on Sato, the JCP were hospitable to their Chinese
307guests but notably silent in the debate that occurred. Satomi
Hakamada, the pro-Peking central executive and secretariat member
of the JCP was in Peking from 14 August to 2 October, without a word
308being published as a consequence of his visit. Except for cere-
monial announcements (like a JCP man's speech at the anti-ROK
309
treaty rally in November the year ended with the unusual silence
between the two parties almost unbroken. Later events have^ led some
observers to speculate that the year must have been spent in hard
discussions between the two parties, especially over Vietnam policy,
but as yet there is no real evidence to support this speculation.
On 15 January 1966, The Japan Times announced that a
major visit to China was planned by Miyamoto for mid-February.
On 4 February, Akahata printed an editorial supporting "United Action",
that is universal Communist cooperation, against the US in Vietnam,
a policy clearly on the Soviet side which had already been denounced
by Peking. Thus even before his trip, which was to seal the split be-
tween the two parties, Miyamoto had reversed the partial pro-Peking
attitude of a year before.
307NCNA Peking 11 Aug 1965, SCMP 3518 p. 18. This is a typical
example of several similar articles. The JCP is hardly even mentioned.
308 China Mainland Review, Vol. 1, no. 1, Jun 1965.
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The Cultural Revolution Phase 1966-1969
I have described 1965 as a year of transition in Chinese
policy towards Japan, transition towards a freezing of relations.
It must be emphasized that by this I meant a freezing of the status
quo , and not in any sense a break in relations or a decline in the
volume of those relations. As far as government-to-government
relations are concerned, the best way to characterize the four
years 1966 to 1969 is refusal on the part of the Chinese to make any
more concessions in the way of economic ties, unless the Japanese
made some major political concessions. Also, in return for keeping
the existing level of trade, they exacted more in the way of propa-
gandists support for their international views. Their hostility to
the SATO government itself became more shrill and virulent as the
decade drew to a close, but none of this significantly reduced the
level of trade between -the two nations, which was after all what the
Japanese were mainly concerned with.
In inter-party relations the situation was quite different,
and we shall again consider these matters separately. It is sufficient
to say here that during this period the JSP regained a great deal of
its favor with China, while the JCP became more and more publicly
estranged from it.
February and March 1966 saw a whole series of extremely
critical articles in the Chinese press on Japan. We have already
mentioned the 4 February article. There were others on February
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10th and 27th, and March 15th, 19th, and 29th 3 10 All of the
editorials, articles, and speeches at rallies emphasized Japanese
militarism and its combination with other hostile forces, including
the United State, the Soviet Union, India, Taiwan, South Korea,
and South Vietnam, and all saw these various combinations as
aggressive conspiracies planning war against China. Yet the bitter-
ness and virulence of these general propaganda attacks was not as
disruptive of actual relations between the two countries as disagree-
ment over specific issues. Liao Cheng-chih had requested from
Sasaki an invitation to the JSP convention in March, and been duly
311
invited as a representative of the PRC Institute of Foreign Affairs.
The government, in accordance with its usual practise of refusing
foreign participation in domestic political party congresses when-
312
ever possible, refused Liao an entry permit. The Chinese reaction
was quick, violent and prolonged, and included an equation of Sato
313
with Tojo by the most authoritative of China's pseudonymous authors.
NCNA Peking 4 Feb 1966, SCMP 3634 p. 29.
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The result was a cancellation of a scheduled visit to China by a group
3 14
of LDP Diet representatives.
This hard line also affected trade negotiations, if not trade
volume. An unofficial representative of a Japanese government-
sponsored trade office returned from Peking on 31 March complain-
ing that he had been treated like a tourist, that China was going to
shift some of its trade away from Japan to Western Europe, and
was threatening to retaliate against Japanese newspapers if they
315
carried through their plans to open offices in Taipei. In a message
to Matsumura Kenzo, Liao Cheng-chih agreed to discuss in general
the future of the LT agreement only on the condition that Matsumura
not bring up his pet idea of being a bridge between China and the US.
d
317
In the negotiations themselves, Chou took a very hard line on Sato
while agreeing in principle that the LT agreement would be extende
All this evidence of a Chinese shift to a more intransigent
attitude, which has since been attributed to the growing intensity of
the Cultural Revolution in China, was only related explicitly to the
Cultural Revolution for the first time on 27 May, when a delegation
of the Japan China Friendship Association first publicly praised the
318
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ment for such obeisance became more and more stringent after
this, both from friendship and cultural delegations and from trading
delegations. From this time on, in fact, press item which once
would have noted only "cordial and friendly talks", contained formal-
istic references to the Cultural Revolution, Mao-think, or both.
Growing Chinese militance was also reflected by the hard and (to
the Japanese government) insulting and interfering line taken by a
friendship delegation from Kwangtung Province which visited Japan
319
in May and June. In one speech they made an obvious if only an
implied reference to Sato as a lackey of the US, language not used
320before by Chinese while visiting in Japan. More explicitly, a
group of Chinese correspondents gave a press conference in Tokyo
accusing Sato of "lies" and "slander" in referring to their coverage
of anti-submarine demonstrations as interference in Japanese political
32 1
affairs. Prior to this, Chinese in Japan had been fairly careful
about giving Japanese authorities cause to complain. Not wishing to
exacerbate the increasingly difficult relation, the Sato government
ignored these incidents, as they did a later one in the same vein when
the Chinese head of the LT liaison office in Tokyo denounced bitterly
Japan's refusal of an entry permit for Liu Ning-yi to attend the 12th
322WC. This same refusal of Liu's visit, when coupled with a US-
319NCNA Tokyo 31 May 1966, SCMP 3711 p. 32,
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Japan security conference at Hakone and a visit by the Soviet official
Gromyko, produced a series of propaganda attacks against the Sato
323foreign policy. The most thorough of these attacks charged that
the US, the USSR, and Japan had formed a new "Holy Alliance"
324
against revolution and especially against China.
The group of LDP Diet representatives which had cancelled
325
their visit in March finally went to Peking in August and September.
In talks with them, Chou and Ch'en Yi took a rather strong anti-Sato
line, but made some ambiguous remarks about the potential for US-
Chinese relations which emphasized that substantive policy was much
less militant than the words in which it was cloaked. Chou also
announced that trade talks in the fall on extension of the LT agreement
were still desired by China, and that he expected step by step improve-
ment in relations towards diplomatic recognition, although this
was expressed more in terms of long range hopes than immediate
f f 327expectations.
During all this relatively high level political maneuvering
and posturing, the substance of economic relations proceeded at a
relatively stable pace. Negotiations for individual contracts continued
NCNA Peking 27 Jul 1966, SCMP 3750 p. 35.
NCNA Peking 28 Jul 1966, SCMP 3751 p. 27.
NCNA Peking 28 Jul 1966, SCMP 3751 p. 28.
NCNA Peking 30 Jul 1966, SCMP 3752 p. 24.
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with hard bargaining but no real stubborness on either side. Friendly
trade in particular was progressing nicely, probably because "friendly
companies" were not reticent about giving lip service to Mao-thought,
the Cultural Revolution, and the three political and commercial
principles. This was especially noteworthy at the Chinese fair in
328Kitakyushu in October and the Japanese fair in Shanghai in December.
What confusion and disruption did exist in this period in friendly trade
was largely a matter of CCP-JCP hostility which will be discussed
later.
Negotiations for the final year (1967) of the original LT
329
agreement began in November as scheduled. They were held up
by a Chinese demand for Japan to buy more rice than it wanted in
return for Chinese fertilizer purchases, but there was no indication
of political demands affecting the talks in any way, and an agreement
330
was signed on the 21st. In talks with an economic delegation in
December, in Peking to discuss specific contracts under the LT
agreement, Ch'en Yi emphasized the political conditions necessary
for trade expansion, that is progress toward diplomatic recognition.
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view and urged the Japanese businessmen to use their influence to
33 1propose a more cooperative policy to the Japanese government.
This was one of the most explicit moves yet by the Chinese to remove
the distinction which had existed till then between LT trade and
Friendly trade, or to attach political and propagandistic demands to
LT trade.
In January 1967 there occurred the first instances of
physical disruption of trade because of the Cultural Revolution. The
Chinese head of the LT liaison office returned to Peking for his health
332
on the 10th (ideological health?). Export delays, due primarily to
333
shipping problems, were reported and traders experienced some
334
difficulty in conducting negotiations on specific contracts. Sports
exchanges were also postponed because of the upheavals in China at
335
the time. Another indication of internal problems in China affect-
ing Japanese relations was the appearance of a Red Guard article in
Jen Min Jih Pao attacking Sato with the usual charges of militarist,
one of the earliest indications that the party and the Foreign Ministry
o o L
were not the only participants in foreign policy making at this time.
331
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332
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333
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Ill
The spring of 1967 saw a gradually increasing militancy in
the details of Sino- Japanese relations. A major attack was mounted
on Japanese restrictions on products to be displayed at the Tientsin
fair (17 items out of several thousand were prohibited by Sato be-
cause of CHINCOM rules) and Japanese traders had to display con-
337
siderable indignation with Sato before the fair was opened.
Similarly traders at the Canton fair were required to carry Mao's
3 38
Little Red Book with them. In July Ch'en Yi told Utsonomiya
that while China wanted trade to continue after the LT agreement
339
expired, the time was not yet ripe for negotiations on an extension.
Accordingly talks were postponed for two months, pending Japanese
concessions on EIB credits and willingness to buy more Chinese meat
340(which the Japanese didn't want because of sanitary problems).
In late July, six Japanese businessmen were interrogated by Red
Guard groups who searched their houses and offices, and finally
341
arrested them for spying. Other businessmen,mostly from
friendly companies, could not get their residence permits extended
337Kyodo News Service 18 May 1967.
Akahata 24 May 1967.
Akahata 25 May 1967.
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during this time as China sought to reduce the foreign presence in
342
Peking. Attacks on Japan for the usual offenses, official visits
to other Asian nations and refusals of entry to some Chinese visitors,
were most pronounced during this period from Chinese trade organi-
343
zations, rather than newspaper editors and columnists. Among
these the Chinese head of the Tokyo LT liaison office was most
vociferous, particularly over Japanese police interference in rioting
344between pro-Chinese and anti-Chinese groups of the Japanese left.
The Japanese press came under attack at the same time.
Three newspapers' correspondents were expelled for anti-Chinese
345
activities. Yomiuri's sponsorship of an exhibition of Tibetan art,
attended by the Dalai Lama, was attacked as an anti-Chinese act and
346
its correspondents were expelled from Peking. Significantly the
announcement of the correspondents' expulsion was made by the head
of the LT liaison office in Peking, just as the most virulent denunciation
of Sato's trip to Southeast Asia came from the head of the Tokyo LT
347
liaison office.
Negotiations for a new agreement or an extension of the LT
agreement were not even officially mentioned during the fall months.
342Kyodo News Service, 24 Aug 1967.
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345NCNA Peking 10 Sep 1967, SCMP 4021 p. 32.
346NCNA Lhasa 26 Sep 1967, SCMP 4031 p. 32.
NCNA Tokyo 28 Sep 1967, SCMP 4033 p. 29.
NCNA Tokyo 2 Oct 1967, SCMP 4036 p. 24.
NCNA Peking 12 Oct 1967, SCMP 4043 p. 35.
347NCNA Tokyo
,
8 Sep 1967, SCMP 4020 p. 33.

113.
In October Jen Min Jih Pao called Sato "the number one running dog
of US Imperialism" and Soviet revisionism because of his Southeast
348
Asia trip. Sato's talks with President Johnson in November
349brought an equivalent series of charges and attacks, as did the
visit of Chiang Ching-kuo in December and Japanese police searches
of offices of the Japan International Trade Promotion Association
350(friendly trade coordinator). Yet at the same time Yawata Iron
& Steel was invited to deal at Canton for contracts, without any pre-
351
tense of "friendly" cover. During this whole period, when China
was resisting public negotiations on extension of the LT agreement,
and friendly firms were required to be more and more friendly, other
firms were permitted to trade without any political conditions at all.
And the final result of all this was essentially that aggregate Chinese
trade with Japan was hardly affected by the Cultural Revolution at all.
It is significant that at this peak of intransigence China was willing to
be quite so flexible.
In January 1968 the Chinese finally indicated a willingness
to begin talks on extending the LT agreement. Chou En-lai told a
group of visiting JSP delegates (the channel indicating clearly who
was in favor with Peking at the time) that negotiators would be
348NCNA Peking 23 Oct 1967, SCMP 4048 p. £|.
349NCNA Peking 21 Nov 1967, SCMP 4066 p. 32.
350NCNA Peking 4 Dec 1967, SCMP 4075 p. 37.
NCNA Kwangchou 27 Nov 1967, SCMP 4069 p. 35.
NCNA Tokyo 4 Dec 1967, SCMP 4076 p. 35.
NCNA Peking 9 Dec 1967, SCMP 4079 p. 42.
351




welcome. According to the socialists, he said that China desired
trade and was unhappy with Japanese reluctance. He also told them
353China was genuinely concerned about a revival of Japanese militarism.
According to Japan's major financial newspaper, however, the reason
for the shift may have been more some signs that Japanese industrial
circles were prepared to pressure Sato for concessions. These signs
included a resolution asking Sato to announce a definite pro-trade
policy, renounce the Yoshida letter finally and unequivocally, and
3 54
remove other "political" obstacles to trade. Whatever the reason
355
negotiators left Tokyo before the month was out, and their entry
permits were granted by Peking, even though Sato's only statement
on long term credits was that they would be handled on a case by
356
case basis, neither affirming nor denying the Yoshida letter.
The negotiations were the most difficult ever as far as the
Japanese were concerned. They lasted from 3 February 1968 to
6 March, and were characterized by repeated Chinese demands for
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could even be discussed. When the negotiators gave in on public
agreement with China's views (that economics and trade were in-
separable and that Sato's government was the main obstacle to trade)
the Chinese became demanding on the trade issue itself, insisting
3 58
that Japan agree to buy more rice and meat. An agreement was
finally signed on 6 March, together with a joint statement which
agreed to the three political and three commercial principles, that
economics and politics were inseparable, that the primary obstacles
to trade were US imperialism and the Japanese authorities, and that
the Japanese would make efforts to overcome these obstacles. In
essence, this was putting LT trade into the same category as friendly
trade propagandistically if not organizationally. (Friendly trade was
still run by left-dominated Japanese trade associations with much
359
more direct ties to Chinese policies. ) The communique was
officially denounced by the Sato government, and the working out of
details of the trade agreement continued for several months more,
but the formal existence of an agreement to some degree reinstated
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the conditions which had been temporarily in abeyance during the
last half of 1967 at the height of the Cultural Revolution. Trade
went on and polemics continued. Disruptions did not completely
end, however. Chou requested cancellation of the fairs planned
for China in 1968 because China was "too busy" to have them.
The polemics covered the usual topics during this period.
Among the targets were all Japanese relations with other non-
Communist Asian states and the Japanese defense industry and Self
"\ A 1 "X A"?
Defence Force, Suharto's visit to Japan in April, Japanese
5 L o
nuclear energy programs, and repression of anti-US demon-
364
strations. A new topic, soon to become one of the most frequently
mentioned, was Sato's "scheme" to maintain the US Security Treaty
365
in 1970. A high point of the tirade during this period was the
366
article by Jen Min Jih Pao's Commentator on 20 April. This
article hit all the major themes from political and commercial
principles to Taiwan visits. Sato was called the most reactionary
of all postwar premiers.
At the same time, however, and for the first time since the
Djakarta talks in April 1965, ambassadorial level contacts between
the two countries were begun in third countries, among them Laos
"^ AO
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and Switzerland. The Chinese never publicized these talks, and
the Japanese only admitted them when the press leaked the story.
No substance was ever reported on the discussions. The mere fact
that such talks did take place, however, indicates some easing in
China's stance at this time.
The remainder of 1968 was relatively uneventful. China was
indeed busy at home with little time or energy to devote to foreign
affairs. The polemics continued but were much less frequent than
usual. The volume of LT trade for 1968 was finally fixed in June
3691968 and Japanese traders at Canton continued to praise the thoughts
of Mao. There were also isolated "struggles" against Japanese news-
370
men and an occasional arrest. The year ended with a blast at Sato
for sabotaging trade by adhering to the CHINCOM restrictions on the
display of certain products at an industrial exhibition scheduled for
1969.
3?1
1969 was almost a replay of 1968. Trade negotiations were
delayed and frequently stalled by Chinese demands for Japanese self-
criticism, but finally settled with the issuance of a joint statement
a L~i
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which the Japanese government then repudiated. Talks on the ex-
tension of the LT agreement did not begin until 19 February, when
the chief Chinese negotiator made a speech insisting on the three
political and commercial principles and the inseparability of politics
and economics, and accusing the Sato government of frantically
accelerating militarism and fascism, tailing after US imperialism,
372
and suppressing the people's just and patriotic struggle. On 4
April an agreement and a joint statement were signed which acceded
to China's views of the situation, but which went even further than
the 1968 statement in admitting Japan's fault in all problems between
the two countries. It even went so far as to state that Peking was the
only legal government of China, that Taiwan was the inviolable terri-
tory of China, and that the US Security treaty was a serious threat to
the peace of all Asia and an obstacle to Sino- Japanese relations which
373
the traders would work hard to abrogate.
Exhibitors at the Peking industrial fair, no doubt at Chinese
instigation, actually initiated a suit against the Japanese government's
374
restrictions on products and participated in demonstrations when
the exhibit opened accusing Sato of obstructing trade and being hostile
375
to China. One sign that Chinese militance had not really eased
was the cancellation of the scheduled Shanghai fair, not because China
was too busy but because of Sato's continued adherence to the CHIXCOM
Peking Radio (Japanese) 19 Feb 1969.
373NCNA Peking 4 Apr 1969, SCMP 4393 p. 35.
374Japan Quarterly
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restrictions. Pure trade issues were also difficult to settle during
1969. Chinese demands that Japan accept more meat were strong
377
and repeated and ultimately Japan found a way to accede to them.
In pite of all of this, contracts were signed and trade did continue
during the year.
Polemics during 1969 continued at a high level of intensity.
Foreign affairs continued to be the main subject, but the Security
Treaty was attacked more frequently, and the university riots and the
anti-riot bills were new items. Commentator, for example, in an
early article praised the demonstrators highly and explicitly approved
of the use of violent tactics against government suppression, while
378
condemning the counter-revolutionary violence of the police.
Much of this rhetoric was directed at the JCP, as we shall see when
we discuss inter-party relations. Sato's comments on Okinawa as a
379
Japanese defense base drew a strong rebuke, as did his frequent
380
other remarks on defense leading up to talks on Okinawa reversion,
38 1
and his reception of a Taiwanese ambassador. This last generated
a promise to "sooner or later settle accounts for the crimes of aggression
38Z
against Taiwan and the 700 million Chinese people". Collusion with
37 A
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the Soviet revisionists was another favorite topic, especially after
383
the Sino-Soviet border incidents began. The polemics built up
during the year until the climax in November when the Nixon-Sato
communique on the reversion of Okinawa was issued. The volume
of attacks produced by this communique was unique, although the
intensity of the invective was by no means unprecedented. The
thrust of them all was, of course, that the whole thing was a trick,
and that Okinawa was not only not going to revert, but that the real
reason for the agreement was to open up Japan itself to nuclear
384
weapons while at the same time wining votes to keep Sato in office.
Informal remarks by Chinese officials, especially Chou
En-lai, to Japanese visitors during the year reinforced the impressions
given by the polemics and the hard-nosed trade stance. Talking to the
chief Japanese LT negotiator in April, Chou refused to accept an in-
formal ambassador from Sato, insisted on an end to the CHINCOM
restrictions, and state that trade could not expand until relations were
385improved. To Utsonomiya Chou again refused to accept the proferred
ambassador (former Foreign Minister Aiichiro Fujiyama), and em-
phasized that his main reason for a hard line was that no real progress
383NCNA Peking 27 May 1969, SCMP 4429 p. 28.
384NCNA Peking 17 Nov 1969, SCMP 4544 p. 20.
NCNA Peking 21 Nov 1969, SCMP 4546 p. 20.
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had been made in Sino- Japanese relations since I960, that all the step-
o o L
by-step improvements had turned out to be just window dressing.
Sporadic attacks on Japanese in China also continued during
the year. In May four Japanese traders were arrested in Canton,
387two for "political" reasons, and two for urinating in public.
Another correspondent was arrested for espionage, but was expelled
388
rather than imprisoned. While the Cultural Revolution was
supposed to be over in China, there was no discernible easing of
the militancy of its posture towards Japan. The decade ended in
1969 with no sign thatthe policies of the 1966 to 1969 period were
changing or even about to change. Hence the recitation of events
must cease at this point without our being able to close out a phase
in Sino- Japanese relation.
Interparty relations JSP-CCP, 1 966- 1969 . In the previous phase,
we have seen how the Chinese hard line disrupted its relations with
the JSP during and after the 1965 anti-bomb conference in August,
causing a hiatus in relations for the last half of 1965. This attitude
on the part of the Chinese was dramatically reversed at the beginning
of 1966. As CCP relations with the JCP suddenly worsened in Feb-
ruary and their ties to the ruling party became more difficult, China
turned to the JSP as its main source of contacts and support in Japan,
OO L
Kyodo News Service 12 Apr 1969.
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and thereafter ties between the CCP and JSP remained generally
very close for the rest of the decade. As usual, their ties were
strongest with the leftist factions of the JSP, and the rightist factions
tried to avoid too close a tie, but the party as a whole was definitely
pro-Chinese for this entire phase of Sino- Japanese relations.
That the JSP was worth cultivating was brought home to the
Chinese when the pro-Peking factional leader Sasaki was reelected
389
to the chairmanship on 22 January 1966. In February, Liao
Cheng-chih wrote to Sasaki, asking him for an invitation to visit a
390forthcoming JSP conference in Japan. In March a Japanese
newspaper reported that China was urging the JSP to try to reunite
391
the anti-bomb movement or face the total loss of Chinese support.
These urgings were to remain for a while a long range affair, how-
ever, as the Sato government refused to permit Chinese visits to the
392JSP, a refusal which brought a predictable attack from the Chinese
393
Institute of Foreign Affairs, the organization of which Liao was head,
394
and from Jen Min Jih Pao's Commentator. The refusal was also
the subject of a meeting for young Japanese Socialists visiting Peking,
and for a message of support from China to a Tokyo rally objecting
389Japan Quarterly
,
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to the visa denial. The joint statement signed by the young
socialists on 22 April probably represents what the Chinese would
like to have obtained from a visit to JSP headquarters in Japan,
namely a memorial to Asanuma and his famous statement, as well
as a statement of support for North Vietnam not in terms of the
then current Soviet line of "united action". This statement can be
seen as a clear differentiation between the JSP and JCP in early
1966, with the former being wooed to replace the latter as champions
396
of the CPR. That at least some elements within the JSP were
more than willing is testified to by the visit of a delegation of JSP
"activists" to China in May and June, during which they contributed
to the chorus of praise for the thought of Mao Tse-tung and the
397
Cultural Revolution. ' At the same time JSP headquarters in Tokyo
398
announced a new drive for diplomatic recognition of mainland China.
In August 1966 the improvement of CCP-JSP ties continued
on several levels. A group of JSP Diet representatives spent three
weeks in China, where they were given strictly VIP treatment, being
received and banqueted by Liao and Ch'en yi, and taking a tour of
399South China. Simultaneously a group of Chinese youth were present
395NCNA Peking 7 Apr 1966, SCMP 3677 p. 40.
NCNA Peking 8 Apr 1968, SCMP 3677 p. 41.
396NCNA Peking 22 Apr 1966, SCMP 3685 p. 34.
397NCNA Peking 5 Jun 1966, SCMP 3715 p. 30.
NCNA Canton 19 Jul 1966, SCMP 3744 p. 21.
398 The New York Times , 24 Jun 1966.
399NCNA Peking 9 Aug 1966, SCMP 3759 p. 28.
NCNA Peking 11 Aug 1966, SCMP 3761 p. 21.
NCNA Peking 12 Aug 1966, SCMP 3762 p. 24.
NCNA Peking 13 Aug 1966, SCMP 3763 p. 35.
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at a youth festival sponsored by the JSP and Young Socialist League
. ~ , 400
in lokyo.
The Dietmen's trip became the cause of a donnybrook within
the party. The leading representative., Tate Kenejiro of the Sasaki
faction, was much too anti-Soviet and pro-Cultural Revolution to suit
the rightest and neutralist factions of the party. They charged the
Sasaki faction was being sucked in by the Chinese to replace the JCP
401
as China's fifth column in Japan. In view of the frequent mention
around this time of the need for revolution to keep US troops tied
down and to thereby prevent a US attack on China, the "fifth column"
metaphor was not too inappropriate. This was re-emphasized as
young Japanese, mainly from the Socialist Youth League, attended the
Second China Japan Youth Festival in China, which occupied itself
largely with Red Guard demonstrations in praise of the Thought of
402Mao. When the Japanese government limited the number of exit
permits for Japanese to attend the youth festival, the Peking press
raised the level of its invective, to the point where a Red Guard
article praised Japanese youth for "rising in revolt" against the Sato
403government.
400NCNA Tokyo 15 Aug 1966, SCMP 3765 p. 21.
401 Japan Times 30 Aug 1966.
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In September the fractionalization of the front organizations
in Japan began. The "friendly" trade organizations were divided into
two: the JCP dominated Japan China Trade Promotion Association
and the mixed Japan International Trade Promotion Association,
which had JCP, JSP, and LDP membership. On 18 September, a
miniate signed by the latter group in Peking thoroughly adopted the
current Chinese line (praise for the Cultural Revolution and Mao
thought, condemnation for Sato, US imperialism, and Soviet revision-
ism, support for the three political and three commercial principles)
and at the same time attacked the former organization for anti-Chinese
hostility, promising to assume all the coordinating functions formerly
404
carried out by both organizations. This splittist movement ex-
tended to the Japan China Friendship Association in October, when the
JSP and left JCP members walked out and formed their own organi-
zation, thenceforth known to the Chinese as the Japan China Friend-
405
ship Association (Orthodox). In November the split extended to
most other front organizations, including Afro-Asian solidarity,
women's league, and journalists. These splits had their violent
moments, beginning with a riot between JCP and JSP activists at the
Chinese industrial exhibition in Nagoya in November 1966, riots
initiated over the attempt of the JCP to stop the sale of Mao Thought
404NCNA Peking 18 Sep 1966, SCMP 3786 p. 39.
405Japan Quarterly
,
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propaganda items, and the attempt of the pro-Peking JSP to stop the
407JCP. The violence brought a rebuke to the JCP from Narita for
obstructing Sino- Japanese relations.
Another evidence of China's wooing of the JSP was the visit
of a delegation from the ACFTU to SOHYO in December 1966. The
line they took was a very soft one, to cool the resentments they had
generated the previous year in arrogantly demanding support for
China's nuclear policy. They agreed to accept SOHYO's disagree-
ment with their nuclear policy, and on an expanded personnel visit
409
exchange. On the 6th, Sasaki was reelected chairman of the JSP,
but Eda managed to get over 48 percent of the votes, to Sasaki's less
than 52 percent. Clearly the pro-Peking wing had only a bare majority,
nothing like the general consensus needed to control in Japanese
. t . 410organizations.
For the next several months, the JSP pro-Peking fronts
continued to lend themselves to the Chinese propaganda machine, which
now attacked the usual targets plus the "handful of obstructionists" and
"betrayers" in the un-named JCP. This propaganda extended to
violence once again in March, when a riot occurred at the Tokyo
411headquarters of several of the Chinese fronts. Polemics on these
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riots contained the first attacks on the JCP by name. By May Chinese
polemics had settled on the "four enemies" as standard topics of attack:
US imperialism, Soviet revisionism, Japanese reactionaries, and the
Miyamoto clique of betrayers, targets to be repeatedly referred to in
minutes, communiques, and joint statements signed by visiting JSP
412
led front delegations.
This alliance of the JSP with China was obnoxious not only to
the JCP but also to the moderate factions of the JSP. In late May these
two groups met to seek ways of avoiding a split in their domestic
413
collaboration in local elections. Eda publicly called on the JSP to
414
stop issuing pro-Peking circulars, and in June Akahata urged
415
Narita to annul the pro-Peking circulars being published by his party.
But Sasaki was still in command, and in July was demanding the govern-
ment approve entry permits for Chinese to attend the JCFA(O) con-
416
vention. This was, however, his last major act as Chairman. In
August he was forced to retire, and in new elections Katsumata (of the
Narita faction) and Eda were elected, bringing an end to the domination
of the pro-Peking wing of the JSP. Katsumata began his chairmanship
with a call for "Japanese-oriented socialism", a clear call for neutrality
412For example NCNA Peking 11 Apr 1967, SCMP 3919 p. 25 and
NCNA Peking 15 Apr 1967, SCMP 3925 p. 31.
413Asahi Evening News
,
2 5 May 1967.








in the Sino-Soviet and CCP-JCP splits. This did not stop individ-
ual JSP members from continuing their activities in the pro-Peking
fronts, nor from visiting China and signing propaganda statements as
individuals or as members of the JCFA(O) or JITPA; it did mean an
end to official party support for pro-Peking causes. JSP official
cooperation had, however, played an import if temporary role in
maintaining Chinese influence in Japan after the JCP split, and while
the revolutionary left of the JCP was getting organized.
In January 1968 the Chinese tried to revive their ties with
the JSP leadership. A JSP delegation visiting Peking was urged by
Chou En-lai to increase their militance, to overcome the factionalism
within the party, and to form a united front with the left JCP and the
pro-Peking "new right" in the LDP to oppose Sato's revival of militar-
ism. Chou also chose this group to carry a message back to Japan
418
that he was ready to talk about extending the LT agreement. The
JSP response was ambiguous. Although keeping to its desire to stay
out of the JCP-CCP invective exchange, it did renew its call for
diplomatic recognition of mainland China in a campaign begun in April.
It also made the point that this campaign would not be tied organiza-
419
tionally to the JCFA(O). Chinese acceptance of this limited effort
signalled to an anti-Sato article on 20 April which praised the JSP for
Japan Quarterly
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its opposition to Sato's policies. This limited support and limited
neutrality did not satisfy the JCP however. Akahata in September
printed a bitter article denouncing the JSP for splitting the anti-Sato
421forces and allying itself with the CCP.
JSP neutrality was reinforced in October, when Narita and
Eda were elected as Chairman and Secretary-General respectively,
422
in a convention which studiously avoided any mention of China. ' The
JSP continued this neutral policy for several months, and in fact has
made no major change as of the end of 1969. The only two events of
significance during the year were an article in Akahata on 9 April
pleading with the JSP to break officially with the JCFA(O), which
Narita refused to do, and a letter from the JSP to Chou En-lai which
tacitly restricted JSP cooperation to the campaign for diplomatic
recognition, a letter much resented by the pro-Peking Heiwa Doshikai
, .. 423faction.
Interparty relations 1966-69, CCP-JCP . The split between the JCP
and the CCP that developed during the course of 1966 and 1967 has been
well described already by Simon and Kyosuke, and need not be repeated
424
in detail here. The rift was a result of disaffection on both sides:
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the JCP was disturbed over the results of the Indonesian coup d'etat
attempt in 1965, remembering its own experience with a radical line
resulting from COMINFORM orders in 1950. It was also becoming
convinced that the Mao-Lin line was completely inappropriate to
Japanese conditions, that Japan was in no sense part of the "world
countryside", and that the "parliamentary road" was probably the
only road the JCP could take to power. The Chinese, as the Cultural
Revolution increased in intensity, more and more demanded positive
anti-Soviet steps on the part of those parties friendly to it, steps which
the JCP was unwilling to make. Thus from the time of the March 1966
Miyamoto meeting with Mao, in which Mao refused to issue a com-
promise communique worked out by Liu, T'eng, and Miyamoto, re-
lations gradually cooled between the two parties, with veiled attacks
beginning in the summer of 1966, and finally open and direct polemics
in the spring and summer of 1967. It is noteworthy that the JCP did
not initiate the open polemics, preferring when possible to avoid a
public split, but did defend itself when the Chinese began to attack them
in public and by name. As 1967 drew to a close, China has switched
to a policy supporting the JSP, and pro-Peking factions within the LDP
and JCP, and the JCP was openly and avowedly neutral, refusing to
support either side of the Sino-Soviet split.
In 1968, however, as the Chinese gave more and more support
to leftist factions in Japan who were making a concerted drive on the
JCP, Miyamoto and the JCP main stream found themselves being
pushed into the Soviets' arms in self-defense, and their neutrality has
since been eroded to the point where they may be characterized as
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moderately pro-Soviet. In internal Japanese politics this has meant
emphasis on peaceful revolution, the parliamentary road, economic
reform, and opposition to the violent tactics of the new left. Chinese
tactics have essentially concentrated on varied and broad front support
for all anti-JCP forces in the left camp of Japan. We can now review
the details of developments which occurred in 1968 and 1969, after the
two articles cited above were written.
An article in Jen Min Jih Pao in January 1968 reviewed the
development of a revolutionary left mass movement in the preceding
year, based on the thought of Mao Tse-tung, and predicted continued
growth in the movement and the violent struggle of this movement
425
against Japanese reactionaries and their "cohorts" (the JCP). The
same month Suslov and Kirilenko arrived in Tokyo, on the invitation
426
of the JCP, to open formal talks between the two parties. On 8
February, Akahata printed a communique which, while preserving
the JCP's formal independence and autonomy (they still refused to
attend an international conference to excommunicate the CCP from
the movement), nevertheless represented a rapprochement between
the CPSU and the JCP. They agreed to maintain close relations.
China's reaction was a charge that JCP was a Second International
revisionist party and an attack on JCP talk of Japan's justification for
427
maintaining an independent self-defense force.
425NCNA Peking 25 Jan 1968, SCMP 4109 p. 31.
426Moscow Domestic News Service (Russian), 29 Jan 1968.
Kyodo News Service 30 Jan 1968.
427NCNA Peking 16 Feb 1968, SCMP 4122, p. 23.
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In March 1968, a branch of the revolutionary left (calling
itself the JCP Left) was formed in Tokyo, joining those previously
formed in Osaka, Yamaguchi Prefecture, and other areas in the
southwest of Japan. Akahata replied on 10 March by publicizing the
fact that China pays its front organizations with trade concessions
in order to get them to follow its propaganda line. In the same month
occurred an incident which showed up Chinese tactics very clearly.
The JCP had argued against turning a planned national railroad strike
into a violent confrontation, and urged the holding of the strike on a
non-violent basis. China's press quickly picked this up and charged
that the JCP was opposed to the strike in toto
,
thus revealing its re-
actionary, anti-worker character. The JCP was forced on the
defensive and could do little else but issue a denial which did not re-
duce the effect of the Chinese charge on many elements in the Japanese
429
left. The following month, however, the JCP made a few points
more effectively. They complained about cooperation between the JCP
left with the Sasaki faction of the JSP in southwest Japan. At the same
time they charged that two years previously Liao Cheng-chih had told
a group of visiting Japanese educators that students should "rise up in
arms" to overthrow the reactionary Sato regime, and that in April
1968 a pro-Peking JCFA(O) member had quoted Chou En-lai as stating
there hadn't been enough blood at a recent demonstration in Japan.
428





Akahata, 15 Apr 1968.
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Chou was quoted as saying "the number of victims was too small" to
431
arouse the populace. The same month a delegation left for Moscow
432
to open a liaison office there.
The CCP-JCP split became essentially a contest for control
of the leftist movement in Japan. In May Miyamoto made a major bid
for a united action front of all leftists to bring about the abrogation of
433
the US security treaty. He also stepped up his campaign to attract
nationalist sentiment in Japan by repeating his support in principle
for a position of armed neutrality, including readiness to form an
independent self defense force. He attacked violence and "Trotskyites"
as bad tactics which gave the government an excuse for repressive
counter -action, and characterizing the JSP-CCP tie as a form of
434flunkeyism.
The high point of the JCP-CPSU rapprochement came in mid-
August with a communique from Moscow' promising to expand coopera-
435
tion between the two parties in the future, but the trend towards
support of the Soviet Union was brought to a rapid halt by the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia. On 21 September Akahata made a blister-
ing attack on the Soviet Union for the invasion, and on the Voice of
Japan faction (ex-JCP right) for supporting the Soviets' actions in
431Akahata, 22 Apr 1968.
432Nihon Keizai, 19 Apr 1968.
433
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East Europe. This event returned the JCP squarely to the autonomous-
independent camp in the international communist movement, a position
from which it has never strayed since.
The same month Akahata again attacked the JSP for being
436Chinese flunkeys, and replied to a blast from Peking about its
"following the parliamentary road", by reminding the Chinese that
Japan had learned the lessons of ultra-leftist adventurism and violence
437
in 1950, and was not about to repeat the mistake.
In November there was a spurt of propaganda from Peking,
quoting its friends in Japan in their praise for the decisions of the
Chinese Central Committee Plenum of that month, and trying to give
the impression that all true leftists in Japan supported China's
438
policies. Akahata maintained a studious silence. In December
Jen Min Jih Pao's Commentator accused Miyamoto of collusion with
Japanese reactionaries in seeking an anti-Chinese Russo-Japanese
alliance.
In January 1969 Miyamoto's opposition to the student rioting
was used by the Chinese to accuse him of being a tool of US imperial-
440
ist repression of Japanese liberties. At the same time an article
436Akahata, 23 Sep 1968.
4 Akahata, 20 Sep 1968.
438
°NCNA Peking 11 Nov 1968, SCMP 4300 p. 24.
NCNA Peking 12 Nov 1968, SCMP 4301 p. 29.
NCNA Peking 14 Nov 1968, SCMP 4302 p. 35.
NCNA Peking 15 Nov 1968, SCMP 4303 p. 21.
NCNA Peking 19 Nov 1968, SCMP 4306 p. 23.
439NCNA Peking 20 Dec 1968, SCMP 4326 p. 18.
440NCNA Peking 21 Jan 1969, SCMP 4346 p. 26.
NCNA Peking 27 Jan 1969, SCMP 4351 p. 27.
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by a "group of workers" was printed on the need to "smash the
44 1parliamentary road and the legal struggle. " The JCP main-
tained silence this time. In March, it reinforced its neutrality in
the Sino-Soviet split by condemning both sides equally for the border
442
incidents. In April it returned to the attack, accusing the Chinese
Ninth Party Congress of having undemocratically installed the Maoist
"Junta" in power, and again attacking the Japanese "Trotskyites"
443
for needless and provocative violence. It also attacked the LDP
for truckling to China in signing the 1969 LT agreement with its
444
fawning communique. Again attacking violence and "Trotskyites",
Akahata accused the NCNA of trying to turn Okinawa Day celebrations
into a bloody riot which would antagonize the masses and damage the
445
struggle for socialism. It attacked the designation of Lin Piao as
446Mao's heir, the new constitution passed by the Ninth CCP Congress
447
as undemocratic and a result of Mao's packing of the central com-
448
mittee. They also again pleaded with the JSP to break with the
449JCFA(O) and return to support of the JCFA. The Chinese reaction
44 1 NCNA Peking 26 Jan 1969, SCMP 4351 p. 24.
44?
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articles written by pro-Peking leftists.
In July and August the JCP reaffirmed its neutrality by re-
fusing to attend a Moscow conference and repeating its attack on the
451
Soviet Union for its Czechoslovakian policy. It also attacked
Radio Peking for Trotskyite adventurism in supporting violent demon-
452
strations. Miyamoto also made an attempt to reunite the anti-
bomb movement in August, but the three separate organizations held
three separate meetings. The decade ended with Japanese leftists
hopelessly divided into a number of mutually antagonistic groups and
with the JCP itself maintaining an autonomous stand in the movement,
its only foreign allies being the Koreans, the Italians, and the
Rumanians.
NCNA Peking 19 May 1969, SCMP 4423 pp. 22, 23.
4 Akahata
,
5 Jun and 21 Aug 1969.




From the review of Sino- Japanese relations during the nine-
teen sixties presented in the last chapter, it is obvious that trade
between the two countries makes up a large portion of their relations.
If one takes a materialistic viewpoint, trade makes up the largest
portion of the substance of relations: relatively insubstantial propa-
ganda and polemics are the only competitors for importance, with
cultural relations taking a distinctly minor place in the scheme.
Indeed, we have characterized the most stable, productive, and close
phase of relations in the nineteen sixties by the operation of the Liao-
Takaski Memorandum Trade Agreement.
Trade is also important because the Japanese say it is. It is
their explicit desire to be free to conduct mutually beneficial trade
with China to the maximum extent possible, without at the same time
involving them in difficulties with other nations with whom they have
close ties, the United States and the Republic of China. This is the
policy repeatedly expressed by all post-occupation prime ministers;
the "separation of politics and economics". The importance of this
phrase is increased by explicit Chinese denial of the possibility of
separating politics and economics, insisting on combining the two,
and at different times and under various circumstances forcefully




A look at Sino- Japanese relations inevitably raises the question
of whether politics and economics can in fact be separated, whether
China will let Japan benefit from trade relations without paying a
political price. A first attempt to answer this question involves re-
viewing the history of trade between the two countries, seeking for
evidence that points in one way or the other. Unfortunately there is
a multitude of evidence pointing in both ways. The whole idea of
"friendly trade" is that companies wishing to trade with China must
pay a political price: financial support for pro-Chinese organizations
and fronts in Japan, domestic political pressure on the Japanese
government to adopt policies the Chinese want, public expressions of
friendship for China, support for China's views, praise for China's
accomplishments, and kowtows to Mao's thought. This same concept
applies to non-friendly, or LT trade, only more subtly and less publicly
(at least until 1968 when the distinction between friendly and LT trade
began to break down). In return for LT trade, China clearly hopes that
big business circles would put the opportunity for profit ahead of their
ideological objections to communism, and seek to move Japan away
from the US and toward China. The public rationale for permitting LT
trade given by the Chinese was that it would help in fostering and making
easier gradual steps to a closer political relationship between the two
countries.
Evidence on the other side is less clear but equally compelling.
Several times Chinese leaders have tied potential increases in trade
with Japan to economic conditions within China, saying something to
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the effect that "a good harvest this year enables us to trade more".
Similarly many observers of the Chinese scene have noted that the
Chinese need some goods from overseas, and they need to sell their
own goods to earn foreign exchange to pay for imports. Trade is
desired by China, irrespective of the fact that they want to use it to
extract political concessions. The conclusive evidence, however, is
the LT agreement itself. The Chinese did permit trade to increase
rapidly between 1963 and 1966, at a time when the Japanese made no
particular concessions to them in political terms.
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The most dramatic single event in this area itself points both
ways. The cancellation of contracts for a freighter and a vinylon plant
in the spring of 1965 because of Japanese "hostility" can be adduced as
evidence that trade is ultimately a political tool for China. Yet it is
equally valid to argue that, since China couldn't get good credit terms
to buy these two items, they simply could not afford them on the terms
they were offered. They therefore cancelled them primarily for econo-
mic reasons no matter what public face they put upon their action.
If analysis of the facts of Sino- Japanese trade does not help
answer the question, the same can be said for the facts we have on the
domestic Chinese economy. In this realm, however, the cause of the
difficulty is largely the utter insufficiency of data and information. In
an issue of Communist Affairs which devoted a major amount of space
to this very question, three of the most authoritative analysts of the
Chinese economy concluded that there are domestic constraints on
China's trade which play a large but undetermined and, ultimately,
indeterminable role in forming Chinese trade policy. The extent of
this role is ultimately unknowable because foreign trade is, after all,
a very small part of overall Chinese economic activity, and the reliability
and accuracy of the data available are so poor that the total foreign trade
could be comprehended within the margin for error which must be
2
allowed in dealing with the data.
2
Robert F. Dornberger, "The Factors Influencing China's Trade";
Dwight H. Perkins, "Impact of Trade on China's Planning";
Alexander Eckstein, "Foreign Trade of China: A Summary Appraisal";
all in Communist Affairs, Vol. 5, no. 3, May-Jun 1967.
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It seems valid to conclude, therefore, that the question has
no answer which we can get at with any degree of reliability, if this
is so, then perhaps we are really asking the wrong question to begin
with. What, after all, does "the separation of politics and economics"
really mean. By any ordinary definition of the term politics, it is
clear that China and Japan do have a political relationship with each
other. The only relationship they don't have is the formal diplomatic
one in which ambassadors are mutually exchanged and officially re-
ceived. What the Japanese government means by their slogan, then,
can be nothing more than a desire to trade with China, while at the
same time not establishing diplomatic relations with Peking and breaking
them with Taipei. By contrasting, then, economic and formal diplomatic
relations between the two countries, it is not at all difficult to make some
kind of an answer to the question of the relation between the two.
First, it is clear that Japan has no desire to break with Taipei
and establish relationships with Peking unless it has to. It is unhappy
with the present dilemma, but fears it less than possibilities of trade
disruption which would result from action to break out of it. Second,
China has made it equally clear that it will use trade offers and trade
threats to gain a maximum of concessions, but without going to the
extreme of presenting Japan with an ultimatum of "no recognition, no
trade". To do so would be to reduce its ability to exert pressure on
Japan through trade channels. Given the overwhelming importance of
Japan's trade with western countries, any posing of the issue in terms

142.
of either one or the other could have but one answer in terms of Japan's
best interests. Such a confrontation would be foolish for China. Trade
policy is not likely to be the determinant of the question of diplomatic
recognition,
Japan will one day see it in her interest to reverse the present
situation of formal relations with Taipei and informal relations with
Peking (in a recent address one authoritative American observer of
the Asian scene expected this to occur by the middle seventies). But
when it does so it will be a political decision for political reasons,
and it will reflect the changing political realities of Asian international
politics and not the result of a Chinese trade policies.

SELECTED ANALYSES OF CHINA'S JAPAN POLICY
Perspectives on international politics. A careful reading of the
policy statements about Japan in the Chinese press for the past ten
years reveals a considerable amount of consistency and continuity in
Chinese foreign policy. That this period encompassed eras in which
China was controlled by competing sections of its elite at different
times underscores the consistencies. (In a subsequent section of this
chapter the differences in policy between the Maoist and non-Maoist
phases will be discussed. ) Comparison of this decade with the con-
clusions of scholars who have studied preceding decades also emphasizes
the continuities in basic Chinese foreign policy.
The first major theme, in terms of the frequency of its mention
and the intensity of its exposition, is the desire to remove United States
influence from Japan, from Northeast Asia, and in fact from Asia as a
whole. China has consistently demanded abrogation of the US-Japan
Mutual Security Treaty and the expulsion of all US military forces from
the Japanese islands. She has consistently objected to every incident
of consultation, cooperation, or even discussion between the United
States and Japan in matters pertaining to defense, security, or strategy.
She has repeatedly condemned economic ties between the United States
and Japan as being hostile to China, imperialistic as regards to Asia




Japan and carries out its aggressive designs on Asia through its
domination of Japanese monopoly capitalists. Whether Japanese
capitalists are seen as willing or unwilling tools of the US depends
upon the circumstances and attitudes of the moment. China has con-
sistently characterized every aspect of US-Japanese relations during
this decade as imperialistic, exploitative, aggressive, and as a con-
tinuation of the Occupation.
A similar, though more recent concern of the PRC has been
Japanese cooperation and relations with the Soviet Union. This concern
only became overt after the public rift between China and the USSR in
1963. Since that time articles, editorials, and other comments have
objected to Russo-Japanese ties with almost the frequency of US-
Japanese ties. In the matter of intensity, some of the language used
to refer to the Soviet Union has exceeded that used to refer to the US.
Again, every aspect of Russo-Japanese relations has been attacked:
trade, political talks, air transport agreements, fisheries agreements,
economic aid, cooperation in Siberia, etc. All such events have been
seen as displaying hostility towards China, of representing collusion
or conspiracy directed against China.
The same consistency is evident in Chinese views on Japan's
relations with lesser powers in Asia. In every case Japan's foreign
dealings have been attacked: with South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia,
India, Tibet, Southeast Asia in general, Australia and New Zealand,
and the Phillipines. The attack has covered every aspect of these
relations: strategic, political, trade, cultural, and economic aid.
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Objection has been voiced whether these relations are in an Asian or
a world context, whether multilateral or bilateral. In every case
these relations are viewed as hostile to China, as indications of
either Japanese or (through Japan) US aggressiveness and warmonger-
ing. I cannot find one single instance in the primary materials of the
sixties in which China remarked on Japan's foreign dealings with other
Asian powers either favorably or indifferently.
The only relationship between Japan and the rest of the world
upon which China has looked with favor is that of a four non-aggression
pact between China, Japan, the US, and the Soviet Union, an eventuality
which is not distinguished at this point in Asian history by its degree of
likelihood or feasibility.
I conclude, therefore, that China wishes Japan to have no
foreign relations except with China. It can be argued that the existence
of the US treaty, the Sino-Soviet conflict, and Japan's aggressive history
make such a stance reasonable and understandable for China. My
answer is that if an honest and genuine security concern were behind
China's position on this subject, it would be obviously to its benefit to
encourage peaceful and non-threatening ties between Japan and other
Asian states which would reduce Japanese dependence upon either the
US or the Soviet Union, and would lower the incentives for Japan to
build up its own military forces. It has done nothing of the sort.
China's stated positions on Japan's foreign relations resemble nothing
so much as Stalin's views on foreign relations among the East European
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satellites and between them and Western powers in the period from
1945 to 1953, a period when it was easier to go from Czechoslovakia
to West Germany than it was to go from Prague to Warsaw.
This policy of China's can be looked at from several per-
spectives: the classical Chinese tribute system, traditional balance
of power politics, or the world revolution. From any of these per-
spectives it is inescapable that China wants and hopes to achieve
hegemony in Asia, to prevent any other major Asian power from
enhancing its role through alliance or cooperation with other Asian or
non-Asian powers. Whether China wishes to conquer other Asian
powers in the traditional sense of the word is not the point. It is that,
by whatever means is necessary and appropriate, China wishes to
exercise a controlling veto on any ties between Japan and the outside
world. Japan's foreign policies, in short, must be satisfactory to
China. They are only likely to be satisfactory if they are to a large
measure coordinated with and subservient to China's own foreign
policies, and are in no sense competitive or conflicting with them.
This may strike the reader as an extreme conclusion, so
I must emphasize that I am speaking here about what I believe China
would like to see develop. I am not referring to a situation which I
think China is going to actively pursue by any and all means. After
all, it could be argued that a dominant influence over the foreign
policies of neighboring states would be the secret wish of diplomats
in Washington as well as Peking. The wish is neither case is likely
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to be father to deeds of an extreme nature. Nevertheless the fact of
the wish (what at least I believe to be a fact) is important for one
major reason: it shows that China and Japan are not likely to achieve
any kind of harmony of policies and programs except in the case of
domination of one by the other. In the nature of things today Japan
and China are and will indefinitely remain rivals for influence in Asia,
not to speak of the world at large, and that any true rapprochement or
detente between the two major Asian powers is likely to be limited in
either time or scope or both, and in fact is extremely unlikely except
in the event of a major threat to both developing from a single external
source which both perceive to be a common threat and a serious one.
Such an eventuality is clearly what China means to foreshadow in its
constant iteration of the 1959 Asanuma statement that US imperialism
is the common enemy of China and Japan. But not even the JSP really
believe this in any operational or strategic sense.
Perspectives on Japan's domestic politics . During the past ten
years China has concerned itself with, and been under no compunctions
to express itself about, almost every aspect of Japan's domestic life.
It has expressed opinions on legislation before the Diet, cases before
the Supreme Court, decisions of the Cabinet, and acts of the various
executive departments. In articles and editorials in the party press, in
messages from various official and semi-official mass or functional
organizations, in speeches before mass rallies held in Peking, in
speeches given by visitors in Japan, and in conversations with Japanese
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visitors to China, all reported and publicized in both Japanese and
English by NCNA, China has attacked some aspects of Japan's domestic
life, praised others, and actively supported some groups against others
in domestic Japanese conflicts and controversies. It has repeatedly
provided moral and verbal support to a wide variety of domestic pro-
testors, dissenters, and rioters. Through its sponsorship of"friendly"
trading companies it has helped provide financial support to leftist
groups either engaged in or supporting or organizing demonstrations.
Through direct contacts, both in China and Japan, between its own and
Japan's leftist youth organizations it has participated in the indoctrination
of young militant radicals. Through public pronouncements, private
manipulations, and the bestowal of trade privileges it has sought to
influence the policy and personnel of Japan's three major political
parties. In brief, short of actual physical force, China has used every
modern technique of organization and communications to interfere
directly and substantively in Japan's domestic affairs.
In the majority of these cases, but by no means all, China's
concern has been with domestic matters having foreign policy implications;
but all of these interpositions can be categorized as support for opposition,
dissent, or revolution against the authorities, conformity, and stability,
for parties of the left against parties of the right; for socialist decisions
against capitalist decisions. More significant, China's support has been
for causes and organizations which are in sympathy with its own current




I believe that these facts of the past decade, taken together
with the explicit statements of Mao, Lin and others, lead to the in-
escapable conclusion that China wants, is working for, and in the long
run expects a revolution in Japan which will overthrow the existing
government and constitution and put in their place a government and
constitution similar to that of China itself, a government which will
coordinate its domestic as well as its international policies with China.
Again it is important to note that there is no indication of any-
intent on the part of the Chinese to use any means to achieve this end
other than those it has already used up to this time. In every case in
which threats of force have been either explicit or implicit, including
mention of nuclear weapons, the subject has been purely international
(particularly with regard to the use of US bases for operations in Asia)
or with reference to the plans and equipment of the Japanese Self
Defense Forces. In no case have such threats been used where the
subject matter was purely domestic.
It could be argued that what I have described above does not
represent China's maximum program or goal for Japan, but is only a
Chinese reaction to what it sees as the present danger to its own
security created by the US presence in Japan and the gradual rebuilding
of Japan's own military forces. Such an argument would interpret
Chinese interference in Japan during the past decade as merely a means
to a much more immediate and more limited end, namely the expulsion
of United States forces from Japan, an end to the US-Japanese alliance,
and pending that development maximum inhibitions on the use of either
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Japanese or US military forces in Northeast Asia. Chinese support
of anti-US demonstrations can be interpreted as attempts to reduce
the level of US military presence and circumscribe US freedom to use
its forces; attacks on various laws before the Diet can be seen in turn
as helping to prevent the government from interfering in those anti-
US demonstrations. Maneuvering to bring about a defeat of the LDP
in favor of the JSP can be seen as an effort to install a government
which would be more likely to abrogate the Security Treaty and expel
US military forces. Such an argument would deny that China's maximum
program has any substantive interest in Japan's domestic politics, and
that domestic interference today has a purely international purpose.
The answer to this argument lies in Chinese actions today
vis-a-vis the Japan Communist Party and the Japan Socialist Party.
Both these parties have repeatedly expressed, and worked towards
the implementation of policies which would meet every reasonable
security interest of the PRC. Yet in the case of the JCP, as soon as it
adopted a position which was opposed to that of China with respect to
Vietnam, that is "united action" within the international communist
movement against the US war in Vietnam and a "parliamentary road"
to the achievement of socialism in Japan, China immediately mounted
a massive attempt to force it to change those policies, and failing at
that, to build a new leftist movement in Japan which would compete
with and, eventually, supplant the JCP as the "vanguard" of the anti-
imperialist and anti-capitalist united front. With regard to the JSP,
China has consistently condemned the JSP policy of "positive neutralism"
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in international policies and "structural reform" in domestic politics,
both policies which, if implemented, could represent no conceivable
threat to China's essential security interests. The only time China
has been willing to ally itself with a faction of the Japanese left which
did not give complete concurrence with Chinese policies was during
1967 and 1968 when the Narita faction of the JSP was in power in the
party, a period when the break with the JCP was complete and thorough
and before the JCP left groups were organized and operating. This
was the period when the potential allies for China in Japan's political
life were limited to the Narita led JSP and China had little choice but
to accept an ally which was in general though not complete agreement
with China's policy positions.
Chinese views with respect to Komeito are very difficult to
determine at this stage. I have found no specific reference to this
party in any of the Chinese documents nor any mention of a Chinese
policy toward Komeito in any secondary sources. This absence of a
stated policy may be due to Chinese uncertainty as to the real intent
of Komeito similar to :our own ignorance on the matter. But it is
fairly clear the Komeito does oppose the US Security Treaty, the
presence of US military forces, and the growth of the Japanese military.
If China's interests were in fact nothing more than her own security,
one might expect her to express some approval of Komeito for advocating
such policies. She has not.
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China's words and actions with regard to the anti-bomb
movement in Japan are equally indicative of its belief in its right to
interfere in Japanese domestic politics. China has consistently
demanded the right to exercise a veto over who may or may not
attend the annual conferences, and over the resolutions to be discussed
and passed at those conferences. When its demands have been ignored
by the Japanese sponsors, it has refused to continue to participate
and recalled its delegates to Peking for rallies and speeches putting
forth its own line without opposition. One of the most blatant (and
offensive to the Japanese left) acts or interference during the entire
decade occurred in August 1965 when a delegate of the ACFTU in
speaking before a SOHYO convention arrogantly demanded that SOHYO
change its position on rather mild condemnation of the Chinese nuclear
weapons program, and press the JSP to do likewise.
I do not believe a sense of threat to its own security interests
can explain the totality of Chinese policies and program with respect
to Japan's domestic policies in the past decade, although it can be
considered related to many of them. Consequently I believe that the
maximum Chinese goal does include what amounts to hegemony in
.Japan, in effect a role which is comparable to the role Japan tried to
play in Manchuria and North China from 1900 to 1937, but without the
use of military forces to support that role.
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Foreign policy and domestic crises . The parallel shift in the
fifties in domestic and foreign policy at the time of the Great Leap
Forward inevitably raises the question of whether there has been a
similar parallelism in the shifts of the sixties. Has the pendulum
swung from moderation to extremism in both foreign and domestic
affairs simultaneously? An immediate answer, based upon the ob-
vious surface facts, must be affirmative.
As the Chinese moderated their domestic affairs from the end
of the Qreat Leap Forward, they also became easier to deal with in
Japan. From I960 to 1963 as the radicalism of the Great Leap receded
more and more into the background, China progressively lowered the
political price for a resumption of trade relations. In 1963 and 1964
at the extreme rightward end of the swing, trade with Japan grew rapidly
and with relatively little demand for political concessions in return.
Propaganda and polemics were discernibly milder than theretofore,
and less frequently involved personal vituperation against the Japanese
prime minister as opposed to rather general attacks on un-named re-
actionaries. The united front which China urged be formed within
Japan to struggle against US imperialism was extended to include
almost everyone in Japan except the US ambassador and the ghost of
Tojo. Japanese monopoly capitalists, although not identified as such,
were wined and dined in Peking along with their more progressive
compatriots, and Chinese officials like Nan Han-chen and Liao Cheng-
chih were not averse to being seen and heard in what cannot be called
anything but reactionary ruling circles.

154.
As the Cultural Revolution gradually appeared in 1965, this
aura of friendliness and accommodation began to disperse. At the
very beginning of 1965, the contract for a vinylon plant was cancelled
because of a denial of Export Import Bank funding, even though the
year before a similar contract, also not funded by a low rate EIB credit,
was carried out without demur. Attacks in the press on Japan became
more virulent and more personal, and aimed at wider circles within
Japan. Those who during the early sixties were seen as unfortunate
tools of US imperialism, themselves suffering under the oppression
of US monopoly capitalism, were more and more characterized as
equally guilty and equally profiting and equally oppressive and aggressive
with the US. Talk about the unbreakable friendship between the Chinese
and Japanese people, was turned into talk about the iron will and un-
flinching resolve of 700 million Chinese to resist aggression, and
prevent the rebirth of Japanese militarism.
As the Cultural Revolution set in in earnest in 1966 and
succeeding years, the violence of the polemics increased, correspond-
ents and businessmen were abused, arrested, and expelled, and visitors
and traders were compelled to make formal obeisance to the thought of
Mao Tse-tung and the excellence of the Cultural Revolution, and to admit
the criminality of their own government's policies. From talk of struggle
against imperialism, Jen Min Jih Pao began to talk of armed and violent
struggle, and (at least so it was charged by Akahata ) even such a
moderate as Chou En-lai was reported to have been distressed because
there weren't enough victims at a Japanese street demonstration.
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There is another evidence of this parallelism in which Sino-
Japanese relations are particularly illuminating. Most of the Cultural
Revolution can be described in terms of the gradual ascendancy of the
Mao-Lin line over the Liu-T'eng line as guides for Chinese policy,
the former being more militant and less compromising than the latter.
In the development of the dispute between the CCP and the JCP this
duality of line and the predominance of one over the other is clear and
unequivocal. The evidence is overwhelming that in 1965 the JCP began
to have grave doubts about some aspects of the policy being recom-
mended to it by Peking. It was concerned over the adventurism seem-
ingly condoned by the Chinese in Indonesia, over the militancy of the
Lin Piao thesis on people's war, over the growing pressures from
China to raise the level of violence and militancy within Japan and
decrease the effort to accomplish economic reforms and to progress
toward socialism by parliamentary as well as extra-parliamentary
methods. The JCP chose to make its stand on the issue of the correct
road in terms of supporting "united action" of all socialist countries,
including the Soviet Union, against the Americans in Vietnam. I think
in this case the policy of united action can be taken as the symbol of a
general line of relative detente in international politics, emphasizing
peaceful coexistence rather than national liberation. In February 1966
Miyamoto went to China to try and sell this line to Peking, and made
side trips to Hanoi and Pyongyang presumably to garner Vietnamese
and Korean support for this proposal. In his negotiations with the CCP
leadership he is reported to have succeeded in reaching a compromise
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with Liu Shao-chi and T'eng Hsiao-ping, a compromise which was
embodied in a communique to be issued on his return to Japan. Before
he left, however, he spoke to Mao, and Mao flatly refused to authorize
the compromise communique, preferring to issue none at all. Mao
thus completely overruled Liu and T'eng in this matter.
Miyamoto came back to Japan and had his position approved
by the central executive committee of the JCP, thus refusing himself
to submit to Mao's will. In return by the end of the year the Chinese
press began to make more and more overt attacks on the JCP, at the
same time instituting a campaign to weaken the JCP by splitting all the
front organizations which were its main source of funds, public support,
and workers. By the Spring of 1967, at the height of the Cultural
Revolution and the domestic attacks on the "capitalist roaders", the
split with the JCP was total and public.
The point has been made that the decision on foreign policy in
1965 represented by the Lin Piao speech, was for a policy of strategic
defense rather than offense, paralleled with an emphasis on irregular
warfare to defend China against attack, rather than an emphasis on
modernized armed forces to give China a more effective offensive
military capability. In this analysis, the foreign policy associated
with the Cultural Revolution is seen as verbally loud but actually re-
strained. In the matter of Sino- Japanese relations, however, I do not
think this analysis is very enlightening. Chinese policy towards Japan
has been about 99 percent verbal under all circumstances. At no time
since the founding of the PRC has there been any visible sign of physical
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aggression toward Japan. Hence with regard to Japan, as opposed to
India, South-east Asia, or the Soviet Union, the increased militancy
of the verbal war can be viewed as applying to Chinese overall policy
toward Japan. It represented a political offensive and not just a
defensive posture covered by bluster.
Effects of the Sino-Soviet split. The gradual development of
public hostility between China and the Soviet Union during the sixties
has been perhaps the most profound and widely significant event of
the decade. It has produced a total rearrangement of the worldwide
international power equation which is likely to continue to affect the
whole world for some time to come. Japan, both as an Asian power
and as a world power, has been no more immune to the effects of this
development than any other state. We have already mentioned above
very briefly one effect of the split, namely the Chinese fears of, and
political attack against, any combination of Soviet and Japanese power
in East Asia. The question now is what has been the total effect of
the Sino-Soviet split upon Sino- Japanese relations.
The most obvious effect, and perhaps in the long run the most
important for Japan has been the effect upon the Japan Communist Party.
From a situation in which the JCP was a bona fide member of the inter
-
national communist movement, subordinating some if not all of its
policies and programs to the interests of the Soviet Union and China,
there has arisen a situation in which the JCP is by and large an inde-
pendent political party, concerned primarily with Japanese interest,
although it still shares some general goals and policies with the major
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socialist countries. These goals and policies are now interpreted in
almost entirely Japanese terms and are concerned with the develop-
ment of Japanese society and government for what they conceive of as
the betterment of that society and government, rather than as the
development of a pawn in the international power struggle to be played
as Moscow or Peking might see fit. The direct consequence of this
autonomy has been a change in the JCP from a party of revolution to
a party of reform, from a party seeking a destruction of the existing
polity to a party seeking to effect change within the existing polity.
It would not be impermissible to speculate, I think, that this change in
the programs and attitude of the JCP may in the next decade or so
permit what heretofore has been impossible, a majority government
of the left in Japan somewhat similar to the center left coalition which
has been trying to govern Italy. This in turn could have profound and
lasting effects on the entire future course of Japanese history. In
terms of international relations this could mean, in the long run, a
Japan adopting a distinctly more neutralist position between the US
and China or between the US and the Soviet Union than is now the case.
A subsidiary effect of this JCP autonomy has been the rise of
a new revolutionary left in Japan not under the somewhat restraining
hands of the JCP. This too may prove to be a momentous development
in Japanese politics, with consequences we cannot at all foresee now.
It should be noted, however, that this new left in Japan is distinctly
Maoist in ideology and probably has very close ties with China. The
consequences of this are not really predictable. The militancy of the

159.
new left may be controllable by China or it may not. As long as China
maintains a militant posture on such matters as violent revolution it
is likely that the interests of the new left and China will coincide. The
possibility, however, that the pendulum in China will swing back towards
moderation cannot be denied, and in that event the kind of relationship
which will exist between the new left and China cannot even be guessed
at today.
There is a certain amount of irony in this complex of develop-
ments within the Japanese left. None of them can be really regarded
as having been intended by either China or the Soviet Union. It is fairly
clear that the autonomous position of the JCP today is primarily a result
of first Soviet and then Chinese truculence and intransigence. The JCP
made every conceivable effort to avoid antagonizing either side in the
split. They only moved towards one side or the other during the past
decade when they felt it necessary to avoid the excessive interference
in their own affairs being exerted by one of the competitors. The shift
toward China in the early part of the decade was undoubtedly a result
of Soviet meddling and insistence on JCP cooperation against China.
The shift back toward the Soviet Union in the latter half of the decade
was similarly almost entirely a result of the same tactics on the part
of Peking"; Had either or both been willing to leave the JCP in a position
of neutrality between them, I have little doubt that such neutrality would




The effects of the split on the Japan Socialist Party have been
in some ways similar to its effects on the JCP, although of course the
starting point and the process itself were quite different. The JSP was
never a member of the international communist movement in any sense,
and has always been primarily nationalistic and Japan centered. The
only real tie between the JSP and either the Soviet Union or China has
been the unique pro-Peking wing of the JSP, the Heiwa Doshikai.
There has been no comparable pro-Soviet wing as there was in the
JCP. The major ties between the JSP and the communist countries in
general has been mainly a matter of similar views on ideology and
politics and a consequent sympathy for communist interpretations and
positions in the east-west conflict of the post-war years. This sympathy
has played a definite role in the JSP's urging the government of Japan
to adopt policies more in tune with those of China. The Sino-Soviet split,
however, led to a Chinese attempt to establish considerably more in-
fluence within the JSP than any but the Heiwa Doshikai were willing to
accept. The consequence has been a renewed determination on the part
of the main stream of the JSP, now apparently in reasonably solid con-
trol of the party, to escape from the dragon's embrace and to maintain .
its policy of neutrality in the east-west conflict. Again the irony comes
into play which I pointed to with respect to the JCP. Had China not tried
so hard to achieve so much, she might have ended up with far more
influence on the JSP than she now has.
As far as state relations as opposed to party relations are
concerned, the Sino-Soviet split has had much less direct effect on Sino-
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Japanese relations. The Soviet Union has done a great deal to woo
Japanese friendship and cooperation during the past decade, and there
is little doubt that the pace and the scope of these efforts has been
affected by her dispute with China. But the China dispute has by no
means been the only motivation behind Russia's diplomatic and economic
offensive in Japan and it is unlikely that it has made a substantive
difference in Soviet policy. It has, of course, meant opportunities for
Japan to benefit from closer relations with the Soviet Union than might
otherwise be the case.
The Chinese effort during the sixties can hardly be described
as wooing in the same sense. Mao's comment on the justice of Japan's
claim to the southern Kuriles hardly falls in this category. It was the
very epitome of a self-serving and cheap way of posing as the friend of
Japan. It meant a small propaganda success in Japan incidental to
Mao's real aim, which was to indicate to the Soviet Union that making
a fuss about borders was more dangerous to the Soviet Union than to
China. It was an inexpensive statement because no one could ever really
expect him to do anything to help Japan realize its claim.
Other than this one non-event (as I think it was) China has done
no wooing at all. There is no evidence that the Chinese have ever said
to Japan "don't deal with the Russians on such and such a matter, we
will offer you a better deal". The Chinese response to the Soviet-
Japanese rapprochement has been almost exclusively a political offensive
to characterize Soviet- Japanese relations as hostile to China, collusive
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and conspiratorial, and dangerous to Japan because likely to incur
disastrous consequences or at least postpone indefinitely a rapproche-
ment with China. Whereas Russia has offered the carrot, China has
only brandished a stick (albeit a purely verbal one). The result does
not seem to have vindicated China's tactics. Japan is and probably will
continue to reap some economic and political benefits from Soviet policy,
but does not seem to have been deterred from dealing with the Russians
because of Chinese polemics. It is even possible to argue that China's
intransigence has been so severe on this point that the Sato government
has seen no likelihood of improving things by making concessions, and
has therefore largely ignored the Chinese propaganda.
< The past in this matter is, of course, no kind of guide to the
future. Should China adopt more moderate policies during the seventies,
including more in the way of economic and diplomatic competition with
the Soviet Union for Japanese friendship, the results might be quite
different from what they have been till now. This again, of course, is
only speculation. The only solid result of the Sino-Soviet split which
is likely to be irreversible for the next several years is the continuation
of a state of affairs in which Japan is not faced with a combined Russo-
Chinese hostile force, and in which, therefore, there is greater safety
for Japan, greater opportunity for her to maneuver for her own benefit,
and in the long run the prospect of a more pluralistic and fluid power
situation in the whole of East Asia.
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Japan's place in China's world. All communist states devote a
great deal of time and verbiage to defining or prescribing the place of
their foreign protagonists in an ideological schema. This is true of
China with respect to Japan. Articles in theoretical journals are
devoted to analyzing Japan for purposes of fitting it into the Marxist-
Leninist schema. Similar definitions and ascriptions can be found
implicitly in speeches and editorials which deal with specific problems
or topics. Finally China's view of Japan can be inferred from specific
policies and programs which are a part of China's actual foreign
relations. A review of all these types of sources discloses that
Japan's place in China's world is ambiguous.
In theoretical articles, Japan is fairly well defined as an
advanced capitalist/imperialist country. She is seen as a country
with a highly developed capitalist system, where the bourgeoisie are
in firm command, and where capitalist concentration into monopoly
capital has proceeded quite far. Frequent reference in economic
analyses to the imminence of impending breakdown because of the
intense number and level of antagonistic contradictions, make it clear
that in purely theoretical terms at least, Japan is classed with the
United States and western European countries. Among the important
consequences of this classification are the belief that contradictions
between Japan and other advanced capitalist nations, including the
United States, are also highly antagonistic and likely to lead to conflict.
Internally the high level of capitalist concentration also presupposes an
advanced state of "immiseration" on the part of the masses, with an
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accompanying advanced state of class consciousness in a well developed
proletariat which ought thereby to be ripe for revolution, a revolution
which it is China's proletarian internationalist duty to support and
foster.
This is the ideological basis for much of China's word output
on Japan especially the numerous editorials, articles, and messages
from Chinese mass organizations supporting various aspects of the
Japanese people's "struggle". The demonstrations against US bases,
nuclear powered submarine visits, continuation of the Security Treaty,
"repressive" Diet legislation proposal, treaties and agreements with
Taiwan and South Korea, student riots, demonstrations, and campus
occupations, and the more violent and prolonged labor disputes are
all seen as both evidence of the internal contradictions and as means
for heightening the class consciousness of the masses in preparation
for the socialist revolution.
In this perspective, the main enemy must of course be
identified as the Japanese monopoly capitalists and the instruments
of the state power which they control, as well as the foreign power
which props up that class and those instruments, the United States.
The support which the US gives also is convenient as an explanation of
why the socialist revolution has not already occurred and, even though
the country is ripe for it, probably will not occur very soon. Thus there
is no need to allude to theories of protracted conflict or guerrilla war-
fare to justify the need and expectation of a long and difficult struggle
before the revolution takes place.
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This image of Japan is reinforced by Chinese comments on
Japan's role in Asia. Seeing Japan as a political and commercial
rival to her own influence in the less developed countries of Asia,
China can attack Japan's foreign activities as aspects of the exploitative
imperialism common to an advanced capitalist nation. In almost every
article or editorial condemning Japanese dealings with Korea, Taiwan,
or the countries of South-east Asia, there is some reference to im-
perialist aggression, capitalist exploitation, revival of the "Greater
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere", or the like Japan's participation
in the Asian Bank and the Mekong project, for example, have been
characterized as both evidence of her "dream of domination" and as
ways for Japan to dump her surplus production and export her surplus
capital.
This view of Japan was not totally inconsistent with another
temporary view of her, namely as a country of the "second intermediate
zone" in Mao's intermediate zones policy of the mid-sixties. It is
perfectly legitimate in Marxism-Leninism to differentiate between
the bad and the worse, to put nations on a scale of hostility, and to
pick out one nation above all others as the main enemy. Having done
so it is perfectly legitimate, as China briefly did, to cooperate with
lesser enemies like France and Japan, against the main enemy, the
United States. This policy was maintained explicitly by China for only
a very short time, and was then dropped when no other countries of
this second intermediate zone followed France in breaking with Taiwan
and recognizing Peking. It has nonetheless continued to be current
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in Chinese foreign policy toward Japan, as well as to some of the
countries of western Europe. China still from time to time holds
out the offer of friendship and collaboration with the Japanese state
as now constituted, in return for cooperation in opposing the main
enemy of the era. This is one of the justifications for China's
continued dealings, uneven as they may be, with individuals of the
Liberal Democratic Party in Japan, and its unofficial dealings with
the government of Japan with regard to matters of trade, shipping,
fisheries, postal services, air transport, and other functional activities.
The changes in Chinese tactics over the course of the decade also
reinforce this image. Since dealing with capitalists always has some-
thing of the character of "rightist deviation" one would expect that
an intermediate zones type of policy would occur during relatively
moderate phases, and that in radical and leftist phases such a policy
would recede from prominence. That has been the case during the
sixties. It must be emphasized, however, that this is not an on-off,
either-or type of situation. Chinese policy operates on many levels
and in many directions at all times. Leftism and rightism are matters
of emphasis and concentration. Even at the peak of radicalism during
the Cultural Revolution, when relations with Japan and the LDP were
becoming increasingly strained, it was still clear that China was willing
to deal with Japan, and refrain from pushing her maximum program
with respect to Japan, as long as the possibility of driving a wedge
between Japan and the US existed. The decline in relations was never




I think this general view of Japan as an advanced capitalist
country, but one with whom a temporary alliance is possible in order
to concentrate on the main enemy, is the primary image on the basis
of which China decides most of her policy questions. I think it has
been the primary view for the entire history of China since 1949, and
will very likely remain dominant for several years to come. But it
is not the only image which China has of Japan. Japan is also an
Asian country, a colored country, and a country which was once sub-
ject to Western colonialism. There is also, therefore, a tendency
in Chinese policy to categorize Japan with the Afro-Asian world, or
Mao's third intermediate zone, rather than with the advanced world.
(It should be noted that the matter of color has never been explicitly
referred to by the Chinese in its relations with Japan. Many of its
phrases however imply a sense of racial community, and the Chinese
have never to my knowledge objected when Japanese like Matsumura
Kenzo have explicitly alluded to their common racial status. ) At Peking
rallies, banquets, and other ceremonial occasions, the Japanese are
almost always on the same platforms with other Afro-Asian countries.
Japanese members of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee are among
the more frequent visitors to Peking, as well as participants in con-
gresses of Afro-Asian writers, journalists, youth, etc. One of the
major figures in Sino- Japanese affairs, at least during the early sixties
before the Cultural Revolution, was Liao Cheng-chih, a high official
on the Chinese Afro-Asian Committee. Considerable effort was expended
during the early days of the Sino-Soviet split in getting Japan to agree
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to attend the abortive Second Bandung conference as an Afro-Asian
power, regardless of its status as a developed capitalist country solidly
in the capitalist bloc.
Undoubtedly much of this effort at dealing with Japan as ex-
colonial rather than colonialist is a matter of taking what allies one
can find and not bothering too much about the niceties. More likely
however, is it seen as one very good way to split Japan off from
Western Europe and the United States. Japan's national and racial
pride may be less outspoken than it was during the thirties, but it is
real and present in Japan today, and is one factor unifying the major
targets of Chinese pressure - the JSP and the old China hands of the
LDP. By concentrating propaganda on the common interests of Asian
nations against those of Western nations, China sees the possibility of
striking damaging blows at US influence in Japan. The fact that this
cannot easily be reconciled with the socio-economic classification of
Japan is simply ignored.
Japan's capitalist status is also ignored in one of the major
propaganda themes which has been directed at Japan over the decade,
the need for a mass united front of all classes and groups to oppose
the alliance with the US and its various instruments. China has had
no compunctions about including in this proposed united front the biggest
capitalists in Japan. Indeed at times it seems that the united front
she would like to see formed would include everyone in the country
except the prime minister himself, and since 1966, the Communist
Party. The subordination of an anti-capitalist revolution as a goal to

169.
that of expelling the United States troops and ending the alliance is
clear from every piece of primary documentation I have reviewed
for this study.
One aspect of the JCP-CCP split is instructive in this regard.
As a part of its general policy decision in 1965, China chose to mount
a campaign to publicize the imminence of a US invasion of the main-
land, probably as part of the Vietnam war effort. This was partly
aimed, no doubt, at building up a martial spirit within the country and
a willingness on the part of the Chinese people to accept extreme
measures. It may also have been intended in part to deter the US from
making any such attack by warning us that they were ready for us.
As far as Japan was concerned, however, one corollary of this policy
was a demand by China that the JCP get ready for an armed revolution
in Japan to so upset the situation in Japan as to prevent the US from
using Japan as a base for operations against the mainland. JCP leaders
were frankly appalled at the thought of mounting an armed revolution at
that time. They remembered the 1950 fiasco which had resulted in the
long term disruption of their party organization and hence their pro-
longed ineffectiveness during most of the fifties. They observed the
consequences of extreme steps taken in Indonesia in the same year and
they were totally convinced that the Japanese situation was in no way
ripe for revolution. They therefore refused to follow Mao's lead in
this, and this refusal was one of the major reasons for the split which
developed between the two parties in the last half of the decade. China
was clearly willing to sacrifice the JCP and what the JCP saw as the
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best policy for the circumstances, in order to protect China against
what was in itself a phony threat which they had created themselves
out of whole cloth for reasons of their own. As a result the JCP lost
its status in China's eyes as the vanguard of their proposed united
front, a status then ascribed to the revolutionary left splinter organi-
zations which sprang up after the JCP-CCP split. Even under these
circumstances, however, China did not end its talk of a united front,
nor did it exclude large capitalists from potential membership.
Having spoken of the ideologically phrased image of Japan
held by China's leaders, brief mention of more traditional Chinese
images are appropriate. These images are still real, even in a
Communist China, and they are not necessarily inconsistent with
the ideological image. The cultural affinity needs no extensive dis-
cussion: China is conscious of it as is Japan. Both are conscious,
too, that culturally Japan has always been peripheral to China, in a
sense subordinate (tributary if you will), and not a rival or equal
competitor. China would see nothing improper in a state of affairs
which saw Japan as younger brother showing filial respect and obedience
to elder brother. China should lead, Japan should follow.
Japan has on occasion, however, been a very unruly and un-
filial younger brother. China has not forgotten the Japanese aggressions
in the past hundred years, and has a healthy respect for Japanese
military potential. While frequently expressing a willingness to forgive
and forget, while emphasizing the eternal friendship between the two

171.
peoples, China continues to view Japan's rearmament with considerable
alarm, and loses no opportunity to attack it. Conversely China does
not forget that she herself has never really made a serious attempt to
invade and conquer Japan, and frequently plays on the theme of her
own peace-loving nature, her self-sufficiency and total lack of incentive
to ever become a serious military threat to Japan. This attitude (it
has seldom been explicit enough to be called a policy) has indeed been
well understood and largely accepted in Japan, where fear of Chinese
military invasion is all but non-existent. Even when threats of military
action have been made, as in China's remarks about US bases making
Japan into a nuclear target, she has succeeded in not arousing any fear
of an attack upon Japan itself. And it is probably true that China does
not see Japan as a potential invadee under any but the most remote
contingencies.
In summary, China sees Japan as a potential enemy, both
ideologically and traditionally, but distinctly subordinate in danger
to the main enemy of the era, the United States, and hence a potential




The overwhelming weight of evidence in the history of the
past ten years of Sino- Japanese relations must be thrown onto the
side of continuity of purposes and goals in Chinese policy, and against
any significant changes in either. Although the tactics with which
these goals are pursued may vary in the combination employed at
any given time, or in their tone and militancy, there is little sign
that the substance of Chinese policy toward Japan has changed, even
over the course of the last twenty years. These goals are a com-
bination derivable from traditional raison d'etat , and ideological
interests and values, with the emphasis on the latter two. More
exactly, raison d'etat supplies the major goals, but they are expounded,
explained, and justified in ideological terms.
We have not considered Japanese goals and interests in this
paper to any extent, but it is fairly safe to assume that they are
essentially based on similar considerations of national interest: a
desire for prestige and influence in Asia and the world commensurate
with their economic power, access to the world economy to permit
them to maintain and enhance their economic power, and maximum
independence and freedom of action to pursue their own policies in
their own way.
Making this assumption, it is extremely unlikely that the goals




desire for predominance in Asia is not likely to be satisfied with
anything less than a subordinate status for Japan, a status which
Japan will not accept. Even should Japan assume a far more neutral-
ist position in international politics than she does today, we can
expect China to be unsatisfied and to continue to press for Japan to
"lean more to one side". We can expect Japan to continue to resist.
The consequence is likely to be a continuation of the present four way
division of power in North-east Asia, with each power seeking to avoid
a combination of the others against it, and with each power avoiding
any overcommitment to another, so as to preserve maximum freedom
of action. North-east Asia is likely to remain, therefore, an arena
for the playing out of classical power politics among a group of nations
increasingly evenly matched.
Were this a non-nuclear age, the potential for violence in
such a situation would be high. Since it is a nuclear age, however,
inhibitions on violence are strong, and it is likely that the players
will restrain themselves. Until and unless there are basic changes
in the internal domestic politics of some of the actors, we can expect
an indefinite prolongation of the present situation.
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